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Abstract 
The international development cooperation landscape that has been 
largely dominated by the OECD-DAC members since the 1960s began to 
change in recent years with the ‘emergence’ and growing prominence of 
a group of ‘new’ development partners, many of which come from the 
Global South. Heated debate has since been going on around the so-
called ‘emerging donors’ but much of that is flawed by its DAC-
orientation, an almost exclusive focus on the ODA form of cooperation, 
as well as a lack of empirical evidence. Against this context, with an 
intent to further the current research on the Southern development 
partners, this thesis selects China, one of the most representative among 
them, and aims to investigate the Chinese ‘development package model’ 
through the case of its agricultural development cooperation policy and 
practice in Africa. Specifically, this thesis tries to explain how China’s 
current ‘package model’ of development cooperation has been shaped by 
its own decades-long history of aid-giving and reforms. At the same 
time, it attempts to explore how exactly the ‘package model’ has been 
played out on the ground, and especially how the innovative commercial 
elements have been incorporated and utilized in China’s agricultural 
development cooperation with Africa. Lastly, the thesis examines results 
of this new ‘package model’ of Chinese development cooperation so far 
provides a systematic explanation to why the ‘implementation gap’ exists 
in this specific policy issue. 
 
Based on a detailed historical review, the thesis argues that China’s own 
identity and experiences over the past decades have played a significant 
role in shaping its current model, and thus balances, to certain extent, the 
oft-seen ‘DAC/Northern-centric’ tendency of many in observing, judging 
and sometimes trying to assimilate the Chinese/Southern development 
cooperation model(s). The thesis also gives an in-depth treatment to the 
‘development package’ model through the case of Chinese agricultural 
cooperation with Africa and compares that with the emerging trend of 
‘development PPP’ in the Northern DAC community. It thus enriches the 
research on Southern development partners and that on development 
cooperation in general which both tend to focus almost exclusively on 
ODA. Furthermore, the thesis fills the gap of lack of empirical evidence 
in the existing literature by incorporating more project-level, fieldwork-
based case studies on the Chinese/Southern development cooperation 
model(s). By doing so, the thesis also points out a series of practical 
problems in the implementation phase that otherwise may not be 
identified, and more importantly provides a systematic explanation for 
that ‘implementation gap’.  
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From a theoretical perspective, in order to explain the abovementioned 
implementation challenges, this thesis adopts the ‘Public Policy 
Implementation (PPI)’ approach and establishes an analytical framework 
based on a ‘dialogue’ between the theoretical literature and the empirical 
data. It thus finds that three aspects – namely the policy per se that 
structures the implementation process, the policy implementer who are 
formally or informally mandated to carry out the policy, and the 
implementation environment wherein the policy is executed – have 
played a crucial and synergic role in accounting for the observed 
‘implementation gap’ of Chinese agricultural cooperation policy in 
Africa; the ‘implementer’ factor, furthermore, has weighed more strongly 
in this regard given its potential role in remedying policy imperfections 
and responding to adverse environment. This ‘policy-implementer-
environment’ framework may also serve as a useful analytical tool for 
analysing China’s development and foreign policy implementation in 
other fields in Africa and explaining the implementation results. 		
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Research Background 
The past seven decades after the Second World War have witnessed the emergence 
and evolution, both for practice and research, of the so-called ‘development 
cooperation’1 in the advanced world (‘the North’). Despite very widespread use of the 
term, there doesn’t seem to be a standard or strict definition for it2. Quite often, it is 
used almost as the synonym of ‘development assistance’ or ‘foreign aid’3, though 
literally speaking, by ‘development cooperation’ it does not necessarily indicate an 
exclusion of other cooperation modalities as long as they could serve the 
development objectives. 
 
Having said that, the widely presumed link between ‘development cooperation’ and 
‘development assistance’ did not emerge out of nowhere, but has its own historical 
roots. In 1947 the US Secretary of State George C. Marshall launched the famous 
European Recovery Programme (1948–1952) whereby the US offered more than $12 
billion to help rebuild the Western Europe and many of those recipient countries 
managed to recover from the ravages of war within a relatively short period of time 
(Department of State of the US, n.d.). The great success of the ‘Marshall Plan’ thus 
ignited considerable enthusiasm and expectation for the undertaking of helping other 
poorer countries in the world through external assistance (Führer, 1996). The US, 
again, took a lead in this process through President Truman’s ‘Point Four Programme’ 
proposed in 1949. A number of newly recovered European countries also started to 
join in the 1950s4, alongside a series of development initiatives led by multilateral 
international organizations such as the UN, World Bank and the just established EEC 
(European Economic Community). In 1960, the Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC)5, an agency that is with specific mandates to promote economic development 
and people’s welfare in the less-developed countries through providing development 
assistance, was created under the OECD. The DAC has since played a crucial role in 
guiding and coordinating the Northern development-related efforts, especially that of 
the Official Development Assistance (ODA) – and the term ‘development 
cooperation’ emerged and started to prevail roughly from that period of the 1960-70s. 
 
The ODA by the DAC members, or ‘DAC donors’ as what they often call themselves, 
had maintained an upward trend through the decades, increasing by two times from 
about 40 $billion in 1960 to $120 billion in 2010 (Alonso, 2012). Particularly in the 
post-Cold War period, the Northern ODA used to constitute approximately 95% of all 
international aid for almost one decade (Manning, 2006), thus establishing itself a 
dominant position in the global aid landscape. Equally important, the DAC has over 
the years developed a rather complex system of standards, rules and norms in terms 																																																								
1 In practice, it is often interchangeable with ‘international development cooperation’, ‘international 
development’, or simply ‘development’. 
2 Attempts that are made to define the term could be seen, for instance, in Alonso and Glennie (2015) 
and Chandy (2011). 
3 Excluding military aid. 
4 A few European countries such as the UK and Netherlands started to provide development assistance 
even earlier before the 1950s, but mainly to their own colonies. See, for instance, van Soest (1978). 
5 Originally the agency was called Development Assistance Group, which was later reconstituted as 
Development Assistance Committee in 1961. 
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of providing ODA and some other development modalities (Manning, 2006; 
Bräutigam, 2010; Hynes and Scott, 2013), thereby further strengthening its leading 
status in the domain of international development cooperation. 
 
However, despite the prominent role of the DAC donors, similar kinds of external 
development efforts offered by national states towards less developed countries, 
particularly through aid-giving, were just common in the rest of the world – although 
they may not be referred to as ‘development cooperation’6. The single largest aid-
giver outside the DAC community was surely the Soviet Union who had offered 
rather generous aid, including but not constrained to development assistance, to a 
large number of communist countries during the Cold War. In Asia, India, for 
instance, started to commit itself to development cooperation with other developing 
countries almost concurrently with its gaining independence, setting up a series of 
cooperation initiatives first with other Asian countries through the Asian Relations 
Conference in 1947 and ‘Colombo Plan’ in 1950, and then African countries during 
the Bandung Conference in 1955 (Chaturvedi et al., 2014). In a similar vein, China 
also started to provide foreign aid soon after the establishment of the PRC (People’s 
Republic of China) in 1949, first to its Asian neighbours in the 1950s and then Africa 
after the Bandung Conference. Kuwait, one of the Gulf oil-producers, established the 
first of the Middle East development funds in 1961 (Turki, 2014). In Latin America, 
Brazil established its national system for international development cooperation in 
1969, with the main aim to better coordinate foreign assistance it received itself but 
meanwhile also to provide technical assistance to other developing countries, 
particularly in Latin America and Africa (Vaz and Inoue, 2007). Even in Africa that 
usually served as the recipient end of development cooperation or foreign aid, the 
relatively better-off South African government also launched the Economic 
Cooperation Promotion Loan Fund in 1968 as a foreign policy instrument for various 
objectives (Besharati, 2013).  
 
These abovementioned countries, apart from the Soviet Union giant, were largely 
from what is commonly understood as ‘the South’; among other things, many of them 
shared a colonial or semi-colonial history, gained independence not long and still 
faced tremendous challenges of developing their own economies. Therefore, what 
they could possibly offer as external development assistance to other countries was 
rather limited; indeed many of them were back then (and for some even now) by 
themselves ODA recipients of the DAC donors. Their development cooperation and 
aid practice, often situated within the ‘South-South Cooperation’ framework, was 
thus largely incomparable to the DAC donors either in terms of volume or impacts. 
The development cooperation of the Southern countries was further reduced during 
the 1990s after the end of Cold War, when many of them shifted their focus back to 
their own domestic issues (Krugelund, 2008). Entering the new millennium, however, 
some of these Southern countries have gained an unprecedented momentum in 
economic growth, most notably the ‘BRICS’ (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South 
Africa) who are widely regarded as the forerunners among the developing world. 
With the growing economic strength then comes their increasing aspiration to have a 
greater say in the current international arena that is believed by them to be an ‘unfair’ 
system designed and dominated by the advanced countries. The ‘development 																																																								
6 That said, this thesis still uses the term of ‘development cooperation’ in the context of non-DAC 
countries in order to form a dialogue between the two (DAC and non-DAC countries). 
	 11	
cooperation’ has thus become one of the platforms for them to project the image as 
emerging powers both regionally and globally. Lula’s presidency during the 2003-
2010, for instance, has marked a ‘big leap’ of Brazilian development cooperation 
inspired by the so-called ‘solidarity diplomacy’ (Inoue and Vaz, 2012). The budget 
speech made by Indian Finance Minister in 2003 signified significant policy shift of 
India’s international development cooperation policy whereby it proclaimed to 
‘provide relief to certain bilateral partners’ on one hand and strengthen external 
support to other developing countries on the other (Government of India, 2003). But 
most eye-catching among all these Southern ‘donors’ was definitely China, whose 
development cooperation particularly characterised by its ‘development package 
model’ has attained an unprecedented level since the new millennium, and especially 
notable in Africa. 
 
This ‘emergence’ of the so-called ‘Southern donors’, or ‘Southern development 
partners’ as referred to in this thesis, has triggered heated debate in the academia and 
meanwhile great concerns especially from the camp of traditional DAC donors 
(Chapter 1.2). The Southern models of development cooperation are clearly worth 
careful investigation for at least three reasons. First, from the perspective of Southern 
development partners, partly due to the almost hegemonic status of OECD-DAC 
donors in the international development landscape through the past few decades, the 
Southern practices as well as their thinking about development cooperation have been 
largely side-lined. Indeed, in a broader sense, the studies on the South and their role 
in world politics in general have been systematically ignored by traditional 
scholarship in the West for long time (Alden et al., 2010). The growing economic and 
political relevance of some key Southern countries finally grants them a chance to be 
seriously looked at and researched on. Thus, while the (to-varying-degree) distinctive 
modalities of the Southern development partners by no means guarantee greater 
effectiveness or efficiency, they still deserve careful and especially ‘independent’ 
research in the sense that the Southern actors are situated in their own historical 
trajectory and development logics instead of being treated simply as a subject of 
reference or comparison against the Northern models.  
 
Second, for the target countries of development cooperation, the emergence of those 
less advanced but somehow more like-minded development partners from the South 
may imply great new opportunities, though surely not without any risks. It is, 
therefore, very much needed for them to have a clear understanding of the Southern 
actors’ motives, mechanisms as well as implications, be that positive or negative, to 
their home development agenda. Lastly, in-depth studies on the Southern models of 
development cooperation are also valuable to the traditional DAC donors. After a 
half-century history, a critical question now confronting the DAC community is 
whether the DAC-led ODA model has reached its end. What is going to happen next 
– an inevitable reduction of ODA, further reforms on it, or even a ‘revolution’ of the 
current development cooperation architecture (Alonso, 2012)? The DAC has 
launched a series of dialogue with the Southern development partners with a declared 
view to boosting mutual understanding and learning; indeed, the OECD, for instance, 
has seemed to show signs of broadening its cooperation forms by using the PPP 
scheme (Chapter 1.2), and the World Bank, too, started to refocus on infrastructure 
financing in recent years, all of which may to some extent remind people of the 
Southern models. In this vein, the DAC community may find some good experiences 
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or lessons to learn through more in-depth research on the Southern development 
partners. 
1.2 Literature Review 
Richard Manning (2006), the former chair of the OECD-DAC, was among the 
earliest ones who called attention to the phenomenon of the ‘(re-)emerging’ non-
DAC donors particularly since the 2000s. He divided them into four groups, namely 
non-DAC OECD members, non-OECD new EU members, Middle East and OPEC 
countries, and the most disparate, remaining ones which include quite a diversity of 
countries such as Venezuela, Chile, Brazil, South Africa, Russia, Malaysia, Thailand, 
as well as the much discussed two ‘heavyweights’, India and China. For the purpose 
of this thesis, I have grouped the non-DAC donors into three major categories. The 
first type is the DAC-like countries which often include those who are economically 
better off, and more importantly, willing to align their development cooperation (and 
aid) practice to the DAC principles (Zimmermann and Smith, 2011). The second type 
is the Gulf Arab countries who, due to a number of historical, geopolitical and 
religious reasons, stand distinctively from other non-DAC donors and form a separate 
development cooperation model (Villanger, 2007; Shushan and Marcoux, 2011; 
Momani and Ennis, 2012).  
 
The last type of non-DAC donors is perhaps the most controversial and debated in the 
literature, which is also the focal point of the thesis –the Southern development 
partners – or, sometimes termed as ‘providers of South-South Cooperation’ 
(ECOSOC of the UN, 2008; Zimmermann and Smith, 2010). As already roughly 
defined earlier, this group includes development partners from the commonly 
understood ‘Global South’, who are often by themselves still largely developing 
countries and facing a number of development challenges; some of them are still on 
the aid-recipient list of the DAC-donors. Typical examples include, for instance, 
Brazil (Vaz and Inoue, 2007; Xalma, 2010; Inoue and Vaz, 2012; Burges, 2014; 
Cabral et al., 2014; Robledo, 2015), India (Agrawal 2007; McCormick 2008; 
Chaturvedi, 2008 and 2012; Chanana 2009 and 2010; Fuchs and Vadlamannati, 2013; 
Chaturvedi et al., 2014), South Africa (Wolfe et al., 2008; Grimm, 2011; Vickers, 
2012; Besharati, 2013; Grobbelaar, 2014), Turkey (Kulaklikaya and Nurdun, 2010, 
Özkan and Akgün, 2010; Rudincová, 2014; Hausmann and Lundsgaarde, 2015), and 
China (Lancaster, 2007; Chin and Frolic, 2007; Woods, 2008; McCormick, 2008; 
Opoku-Mensah, 2009; Tan-Mullins et al., 2010; Bräutigam, 2011; Haan, 2011; 
Lengauer, 2011; Chin, 2012; Dreher and Fuchs, 2015; Zhang et al., 2015; Dreher et 
al., 2016; Kilama, 2016). The review discussion that follows will focus primarily on 
the Southern development partners. 
 
Despite a rapid increase in the past decade or so, aid provided by non-DAC donors in 
relative terms, is still rather limited. In 2008, for instance, the external development 
assistance of the non-DAC donors in total averaged roughly at $12 billion, 
representing only about 10% of the DAC donors in the same year; the relative weight 
of the Southern development partners, furthermore, is even less (Smith et al., 2010; 
OECD.Stat, 2008). It was expected that DAC aid would still be the dominant source 
of concessional official finance for a good time to come (Manning, 2006). Therefore, 
it is not really the size but rather the modalities of the non-DAC donors – the 
Southern development partners in particular – that have triggered the heated debate in 
the academia (Manning, 2006; Naim, 2007; Woods, 2008; Kragelund, 2008; Six, 
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2009; Paulo and Reisen, 2010; Kim and Lightfoot, 2011; Hann, 2011; Zimmermann 
and Smith, 2011; Chandy and Kharas, 2011 and 2015; Davies, 2011; Sato et al., 2011; 
Chin and Quadir, 2012; Mwase and Yang, 2012; Quadir, 2013; Roussel, 2013; 
Kondoh, 2015; Kilama, 2016). While some of the researchers advocate that the 
distinct models of Southern development partners provide new alternatives and thus 
open policy space for developing countries in need of foreign assistance, many, 
especially those from the DAC community, have shown great concern about this new 
phenomenon and worry that their established rules and standards may be endangered. 
Specifically, some of the most notable differences between Southern development 
partners and their DAC counterparts are discussed as follows. 
 
First, in terms of geographical distribution, the Southern development partners have 
provided most of their development aid to the UN-identified Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs), which demonstrates a similar pattern to the DAC donors. But 
different from the latter, the Southern development partners normally prioritise the 
LDCs that are in close proximity to themselves, rather than extend to a global reach 
as many of the DAC donors do. For instance, India gave more than 85% of aid to its 
(South) Asian neighbours and Turkey around 83% to its (Central and South) Asian 
friends, whilst Brazil distributed the largest part of aid to its Latin American 
neighbours and a few Lusophone African countries who shared a common colonial 
past (ECOSOC of the UN, 2008). Exception of that is China whose aid has 
represented more a global allocation compared to other development actors from the 
South, with Africa receiving more than half (51.8%) of the Chinese aid, followed by 
Asia (30.5%), Latin America and the Caribbean (8.4%), among others (State Council 
of the PRC, 2014). 
 
As regards targeted sectors, the Southern development partners have distributed a 
large proportion of their aid finance to economic sectors (economic infrastructure and 
productive sectors) compared to their OECD-DAC counterparts who have put more 
emphasis on social sectors (or social infrastructure)7 (Kragelund, 2008 and 2010; 
Walz and Ramachandran, 2011; Mwase and Yang, 2012). This feature is particularly 
visible in the case of China and India8. Take the former for example, about 50.4% of 
China’s total aid funds was spent on economic sectors (44.8% in economic 
infrastructure and 5.6% in agricultural and industrial sectors) and 27.6% of that in 
social sectors during the period 2010–2012 (State Council of the PRC, 2014); 
whereas the DAC donors disbursed 23.9% of their ODA to economic sectors (16.6% 																																																								
7 According to the OECD-DAC categorization and definition (China, for instance, has adopted a 
similar system as seen in its ‘White Paper on Foreign Aid’, 2011 and 2014), aid to economic 
infrastructure indicates assistance for networks, utilities and services that facilitate economic activity, 
including such as energy, transportation and communications; aid to social infrastructure refers to 
efforts to develop the human resource potential and enhance living conditions in aid recipient 
countries, including such as education, health and population, water supply, sanitation and sewerage; 
aid to productive sectors include agriculture, fishing and forestry, industry, mining and construction, 
trade and tourism. Other major categories include such as assistance to multi-sectors/cross-cutting 
sectors that are often with a concentration on the environment, gender projects and urban and rural 
development, action relating to debt such as debt forgiveness, humanitarian aid and unspecified aid 
(OECD.Stat, 2012). 
8 This is to a lesser extent the case for other Southern development partners. For example, Brazil also 
puts much emphasis on social sector (Inoue and Vaz, 2012); South Africa gives a special focus on 
peace-building and post-conflict development (Grobbelaar, 2014) and Turkey on humanitarian aid 
(Hausmann and Lundsgaarde, 2015). 
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in economic infrastructure and 7.2% in productive sectors) and 41.3% in social 
sectors in the year of 2012 (OECD.Stat, 2012). 
 
Similar to DAC donors, grants and loans are also widely used (e.g. in China, India, 
South Africa, Turkey) as the main financing methods, or begin to emerge as a new 
trend (e.g. in Brazil) in the development partner countries from the South. That said, 
the proportion of the two (grants versus loans) in total aid differs greatly between the 
DAC and Southern actors. While grants have represented more than 80% of the total 
ODA among DAC donors in the past decade (OECD.Stat, 2015), the figure is about 
36.5% for China during 2012–14 (State Council of the PRC, 2014), and only 4% for 
India (in terms of its aid to Africa) during 2000–2014 (Chaturvedi et al., 2014). 
Furthermore, the concessional terms of the loans provided respectively by the DAC 
and Southern actors are also quite different from each other (see ‘concessionality’ 
below). 
 
Regarding aid forms, while ‘project aid’ is still overwhelmingly utilized among the 
Southern development partners, the DAC community has, since the 1980s, diverted 
increasing attention to the so-called ‘programme aid’ or ‘PBAs’9 as referred to in 
recent years, and particularly ‘budget support’ which stands as a major component of 
the former (Camara, 2004). In 2015, for example, general programme aid represented 
8% of DAC donors’ total ODA in Africa (OECD, 2017), whereas the Southern 
development partners normally do not provide programme aid to other developing 
countries (ECOSOC of the UN, 2008). Exceptions may be seen in the use of budget 
support by South Africa and India, which however remains at a very limited scale in 
both cases (Besharati, 2013; ECOSOC of the UN, 2008). 
 
Meanwhile, different from DAC donors, technical assistance has traditionally 
occupied a special position in the aid practice of the Southern development partners, 
especially during the earlier decades (1960-90s) when they had a relatively weaker 
financial strengths. For instance, India’s famous ITEC (Indian Technical & Economic 
Cooperation) programme which was launched in 1964, remains as an integral part of 
Indian contemporary aid. About 11 million USD were spent on ITEC every year and 
the total disbursement mounted to almost 60% of the overall expenditure of Indian 
Ministry of External Affairs during 2012–13 (Chaturvedi et al., 2014). Brazil, as well, 
has had the tradition of providing technical assistance to other developing countries 
for decades, especially since 1978 when the Buenos Aires Action Plan was approved, 
whereby the TCDC (Technician Cooperation among Developing Countries) concept 
was increasingly integrated into Brazilian domestic system (Vaz and Inoue, 2007). 
 
Apart from some of the general features and differences as mentioned above, a few 
other issues, particularly those around concessionality, conditionality and the typing 
status of aid, have made the Southern modalities of development cooperation even 
more controversial. 
 
																																																								
9 PBAs, short for ‘Programme-Based Approaches’, are defined as ‘a way of engaging in development 
co-operation based on the principles of co-ordinated support for a locally-owned programme of 
development, such as a national development strategy, a sector programme, a thematic programme or a 
programme of a specific organisation’ (OECD-DAC, 2007). 
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To ‘ensure the benefits of the recipient developing countries’, the DAC stipulates that 
ODA must be ‘concessional in character’ and uses ‘grant element’10 as a yardstick to 
measure the consessionality of the ODA of DAC members (OECD, 2008). A 
minimum grant element of 25% is required for a loan to be qualified as ODA, 
calculated against a 10% reference rate of interest/discount that was adopted since the 
1970s (Hynes and Scott, 2013). To LDCs, furthermore, the DAC demands even 
softer terms that the ODA should be essentially in the form of grants and as a 
minimum, the average grant element of all commitments from a given donor should 
either be at least 86% to each LDC over a period of three years, or at least 90% 
annually for the LDCs as a group (OECD, 1978). In effect, the average grant element 
of total ODA by DAC donors is almost 96%11 (OECD, 2016). By contrast, there isn’t 
a strict stipulation among Southern development partners on the concessionality of 
their financial flows to the recipient countries. They apply varying rates of interest for 
their loans extended, which are often lower than market terms, but still appear ‘less 
concessional’ than the DAC donors if measured by the OECD ‘grant element’ criteria. 
For instance, the grant element of Chinese loans is about 75.1% for the zero-interest 
government loan and between 24.2-67.6% for concessional loans provided by 
China’s EXIM Bank; the figure for India is around 53.1-56.5%, and Turkey 26.6-80.8% 
(ECOSOC of the UN, 2008). 
 
Conditionality is another long-held principle of the DAC donors particularly since the 
debt crisis in the 1980s. The ODA has become conditional on a wide range of 
economic, political, social and environmental policies, such as macroeconomic 
stabilisation, privatization, ‘good governance’ and related reforms (Mold, 2009). And 
despite the Paris Declaration emphasis on ‘ownership’, the DAC donors seem to have 
adopted an increasingly hands-on approach (Zimmermann and Smith, 2011). Many of 
the Southern development partners, on the other hand, do not usually attach such 
economic or political conditions when giving aid to other developing countries, or at 
least to a far less extent than their DAC counterparts. China stands out greatly in this 
regard for its firmly held non-interference position (Tan-Mullins et al., 2010). While 
the Southern actors usually invoke the core principles for South-South Cooperation as 
the rationale for their non-conditionality practice 12 , it is more often than not 
interpreted (particularly by the Northern donors) as merely a sort of political rhetoric 
(for commercial benefits) rather than being taken seriously. 
 
Another important and hotly debated issue around development cooperation provided 
by Southern countries is tied aid, and more broadly, the ‘development package’ 
model that often combines aid with other economic activities such as trade and 
																																																								
10 Grant element is a measure of the concessionality of a loan, expressed as the percentage by which 
the present value of the expected stream of repayments falls short of the repayments that would have 
been generated at a given reference rate of interest (OECD-DAC, 2013). For the exact methods of how 
to calculate the ‘grant element’ of certain ODA flows, see OECD-DAC (2013).  
11 With only a few exceptions below 90% including three of the largest donors, France (85.6%), 
Germany (83.6%) and Japan (89.1%). 
12 For instance, the principles of ‘respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations; 
abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country; abstention by any 
country from exerting pressures on other countries’ (Final Communiqué of the Asian-African 
conference of Bandung, 1955); and that of ‘strict observance of national sovereignty, economic 
independence, equal rights and non-interference in domestic affairs of nations, irrespective of their 
size, level of development and social and economic systems’ (Buenos Aires Plan of Action, 1978). 
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investment. Tied aid13 is not formally prohibited – though subject to a series of rules 
concerning, for instance, the concessionality level14, the target countries as well as the 
developmental relevance – and used to be widely practiced among DAC donors for 
decades. However, given the common belief in the cost-inefficiency (compared to 
procurement through open bidding) and reduced effectiveness (esp. concerning 
‘ownership’ and developmental impacts) of tied aid, the OECD-DAC made a 
Recommendation in 2001 for the donors to untie their ODA, especially that towards 
the LDCs. By the year of 2007, the proportion of fully untied bilateral aid of DAC 
donors rose from 46% in 1999-2001 to 76%, and for LDCs from 57% to 83% (Clay 
et al., 2009). In parallel with the efforts made by the DAC community – regardless of 
evident limitation at the same time15– many of the Southern development partners, 
however, still widely and frequently use tied aid. This has inevitably evoked great 
resentments and criticisms from the DAC donors (Manning, 2006), though the actual 
effects of that remain largely unevaluated from either an efficiency or effectiveness 
perspective (Woods, 2008; Clay et al., 2009).  
 
Closely linked to tied aid, aid provided by Southern development partners is also 
often associated with their broader economic interactions with the recipient countries 
(Manning, 2006; Alden, 2007; Woods, 2008; Collier, 2008; Paulo and Reisen, 2010; 
Kragelund, 2010; Mwase and Yang, 2012). In contrast with the DAC donors who 
always prefer to deal with ODA in a very independent, ‘neutral’ way, aid of Southern 
actors is provided often as only a part of a much larger, more comprehensive 
economic cooperation package that often encompasses ambitious trade and 
investment pledges, and is believed as having ‘taken account of wider political and 
economic interests’ (Manning, 2006). In fact, this has constituted a marked feature of 
the way the Southern development partners engage with Africa – particularly typical 
in the case of China and India (Goldstein et al., 2006), and to a lesser extent, Brazil, 
Turkey and South Africa – with a often claimed objective for mutual benefits. This, is 
referred to as ‘development package’ in this thesis, indicating the mix of cooperation 
modalities with a clear view to achieving development objectives for both recipient 
countries and the development partner countries themselves.  
 
To sum up, there are several shortcomings concerning the existing research on the 
Southern development partners. The first one is the ‘DAC-centred’ tendency that is 
often seen in the literature. Given the long and rich practice of the Northern countries 
in development cooperation – especially the dominant position of DAC aid and the 
established status of DAC rules and norms in the recent decades – many of the 																																																								
13 Tied aid, according to the OECD-DAC, indicates ‘official grants or loans where procurement of the 
goods or services involved is limited to the donor country or to a group of countries which does not 
include substantially all aid recipient countries’ (OECD, 2016). 
14 An export credit is considered to be concessional if it has a grant element of at least 35% (50% for 
least-developed countries) and the discount rate for calculating the grant element of that was according 
to the market-related Commercial Interest Reference Rates (CIRR) rather than the 10% benchmark 
rate of interest as used for ODA (ECOSOC of the UN, 2008). 
15 According to Clay et al. (2009), technical cooperation and food aid were excluded from the 
Recommendation and both remain significant ‘gray areas’, with 30% and at least 50% respectively still 
reported as tied; meanwhile, there are large variations in the untying status of different DAC donors 
(e.g. the US and Japanese ODA were still heavily tied) and high level of non-reporting for technical 
cooperation and likely tied sectors (e.g. infrastructure, transport and energy); besides, statistical 
evidence also implied a considerable element of intended or unintended de facto tying that still widely 
exists in practice.  
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existing research tend to observe and judge the Southern actors through the lens of 
the DAC model. The Southern development partners are labelled as ‘donors’, which 
is influenced by DAC’s accustomed mentality of the ‘donor-recipient’ logic. They are 
regarded as ‘emerging’ or ‘new’ actors due to DAC donors’ more powerful and 
visible role in the international aid landscape. Their modalities of development 
cooperation – such as the financing methods, concessionality, conditionality and 
tying status of aid reviewed above – are considered problematic and even ‘rogue’ for 
the obvious departure from the established DAC standards (Naim, 2007; Paulo and 
Reisen, 2010; Walz and Ramachandran, 2011). They are hence invited to different 
sorts of ‘dialogue’, which however are often with an inexplicit intension of the DAC 
trying to converge the Southern actors and the underlying belief that DAC principles 
‘should be maintained’ (Manning, 2006). Some scholars have further explored why it 
has been difficult for the Southern development partners to converge to the DAC 
guidelines (Kondoh, 2015), and how possible – for instance, through policy dialogue 
and peer review – to achieve that goal (Paulo and Reisen, 2010).  
 
In short, the development cooperation models of the Southern actors are not really 
judged by what they are, but rather, what they are not (Kim and Lightfoot, 2011); and 
this is so even when those rules and norms are neither fully complied by the DAC 
members themselves (Woods, 2008; Tan-Mullins et al., 2010), nor have them been 
proved more productive or beneficial to recipient countries than the Southern models. 
Accordingly, what is relatively lacking is research that is conducted from more 
South-oriented perspectives, that is aimed to explore, for instance, how the 
contemporary modalities of development cooperation have been shaped by the 
Southern actors’ respective histories and experiences in the past decades. To give 
some examples: the widely used financing method of loans in India’s current external 
development cooperation is believed to have much to do with the influence of its own 
aid-receiving past, wherein the proportion of loans in the total aid received by India 
remained high and in fact increased from 81% in 1981-1982 to 93% in 2010-2011 
(Chaturvedi, 2012); and the principles of non-conditionality of Brazilian development 
cooperation was very much informed by the emerging ideals of horizontality in the 
1970-80s as well as its own experiences as an aid recipient (Leite et al., 2014). 
Therefore, as some have rightly pointed out, there may be some real obstacles to the 
mutual understanding between the DAC donors and Southern development partners, 
and it may thus be more realistic to have differentiated standards (Chandy and 
Kharas, 2011).  
 
Second, the existing literature on the Southern development partners has put an 
almost exclusive focus on ODA; indeed even the studies on development cooperation 
in a broader sense also reflect the tendency of an overconcentration on development 
aid (Chandy, 2011; Currie-Alder, 2016). One just needs to take a glance at the annual 
‘Development Cooperation Reports’ produced by OECD in the past few decades, for 
instance, wherein all the documents were indeed only dealing with ODA-related 
issues. As noted in the very beginning of the chapter, this is understandable given the 
specific historical roots of ‘development cooperation’ that back to half a century ago 
the whole area of ‘development cooperation’ emanated from and rested on the 
practice of development aid from advanced Euro-American countries to the 
developing world. However, times have changed. The international development 
cooperation landscape has undergone dramatic shifts over the half-century, either at 
the ‘recipient’ developing world end (e.g. growing heterogeneity among different 
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developing countries and new geography of global poverty) and or the ‘giving’ end 
(e.g. emergence of ‘new donors and new instruments’) (Alonso, 2012). Adding to the 
urgency of a change of mind is also the widespread questioning and heated debates as 
to the actual effectiveness of the decades-long ODA from both outside and within the 
OECD-DAC community (Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Hansen and Tarp, 2000; 
Easterly, 2003; Sachs, 2005; Moyo, 2010). After all, if ‘development’ is the ultimate 
goal, shouldn’t ODA only be one of the ‘cooperation’ means rather than the ends per 
se? 
 
That said, there have seemed to be some signs of change in the recent years; one 
notable case is the PPP (Public-Private-Partnership) model that starts to be adopted in 
the international development cooperation area. There is no widely recognized 
definition of PPP, but rather a cluster of different arrangements that share some key 
common features: notably the incorporation of private sector actors in the provision 
of public goods (esp. facilities and services) that traditionally fall into the domain of 
government responsibilities. The PPP scheme was initially used in domestic area, 
particularly in that of infrastructure, and brought into international development 
cooperation (‘development PPP’ hereinafter) since the late 1990s largely due to the 
growing role played by the private sector in international financial flows. Indeed, 
from the 1990s, private financial flows has grown rapidly and far surpassed ODA; by 
end of the 1990s, private flows had mounted to 82% of total global financial flows, 
representing more than 4 times of that of ODA (Ierley, 2002). One of the major 
objectives of initiating ‘development PPP’, therefore, is tying to mobilise the private 
sector resources, particularly capital funds but their specialised expertise as well16. 
Against this background, the development PPP began to be widely adopted by a large 
number of DAC donors such as the US, UK, Netherlands, Germany, Sweden, 
Denmark, Canada and publicly advocated by international organizations like the UN 
and World Bank (BMZ, 2005; DFID, 2011; Lawson, 2011; IOB, 2013; Silva et al, 
2015; Ingram et al., 2016). In particular, the concept of ‘partnership’ started to be 
raised also in the abovementioned OECD ‘Development Cooperation Reports’ in 
recent years and in their 2016 report; for instance, the Report in 2016 clearly 
mentioned and elaborated on the potential positive role of ‘business and private 
sector’ (OECD, 2016). 
 
In essence, ‘development PPP’ could largely be understood as the expansion of 
participants from traditional public sector actors to private sector actors17 and the 
incorporation of business model – though a number of restraints are imposed in order 
to safeguard the developmental impact (European Commission, 2014). This new 
trend emerging in development cooperation has so far not been well researched, 
which may be attributed to the infancy status of the development PPP practice and 
thus its still relatively marginal position in the development cooperation landscape. It 																																																								
16 There are mainly two methods whereby the private sector actors are mobilized through the PPP 
scheme, namely ‘Grants Model’ and ‘LEGs Model’. In the first form, the governments invite private 
sector actors to engage in development-oriented projects through providing a certain amount of ‘free 
money’; a typical example of this is the widely used ‘Challenge Funds’ by many DAC donors (Pompa, 
2013). The ‘LEGs Model’, on the other hand, indicates cases when the governments form partnership 
with private sector actors through providing the latter with Loans, Equities or Guarantees in projects 
that are believed to bear important developmental impacts; this is mostly realized through the 
respective development finance institutions of the DAC donor countries, such as the CDC (UK), OPIC 
(US), Kfw-DEG (Germanny), among others.  
17 Or more broadly, all the non-pubic actors as practiced in reality. 
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is a shame of that for, in many ways, it resonates with the ‘development package’ 
model of the Southern development partners, despite important differences at the 
same time. 
 
The last limitation of the existing literature on Southern development partners is the 
lack of empirical studies. The current research of the topic can be roughly divided 
into two types: country-specific studies of the respective Southern development 
partners, and comparison work between those and the traditional DAC donors. Either 
line of research, however, tends to focus mostly on general patterns (and sometimes 
even exact figures given the often lack of transparency) of the Southern actors, as has 
been reviewed earlier. Research from a more micro-level (e.g. project level), and 
especially based on in-depth fieldwork, on the other hand, has been relatively few. 
Among the few, a good example – also closely linked to the study of this thesis – is 
the three-year (2013–15) research project  ‘China and Brazil in African Agriculture 
(CBAA)’ initiated by the Future Agricultures consortium, which has a specific 
purpose to investigate ‘if a new paradigm for development cooperation is emerging’ 
(Scoones et al., 2016; Amanor and Chichava, 2016; Gu et al., 2016; Cook et al., 2016; 
Tugendhat and Alemu, 2016; Xu et al., 2016; Scoones, 2013). The research team is 
composed of 20 or so scholars, mostly with agricultural and developmental 
backgrounds. A particular merit of this research project is that they have conducted 
in-depth fieldwork in four African countries – Ghana, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe and 
Mozambique – and also tried to combine and balance viewpoints from European, 
African and Chinese scholars. This type of fieldwork-based studies on Southern 
development partners, however, is in general very much lacking. One possible 
problem caused by this may be that much of the implication in terms of Southern 
actors drawn from the current studies are at best based on theoretical conjectures, but 
lacks the support of empirical evidence from the ground. 	  
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1.3 Research Questions 
Given the considerations above – the necessity for deepening understanding of the 
Southern models of development cooperation as well as the limitation of the existing 
academic studies on that – I developed an interest in further investigating the 
Southern models, particularly the ‘development package’ model that goes beyond the 
traditional ODA concept, with an intentional effort to take a more South-oriented 
approach and bring in more fieldwork-based empirical evidence in order to remedy 
the shortcomings of the existing literature (Chapter 1.2). To do that, I decided to 
choose the case of Chinese development cooperation in African agriculture as the 
subject of examination. The reason why China is chosen is easily justifiable. As has 
been reviewed before, China has stood most outstandingly among the Southern 
development partners, both in terms of the absolute volume and also the distinct and 
often controversial modalities – especially that of the ‘package model’ – of its 
development cooperation. Perhaps a few more words should be given here as to why 
agriculture is chosen as the targeted sector to examine. 
 
Agriculture is selected first and foremost due to the sector’s particularly significant 
role for African development, both for economic growth and people’s welfare. 
Agriculture constitutes the backbone of most African economies. In the bulk of 
African countries, the agricultural sector is still the largest contributor to their GDP 
and the main generator of savings, tax revenues and hard currency earnings. With 
nearly two-thirds of the manufacturing value-added based on agricultural raw 
materials, agriculture also serves as a significant boost to the continent’s industrial 
development (NEPAD, 2003). Meanwhile, conventional wisdom also supports a 
strong role of agriculture in addressing the poverty and hunger problem that still 
prevails on the continent nowadays (Diao, Hazell and Thurlow, 2010). With some 70-
80% of the total population- including 70% of the continent’s extremely poor and 
undernourished- living in rural areas and depending mostly on agriculture for their 
livelihood, the agricultural sector is believed to have the potential to enhance the food 
security and uplift people on a mass scale more than any other sector (NEPAD, 2003; 
ECA of the UN, 2007). Therefore, African agriculture has long been the focal point 
and emphasis of a large number of bilateral and multilateral international 
development partners in the past half-century, both from the DAC donors (Eicher, 
2003) and Southern actors including China (Bräutigam, 1998). 
 
Furthermore, in relation to China-Africa development cooperation, agriculture has 
been in the central place of Chinese foreign aid in the last century since the late 1950s; 
more importantly, it has also become the frontier area for China to apply or at least 
experiment on its innovative ‘development package’ model of cooperation at the 
current time. The nature of agriculture being as a productive sector, different from 
other developmental targets such as health and education, makes it possible to 
embrace other market-oriented cooperation modalities such as agribusiness, rather 
than merely relying on development aid. China, for instance, has launched a series of 
policy measures – far beyond only aid – with the view to boosting agricultural 
cooperation between China and the African continent since the 2000s under the 
FOCAC (Forum on China-Africa Cooperation) framework18. Just to mention a few, 
the Chinese government: 																																																								
18 The choice of ‘agriculture’ has also been motivated, to a lesser extent though, by the ‘food security 
debate’ arising from the recent wave of China-Africa agricultural cooperation – that is, whether China 
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• promised to establish 10 Agriculture Technology Demonstration Centres (ATDCs) in 
Africa (FOCAC, 2006); the number was later increased to 20 (FOCAC, 2009);  
• pledged to send 100 Chinese agro-experts (FOCAC, 2006) and dispatch 50 
agricultural technical teams with a view to training 2,000 agro-technicians in Africa 
(FOCAC 2009), and furthermore, help Africa establish a vocational agricultural 
education system (FOCAC, 2012);  
• donated 30 million USD to support South-South cooperation between China and 
African countries under the framework of the UNFAO’s Special Program for Food 
Security (FOCAC, 2009);  
• promised to help African countries improve the capacity for independent 
development and provide technical support in grain planting, storage, processing and 
circulation (FOCAC, 2012);  
• pledged to encourage Chinese financial institutions to support cooperation between 
Chinese and African companies in agricultural planting, processing of agricultural 
products, animal husbandry, fishery and aquaculture (FOCAC, 2012);  
• pledged to encourage and support Chinese enterprises to invest in agriculture in 
Africa; and to implement cooperation projects focusing on technical support in grain 
planting, storage, sanitary and phytosanitary requirements, animal husbandry, agro-
processing capacity, forestry, and fisheries to create a favourable environment for 
African countries to realize long-term food security supported by national 
agricultural production and processing (FOCAC, 2015). 
 
Out of considerations of all above, I regard China-Africa agricultural cooperation as 
an appropriate case for investigating Chinese contemporary development cooperation 
models, especially that of the ‘development package’. Specifically, I have developed 
the research questions (RQs) revolving the selected topic as follows: First, this thesis 
aims to adopt a more China-oriented approach and thus try to explain how the 
‘development package model’ as typically demonstrated in China’s contemporary 
agricultural cooperation with Africa has been shaped by its own decades-long history 
of aid-giving and reforms, and particularly by some of the evolving mentalities that 
underpin this historical trajectory (RQ1). Second, the thesis attempts to explore, 
through in-depth project-level fieldwork, how exactly the ‘development package 
model’ has been played out on the ground, and especially how the innovative 
commercial elements (e.g. business actors and mechanisms) have been incorporated 
and utilized in China’s agricultural development cooperation with Africa (RQ2). 
Lastly, based on the historical and empirical research, the thesis also tries to make an 
initial effort to examine the results of this new ‘package model’ of Chinese 
development cooperation so far, and more importantly, to provide a systematic 
explanation to why the ‘implementation gap’ (between the policy expectation and 
realities) exists in this specific policy issue (RQ3). 	  
																																																																																																																																																														
is trying to pursue food security of its huge population at home through obtaining land and developing 
agriculture in Africa (Freeman et al., 2008; Rubinstein, 2009). I have touched upon this issue in this 
thesis (Chapter 4.1) and also separately in another paper (Jiang, 2015) in response to the debate. More 
recently, Professor Deborah Bräutigam’s new book – Will Africa feed China (2016) – addressed 
exactly this problem, providing plenty of valuable empirical evidence and insightful analysis for 
readers to fully understand the land and food security dimension amid China-Africa agricultural 
cooperation. 
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1.4 Methodology 
This research project is essentially a piece of qualitative work. It does not aim to 
arrive at any abstract, universally applicable statement, but endeavours to generate 
explanations to a specific phenomenon with greater richness. It is based on methods 
of materials collection that ‘are both flexible and sensitive to the social context in 
which data are produced, rather than rigidly standardized or structured, or entirely 
abstracted from ‘real-life’ contexts’, and methods of materials analysis that ‘involve 
understandings of complexity, detail and context’ rather than ‘surface patterns, trends, 
and correlations’ (Mason, 2002: 2-3). The following section will explain how data 
have been collected and analysed in order to seek answers to the proposed research 
questions.  
1.4.1 Data Collection 
Document survey 
To collect materials for this thesis, I have conducted both a document survey and 
fieldwork. Data was collected from documents through an extensive document survey 
from different sources. Most scholarly works were accessed from qualified academic 
databases through the search engines of the LSE library and National Digital Library 
of China – the former for literature in English and the latter for that in Chinese. This 
includes books, journal articles, and conference papers on related themes. For 
statistics, I used mostly the data and reports released by recognized institutions such 
as government agencies (e.g. the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Commerce 
and National Bureau of Statistics in China) and international organizations (e.g. the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the United Nations and 
the World Bank), and cited directly from their original print or online publications. 
For general information, I have consulted a variety of sources (e.g. government, 
company and personal documents), mostly searched for on the Internet; for the 
consideration of data reliability and quality, I have tried to use documents produced 
by recognized institutions or professional individuals.  
Fieldwork 
I. Preparing for the Field  
(i) Case country selection 
Mozambique is chosen as the case country in this thesis to investigate China’s 
contemporary agricultural development cooperation models in Africa. There are a 
couple of reasons for that. Firstly, the two countries have enjoyed a decades-long 
benign cooperation in the area of agriculture. China was among the first countries to 
recognize Mozambique’s independence in 1975 and immediately established 
diplomatic relations with the latter. Soon after that, in 1976, China started to conduct 
development cooperation with Mozambique wherein agriculture was already put in 
the central place (Chichava, 2008). The agricultural cooperation link has since been 
kept between the two countries and significantly strengthened under the FOCAC 
framework after the 2000s.  
 
Secondly, the contemporary China-Mozambique agricultural interaction has fully 
demonstrated the ‘package model’ of Chinese agricultural development cooperation 
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in Africa and shown particular representativeness in terms of the ‘innovative agro-
aid’ and ‘agribusiness’ sub-models. For instance, the ATDC (Agriculture Technology 
Demonstration Centre) in Mozambique was among the first of the 20 or so ATDCs – 
which are a typical example of the ‘innovative agro-aid’ model – that China has built 
in different African countries since 2006; it is also regarded by the Chinese 
government (particularly the Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of Agriculture) as 
one of the most successful cases of all the ATDCs (Zhang and Zhang, 2015). As 
regards Chinese agribusiness engagement, Mozambique is one of the countries in 
Africa that hosted the largest number of Chinese agro-investors as well as the most 
sizable Chinese agribusiness projects (Table 4-4 and Box 4-1). It is thus a very 
typical case to examine China’s current agricultural engagement in Africa.  
 
Thirdly, Mozambique is still a largely agriculture-based country with agriculture 
contributing to 25% of the country’s GDP, 41% to its exports and with 67% of the 
people living in the rural area. Food security remains a concern to the country. Also, 
Mozambique has roughly 70% of the total population who are still living under the 
poverty line of $1.9 per day according to the World Bank calculation, and staying on 
the list of the UN-identified Least Developed Countries by 2016. Agricultural 
development, therefore, bears large potential to help create jobs, alleviate poverty as 
well as improve food security of the country; and so does agricultural development 
cooperation with external partners including China.  
(ii) Pre-field survey 
A comprehensive survey was conducted before heading for the field. This involved, 
for instance, a survey on general backgrounds such as the bilateral relations between 
China and the case study countries, the current situations of Chinese agricultural aid 
and agribusiness investment in the case country, and the development status of the 
case country’ agricultural sector; and more specifically, a survey on the different 
Chinese agro-aid and investment projects in the case country, including the project 
backgrounds, histories, localities and operations.  
 
Based on that, three sets of documents were carefully prepared beforehand: 1) a list 
of all the potential projects and institutes to visit; 2) background of these projects and 
agencies; 3) an outline of interview questions for different projects and agencies. 
II. In the Field  
I went to the field twice to collect the required data. The first fieldwork was carried 
out in Mozambique from September to December in 2013. It took about two months 
(Sep–Oct 2013) for me to get familiar with the local environment – for it was the first 
time for me to visit Africa – and more importantly, to establish personal networks and 
find reliable informants19. Interviews and other fieldwork, including site visits and 																																																								19	On the Chinese side, I gained contacts mainly through two channels, going to visit people and find 
informants directly, or getting to know them through others’ introduction. The first one was the most 
important channel, especially in the initial phase when I basically knew no one there. I went directly to 
the targeted projects (e.g. the ATDC in Boane and the Wanbao project in Xaixai) and the relevant 
Chinese government agencies in Mozambique (e.g. the Economic and Commercial Counselor’s Office 
of the Chinese Embassy) according to the list prepared beforehand, introducing myself and the 
research purposes to the people on sites and inquiring about the possibility of talking to someone who 
may provide some information. This, however, proved to be rather difficult, for the Chinese 
stakeholders, especially those working for the government or government projects, tended to be very 
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market surveys, were intensively conducted in November and December, mostly in 
Maputo (the capital city), Boane (in Maputo province) and Xaixai (in Gaza province). 
I also went to the central province of Sofala, trying to visit two other projects (Hefeng 
and CACD) and interview the relevant stakeholders, but did not succeed due to some 
communication problems. 
 
The second fieldwork was conducted in Mozambique between December 2014 and 
January 2015. The reason why this second fieldwork was needed was: 1) to follow up 
the projects in Mozambique; 2) to research the two projects in Beira that I did not 
manage to do during the first fieldwork. Because of the network established and 
experience gained during the first fieldwork, this time the fieldwork went more 
smoothly and also took much less time. The research tasks were finished within two 
months.  
 
Two specific methods were used during the fieldwork process: qualitative 
interviewing and participant observation. 
(i) Qualitative interviewing 
 
Qualitative interviewing refers to ‘in-depth, semi-structured or loosely structured 
forms of interviewing’, with a few distinctive characteristics such as ‘the interactional 
exchange of dialogue’, ‘a relatively informal style’, and ‘a thematic, topic-centred, 
biographical or narrative approach’ (Mason, 2002: 62-3). 
 
I researched in total six different Chinese agro-aid and agribusiness projects, but 
included only four of them in the thesis – specifically the ATDC in Mozambique, 
Waobao, Hefeng and CAAIC – for their representativeness (Chapter 4.2). During this 
process I talked with around dozens of informants through formal and informal 
interviews (see Appendix 9). The informants roughly fall into three categories: 1) 
officials from both Chinese and Mozambican sides related to the projects; 2) 
company staff (Chinese and Mozambican), including the heads, managers, 
technicians, as well as the workers and farmers working on the projects researched; 3) 
local Mozambican farmers living near the project sites and NGOs. 
 
Interviews were conducted mostly by myself, but on a few occasions in collaboration 
with other colleagues or with assistance from local translators. Most of the interviews 
were done face-to-face between the interviewees and me in the field, but some were 																																																																																																																																																														
cautious about the my identity (including nationality) and purposes; being an independent PhD student 
(rather than an established scholar associated with certain institutes) who studies in a Western 
university and without any referees, among others, all seemed to have further compounded the 
difficulties. It was in essence a matter of trust building between the Chinese stakeholders and me; and 
it did take time, sometimes involving several rounds of formal and informal talks with different people 
just to gain access to one project or to talk to one person. But the efforts were all worth it for in the end 
most of the stakeholders agreed to provide interview opportunities or at least some useful information. 
Meanwhile, I also tried to get into the Chinese community in Mozambique and later on also found a 
part-time job in a Chinese state-owned enterprise. This proved to be very helpful for the my research 
because the Chinese community there was a small circle where people know people; thus you would 
be able to get more contacts for research within shorter period of time, and often have easier access to 
the informants for you’ve got some people as your referees. The contacts of Hefeng and CAAIC, for 
instance, were gained and accessed in this way. On the Mozambican/South African side, I gained great 
help from local researchers -- Dr. Chichava, for instance, from the IESE based in Maputo – who 
provided some local contacts and collaborated in conducting some interviews and fieldworks.  
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also conducted over the telephone. For a formal interview, it normally took 1-2 hours 
with recordings and notes. 
(ii) Participant observation 
 
Participant observation refers to ‘methods of generating data which entail the 
researcher immersing herself or himself in a research ‘setting’ so that they can 
experience and observe at first hand a range of dimensions in and of that setting’ 
(Mazon, 2002: 84). It requires the researcher to prepare ‘not just for the process and 
technique of observation, but also for social interaction’ in a diversity of ways, such 
as ‘participating, interrogating, listening, communicating, as well as a range of other 
forms of being, doing and thinking’ (Mazon, 2002: 87). 
 
In this research, I conducted participant observation in two ways: First, through 
working and living together with the company staff being researched. I went to visit 
and stayed on the project sites twice: once at the Wanbao project for one week 
(Xaixai, Gaza; Nov 2013), and once at the Hefeng project for two days (Buzi, Sofala; 
Jan 2015). During the working time, I went with the staff to the paddies and 
observed, for instance, their production and processing model, the agro-technology 
training (between the Chinese technicians and Mozambican farmers), and the co-
working model (between Chinese and Mozambican farmers); during lunch and dinner 
break, I conducted semi-structured interviews (formal) or had causal talks (informal) 
with different people on the sites. 
 
Second, the participant observation is also conducted through site visits and informal 
inquiry. For example, in order to understand the sales situation of the rice produced 
by the Chinese companies being researched, I went to different supermarkets and 
convenience stores, both of Chinese and other local brands, to check and compare the 
prices, ask the shopkeepers about the sales (and problems, if any) and consumers 
about their feedback as to certain Chinese brand rice.  
1.4.2 Data Analysis 
After the questions being proposed (Chapter 1.3) and data collected (Chapter 1.4.1), 
the (descriptive/causal) links between the two now need to be established, which is 
also the core task of data analysis for a qualitative work of research. Given that 
RQ1&2, for their descriptive nature, can be largely answered directly by the data, the 
following section will only introduce the data analysis methods adopted by in the 
thesis trying to bridge the data and the why-question (RQ3). To do that, I found 
necessary to develop an analytical framework and it took me three steps as follows.  
 
First, I went back to the collected data (the reading notes, interview transcripts, field 
notes, etc.), carefully going over every detail in the notes and getting myself fully 
familiar with the data. Then, I tentatively summarized all the potential explanatory 
factors/variables – no matter the extent of their explanatory power they have – wrote 
them down alongside the notes and highlighted them; and greater attention was paid 
to those that repeatedly appear in different fields (aid/investment) and specific project 
cases. For example, ‘the actors’ lack of knowledge about the local environment’ arose 
frequently when I went through the notes and was signalized every time when it arose 
and put together.  
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Notably, this process was not purely literal reading; instead, interpretation was 
indispensible. For instance, in the original notes they may only said that ‘XX 
expressed they did not know who on the Mozambican side was in charge of the 
issue’, ‘XX said they did not expect the risk of the climate disaster”, or “XX did not 
realize there were so many foreign traders already existing in the local markets’; and 
to label all similar situations under the ‘actors’ lack of knowledge about the local 
environment’ was an interpretation of the author. This first-step, as explained above, 
is similar to what is termed by Mason (2002) as “cross-sectional and categorical 
indexing” and all those categorically indexed data, such as the ‘actors’ lack of 
knowledge of local environment’, formed a pool of potential explanatory 
factors/variables – which could be called Pool A. 
 
After that, I started to seek theoretical support from existing literature. This was 
considered necessary for two reasons: first, to offset the possible omission of 
important variables by taking advantage of the established theories; second, to ‘talk 
with’ the existing theoretical debates and hopefully contribute to that by my empirical 
findings. Specifically, I first positioned the research question in the field of Public 
Policy given the close relevance between the two, and then conducted a systematic 
literature review on implementation, with a particular focus on the implementation 
effectiveness. For the framework building purpose, I intentionally highlighted the 
variables that were already identified by existing literature as relevant to the 
implementation effectiveness. This formed a pool of existing explanatory 
factors/variables – which can be called Pool B. 
 
Lastly, I started to try establishing the analytical framework by comparing Pool A and 
Pool B and finalized the group of variables that are most relevant to this present 
research. This process involved: i) identifying the overlapped variables between Pool 
A and Pool B, for they may mean the same thing but use different terms, and keeping 
them in the framework; ii) identifying those that were deemed important in Pool B 
but absent in Pool A, thinking about the reasons (not at work in the present work or 
omitted during the data review process), and adding the omitted in the framework; iii) 
identifying those appearing in Pool A but not (or not adequately) discussed in Pool B, 
thinking about the reasons (the specialty of this present research?), and deciding 
whether to keep these variables or leave them. In sum, this last step was an interactive 
dialogue between empirical data (Pool A) and existing theories (Pool B). 
 
It took about a few months for this framework building process, the outcome of 
which is demonstrated in the following section (Chapter 1.5). It is worth noting that 
this is actually also a hypothesis-making or explanation-seeking process. Different 
from the type of research wherein hypotheses are propositions that are often deducted 
from existing theories/studies and wait to be tested out by the research, in this thesis, 
hypotheses are indeed a set of tentative explanations deriving from the research for 
the specific research question (RQ3). For that reason, there are no clearly pre-
proposed hypotheses, but all working hypotheses which have kept being refined in 
the process until the analytical framework is built up. The framework, therefore, 
could be seen as a skeleton of the explanations (to RQ3) for it already entails a 
dialogue with the data rather than being merely a theoretical one – although these 
explanations still need to be further fleshed out in the final conclusive chapter 
(Chapter 5). 
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1.5 Explaining the ‘Implementation Gap’: The Public Policy Approach 
The broader research topic of the thesis, namely Chinese development cooperation 
with Africa, could essentially be treated as a ‘public policy’ question – marked by a 
series of intentional action plans, i.e. the development package, initiated and led by 
governmental actors, orienting towards a clearly stated and shared public problem, 
agricultural development. In this vein, the RQ3 set forth earlier (Chapter 1.3), which 
is aimed at evaluating the results – particularly the ‘gap’ as observed through 
fieldwork – as well as the influencing factors, is a problem of policy implementation 
and will be investigated in this thesis by applying the approach of Public Policy 
Implementation (PPI). The following section will first provide a brief introduction to 
the implementation studies of public policy, and on the basis of that, develop an 
analytical framework to explain the results of Chinese development cooperation 
policy in African agriculture specifically. 
1.5.1 Implementation of Public Policy (PPI) 
[P]olicy implementation encompasses those actions by public and private individuals (or 
groups) that are directed at the achievement of objectives set forth in prior policy 
decisions. This includes both one-time efforts to transform decisions into operation terms, 
as well as continuing efforts to achieve the large and small changes mandated by policy 
decisions. (Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975: 447) 
 
Implementation is the carrying out of a basic policy decision, usually made in a statute 
(although also possible through important executive orders or court decisions). Ideally, 
that decision identified the problem(s) to be addressed, stipulates the objective(s) to be 
pursued, and, in a variety of ways, 'structures' the implementation process. (Sabatier, 
1980: 540-41) 
 
Implementation research is regarded by some as an interdisciplinary subfield of 
Public Policy and Public Administration under the broader umbrella subject of 
Political Science (Winter, 2012a: 256). While it by no means indicates that no one 
had paid any serious attention to this issue before (Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975: 
452-8; Hill and Hupe, 2002: 18-40), it is still fair to claim that, as a relatively 
independent academic field, implementation research emerged around the early 1970s, 
largely in response to the domestic public policy failures that were quite often seen in 
industrial societies of the North America and Europe. As observed by Hanf (1978: 1), 
‘The euphoria that accompanied attempts at social engineering through public 
policies in the sixties has given way to a sobering recognition of the basic 
intractability of social problems’. ‘Implementation’, therefore, was discovered as a 
‘missing link’ (Hargrove, 1975) in the sense that neither the research on policy 
process in general nor that on policy failures specifically had given adequate attention 
to it. Greatly stimulated by the seminal work of Pressman and Wildavsky in 1973, 
implementation research gradually became ‘one of the fads of political science and 
policy analysis and reached its peak in the mid-1980s’ (Winter, 2012a: 255). Studies 
on implementation went on through the 1990s until the present time, but at a much 
lesser strength especially compared to the high tide of the 1970s and 80s20.  																																																								
20 Some scholars in the field claim that implementation research has already lost its momentum, partly 
due to its considerable pluralism and fragmentation and thus lack in any consensual theory after 
decades of scholarly pursuit (DeLeon, 1999; O’Toole, 2000); whereas others argue that the decline is 
only ‘relative’, or, there have been indeed more writings on this subject but ‘with diverse themes taken 
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There are chiefly three approaches – namely ‘top-down’, ‘bottom-up’ and ‘synthesis’ 
– to the implementation research21. Perhaps most intriguing is the debate between the 
first two, that is, to put it in the simplest way, who is taking the lead and making the 
real difference in the process of implementation – ‘the top’ which refers to the 
policymakers, and particularly, their formulated policy; or ‘the bottom’, that is the 
policy implementers? This top/bottom divide has in fact inexplicitly shown the 
conventional ideas as to the differentiation between the process of government 
politics and administration; or, through the lens of policy approach, the differentiation 
between policy-making and policy-execution. It may also be helpful to note that the 
top/bottom debate is not new, nor is it exclusive to the studies of implementation only. 
Therefore, the readers may well find themselves hearing reverberations of some old 
themes, such as ‘rational analysis versus muddling through, scientific management 
versus organization development, top-down compliance versus grass-roots control’ 
(Berman, 1980: 206); and it is indeed quite necessary for one to bear this in mind in 
order to gain a broader understanding. 
I. Top-Down Approach22 
The top-down approach, as its label implies, places great emphasis on the role of ‘the 
top’ – that is, as mentioned earlier, the policymakers as well as their formulated 
official policy – in shaping the process of implementation. It is assumed that the 
power, both in terms of authority and capability, of guiding and steering 
implementation resides with ‘the top’, and thus, efforts should be made in advising 
policymakers on how to formulate a good policy and control the implementation 
process in an effective way. Accordingly, it is common to find in top-down works a 
good number of ‘variables’ or ‘conditions’ identified by researchers as indispensable 
for enabling a satisfactory implementation, presenting itself as a fairly prescriptive 
approach (e.g. Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975; Hood, 1976; Gunn, 1978; Sabatier 
and Mazmanian, 1979 and 1980).  
 
The policy-implementers that are considered as the ‘bottom’ end of a policy process 
have therefore been largely downplayed. Their role is reduced to no more than one 
who is supposed to merely and strictly carry out what they are told to do. In some 
cases, such as for Dunsire (1990: 15), everything that concerns ‘love, hate, envy, in 
fact any motivational factors whatsoever’ is deliberately excluded, in order to create a 
perfect rational model and better understand the logical relationship between input 
(policy), process and output (Parsons, 1995: 466-7). That said, this does not mean 
that top-down scholars entirely ignore policy-implementers; indeed, much attention 
has been paid to, for instance, the implementer ‘characteristics’ and ‘dispositions’ 
Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975), as well as the dynamic ‘games’ among 
implementers (Bardach, 1977). However, with a presumed dominance of ‘the top’ in 
mind, top-down scholars tend to regard policy-implementers only as part of the 																																																																																																																																																														
up in different ways, under different labels, and often in distinct substantive fields’ (Hill and Hupe, 
2002: 96; Lindquist and Wanna, 2015: 211). 
21 Some more comprehensive reviews on the three approaches of the public policy implementation 
research could be seen, for instance, in Sabatier (1986), Parsons (1995), Hill and Hupe (2002) and 
Lindquist and Wanna (2015). 
22 Representative top-down works include, for instance, Pressman and Wildavsky (1973, 1984), Van 
Meter and Van Horn (1975), Hood (1976), Bardach (1977), Gunn (1978, 1984), Sabatier and 
Mazmanian (1979, 1980). 
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policy formulation and object of control – and when they go astray from central 
command – something that is ‘dysfunctional’ (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973: 134), 
‘illicit’ and ‘evil’ (Elmore, 1979: 610), and thus has to be ‘fixed’ through careful 
‘scenario writing’ (Bardach, 1977).   
 
Along these lines, a typical chain of analysis from a top-down scholar would be, as 
summarized by Sabatier (1986: 22-3), to start with a policy decision by governmental 
officials, then to examine to what extent the implementers and target groups’ actions 
are consistent with policy objectives, thus to evaluate to what extent the objectives 
are achieved over time, and based on that, to investigate the factors that affect policy 
outputs and impacts. The attainment of the policy objectives, therefore, – suppose the 
policy is soundly formulated – is usually regarded as the criteria for successful 
implementation; and if not, efforts should then be put into ‘reformulating’ the policy 
‘on the basis of experience’. 
II. Bottom-Up Approach23 
The bottom-up camp, on the other hand, advocates that it is the ‘bottom’ 
implementers that dominate the process and outcomes of policy implementation. 
Although with a clear problem-solving orientation, a policy that is made by the 
policymakers based on the top-down assumption, or through a ‘forward mapping’ 
strategy as termed by Elmore, is largely only a ‘hypothetical’ connection building 
between policy implements and expected outcomes. A more accurate reading of the 
cause-effect relationship may well come from ‘the bottom’, and thus their options 
and choices are more valid (Elmore, 1985: 36). Even if a correct causal link is 
represented in a policy, ‘it is not the policy or the policymaker that solves the 
problem, but someone with immediate proximity’; policy can only ‘direct 
individuals’ attention toward a problem and provide them an occasion for the 
application of skill and judgement, but policy cannot itself solve problems’ (Elmore, 
1979: 612). Simply put, the agency of ‘bottom’ policy-implementers, good or bad, 
can by no means be neglected; however sound a policy might be in design, it boils 
down to the capability and willingness of the implementers to follow it through.  
 
It is in this vein that the exact influence of policy and its formulator on 
implementation, which the top-down approach highly emphasize, is greatly 
questioned by the bottom-uppers (Elmore, 1979: 604). To extend this even further, 
Lipsky (1980) challenges the actual validity of a centrally defined policy in terms of 
the extent to which it is to be executed. 
 
I argue that the decisions of street-level bureaucrats, the routines they establish, and the 
devices they invent to cope with uncertainties and work pressures, effectively become the 
public policies they carry out. I argue that public policy is not best understood as made in 
legislatures or top-floor suites of high-ranking administrators, because in important ways 
it is actually made in the crowded offices and daily encounters of street-level workers. 
(Lipsky, 1980: xii) 
 
Further, effective control from the top, another top-down core element, seems to 
bottom-uppers no more than a myth (Elmore, 1979: 603). The discretion of and 
complexity of joint action among implementers, among other key issues addressed by 																																																								
23 Works of typical bottom-up approach include, for instance, Lipsky (1971, 1980), Elmore (1980), 
Hjern et al. (1978), Hjern and Porter (1981), Hjern (1982), Hjern and Hull (1982) 
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the bottom-up scholars, make central steering incredibly difficult, if not impossible.  
Furthermore, control can even be counterproductive. Taking bureaucrat implementers 
as an example, if, the implementation of policy is understood as being what Lipsky 
depicts as ‘street-level workers with high service ideals exercising discretion under 
intolerable pressures’, then, any attempt to control them hierarchically would only 
increase their tendency to stereotype and stray away from ‘top’ expectations (Hill and 
Hupe, 2002: 53). 
 
A typical bottom-up method in studying implementation processes can be seen in the 
work of Hjern and his colleagues (Hjern et al., 1978; Hjern and Porter, 1981; Hjern 
and Hull, 1982). Instead of a preoccupation with any policy mandate, they start from 
in a pool of relevant organizations – that is, the ‘implementation structure’, as it is 
termed by the authors – and then investigate their opinions, strategies and actions 
concerning a specific policy problem. Accordingly, what matters in assessing the 
success or failure of implementation, in the eyes of bottom-uppers, is indeed to what 
extent the target problem is solved, rather than that the policy objective fulfilled.  
III. Synthesis24 
Following on the initial debate between the ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ approaches, 
more and more scholars, particularly from the 1980s on, tended to take a synthesizing 
approach to implementation research. The ‘synthesizing’ efforts are most manifestly 
seen in those works that try to bring the perspectives and variables of the two schools 
of thought together, either in an integrated way (e.g. Elmore 1985, Sabatier, 1986; 
Winter, 1990), or on a contingency basis (e.g. Berman, 1980; Matland, 1995). 
 
In a more general manner, Elmore, one of the abovementioned ‘bottom-up’ advocates, 
compared, in his later work (1985), the two logics of ‘forward mapping’ and 
‘backward mapping’, and went on to call for a combination of both in order to 
achieve a satisfactory policy outcome. 
 
From the forward mapping perspective, the problem is finding a collection of implements 
that is likely to produce the effect that policymakers want. From the backward mapping 
perspective, the problem is finding a set of decisions that policy can influences and 
specifying how policy can tip those decisions in the desired direction. Forward mapping 
stresses what policymakers control; backward mapping stresses the marginal influence 
that policy exercises over decisions by individuals and organizations… the success of 
policy depends on more than choosing the correct combination of implements; it depends 
as well on conditions outside the control of policymakers and on decisions over which 
policy exercises only a marginal influence. (Elmore, 1985: 68-9) 
 
In a more theoretical attempt, Sabatier (1986) proposed an ‘advocacy coalition 
framework’ as a conceptual vehicle to analyse implementation processes, and 
particularly, to explain policy change over time. This is a typical integrated 
framework built upon the two schools in that it adopts ‘a whole variety of public and 
private actors involved within a policy problem’, both proponents and opponents, as 
its unit of analysis as what the bottom-uppers normally do.  At the same time it 
																																																								
24 Works using a synthesizing approach include, for instance, Majone and Wildavsky, 1978; Browne 
and Wildavsky, 1984; Sabatier, 1986, 1988; Winter, 1990; Scharpf, 1978; Matland, 1995; Elmore, 
1985; Ripley and Franklin, 1982; Goggin et al., 1990.  
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blends that with the top-downers’ concerns with the manner in which ‘social-
economic conditions and legal instruments constrain behaviour’ (Sabatier, 1986: 39).  
 
Similarly, in what is termed the ‘integrated implementation model’, Winter (1990) 
combines the typical top-down kind of consideration as to ‘policy formulation’ and 
‘policy design’ with the ‘implementation process’ where, in line with the bottom-up 
approach, emphasis is put more upon the attributes and behaviours of the field actors, 
specifically organizations, street-level bureaucrats and target groups. But as he 
himself commented later on, the purpose of the model is ‘not to make a true synthesis’ 
between the two schools of thought, but rather ‘to integrate a number of the most 
fruitful theoretical elements from various pieces of implementation research – 
regardless of their origin – into a joint model or framework’ (Winter, 2012a: 270). 
 
Another line of synthesis is the development of contingency analysis of 
implementation. Berman (1978, 1980) and Matland (1995) are representative writers 
in this fashion. In Berman’s work (1980), he first sets out two types of 
‘implementation strategy’: ‘programmed implementation strategy’, a typical top-
down method that depends highly on the ‘specificity’ of a given policy and the strict 
following through by all levels of the implementers involved; and bottom-up 
‘adaptive implementation strategy’ that ‘allows policy to be modified, specified and 
revised – in a word, adapted – according to the unfolding interaction of the policy 
with its institutional setting’. He then argues that, in choosing from the two strategies 
with a view to achieving a satisfactory implementation result, one has to be take 
adequate consideration of the ‘context’ or ‘policy situation’ to make sure that 
strategies match situations. Specifically, five elements of the policy situation are 
picked out as important in shaping the choice, that is the policy’s ‘scope of change, 
its degree of technical certainty, the extent of agreement about the policy, the degree 
of coordination characteristic of the implementing system, and the stability of the 
policy’s environment’. 
 
Critically drawing on Berman’s work (1978, 1980), Matland (1995) later developed 
his ‘ambiguity-conflict model’, in which he distinguishes four types of 
implementation according to the different collation of the two determinant variables. 
Under this typology, Matland points out that the top-down models present an accurate 
description of the implementation process when policy is clear and conflict is low, i.e. 
the ‘administrative implementation’ in the matrix, thus macro-implementation (a 
concept borrowed from Berman 1978) planners can wield considerable influence. 
Meanwhile, bottom-up models better suit the implementation process when policy is 
ambiguous and conflict is low, i.e. the ‘experimental implementation’, where micro-
implementation levels dominate and should be encouraged to vary. 
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Table 1-1 Matland’s Model 
 
Source: Matland, 1995. 
 
Aside from what have been discussed above, the synthesizing approach also includes 
a broader group of works which may endeavour to elaborate on some more specific 
issues, but with a natural embrace of both the roles of ‘the top’ and ‘the bottom’. 
Some of the important issues addressed include, for example, ‘policy types’ 
(Windhoff-Héritier, 1980; Ripley and Franklin, 1982); ‘policy network/multi-actor 
environment of implementation’ (Scharpf, 1978; O’Toole, 1986 and 2000; Kickert, 
Klijn and Koppenjan, 1997); ‘communications model’ between layers of government 
(Goggin et al., 1990); and ‘governance’ whereby the authorities can ‘manipulate the 
conditions of the implementation process to encourage co-operative responses to 
conflicts of interest’ (Stoker, 1991: 50). Processure  
1.5.2 The ‘Policy–Implementer–Environment’ Analytical Framework 
Drawing greatly from the PPI literature and closely linking to the empirical evidence 
of the thesis, I develop the following framework as an analytical tool to examine and 
explain the actual outcomes of Chinese development cooperation policy in African 
agriculture and particularly the influencing factors behind them25. The framework is 
held up by three main pillars, namely policy, implementer and environment. Policy is 
attached with considerable importance in this framework and treated as the starting 
point of analysis. That said, the present framework does not entirely agree with the 
top-down approach and indeed puts great emphasis onto implementer behaviours. It is 
in this sense that this framework is in effect adopting a synthesizing approach, but 
more in the fashion of Sabatier (1986) and Winter (1990) that attempts to develop an 
integrated synthesis by combining together key elements that are considered 
important from the two approaches. Environment – more specifically, the 
implementation environment – which has not been very much discussed in the PPI 
literature but proved to be very pertinent to the research topic of the thesis, is also 																																																								
25 For the details of how this analytical framework is developed, see Chapter 1.4.2. 
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incorporated as an important aspect in this framework. The section that follows will 
explain in more detail the three key aspects as well as some subordinating variables 
that are deemed as particularly relevant in analysing the research topic of the thesis. 
I. Policy 
Policy is defined here as a purposive course of action proposed and adopted by 
government authorities aiming to deal with specific public issues or problems. By 
emphasizing ‘proposed and adopted’, the ‘policy’ definition here excludes the 
situation where policies are proposed only for certain political reasons (e.g. winning 
public support in elections) but never put into practice; rather, in this analytical 
framework as well sd the discussion of the thesis topic, ‘policy’ is always associated 
with concrete actions that have been or will be actually taken. Furthermore, while 
admitting the validity of top-down-style made policies26, the definition here includes 
far beyond only those white-paper-like, readily-written-type policies; as long as 
policy initiatives are proclaimed in public occasions and followed on by actual 
actions, they are regarded as government policies in the thesis. Lastly, it should be 
noted that policies can be examined in different levels; taking the Chinese 
development cooperation policies under discussion for example, the overall 
development cooperation policies as well as those more detailed innovative aid and 
agribusiness sub-policies are all within the application range of this analytical 
framework. 
 
Two policy-related variables are considered important and pertinent to the thesis 
topic, namely policy design and policy control27. Policy design is defined as ‘the 
process of inventing, developing and fine-tuning a course of action with the 
amelioration of some problem’ (Dryzek, 1983: 346). It involves setting and/or 
choices of intentions or goals, instruments or means for accomplishing the intentions, 
governmental and non-governmental entities charged with carrying out the intentions, 
resources for requisite tasks (May, 2012: 279), with a view to making each of these 
policy components not only inherently as sound as possible but also validly linked 
with one another28. For instance, policy objectives are expected, at least in an ideal 
situation, to be ‘precise and clearly ranked in importance’ (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 
1979: 487), while demonstrating a reasonable causal theory linking both to the policy 
problems and the specific action plans. Or, the policy tasks are ideally supposed to be 
specified ‘in complete detail and perfect sequence’ to ‘each participant’ (Gunn, 1984: 
205).  																																																								
26 Thus dismissing the use of ‘policy’ as what the front-line implementers are actually carrying out, as 
the bottom-up scholars advocate; see Chapter 1.5.1. 
27 Other variables being discussed in the PPI literature include, for instance, “setting of goals”, “causal 
chain connecting actions to objectives” (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984: xxii-xxv); “policy standards 
and objectives”, “policy resources” (Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975: 462-65); 
“norms/rules/objectives”, “line of authority”, “obedience” or “administrative control” (Hood, 1976: 6-
7); “resources”, “theory of cause and effect”, “dependency relationships” of implementing agencies, 
“objectives”, “tasks”, “compliance” (Gunn, 1984: 200-207); “causal theory”, “policy objectives”, 
“financial resources”, “agencies” selection, “hierarchical integration with and among implementing 
agencies”, “recruitment of implementing official”, “formal access by outsiders” (Sabatier and 
Mazmanian, 1979: 486-494; Sabatier, 1986: 24); “policy conflict” and “policy ambiguity” (Matland, 
1995). 
28 Policy design, at least in this present framework, is treated as a technocratic matter – while admitting 
the bounded rationality and practical difficulties to always achieve a perfect design, it does not take 
into consideration the possible political manipulation such as policy goals that are intentionally made 
vague in order to reduce conflicts and get the policy passed. 
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That said, however well a policy might be designed, what is simultaneously needed is 
appropriate and adequate policy control. This is so because seldom is a policy self-
implemented; to put it into effect, a policy has to be executed by some intermediary 
implementers in an effort to influence the behaviours of certain target groups – and 
neither of these two groups are naturally obedient to their commanders. Therefore, as 
rightly pointed out by Hood (1976: 23), ‘controls have to be deployed at a minimum 
of two levels: the level of the administrative apparatus itself and the level of the 
‘administered’ population’. There are many specific methods (Peters, 2013: 306-332) 
but also important limitations (Hood, 1976) for policy controls. Control can be 
particularly difficult in the case of external (public) policies due to the geographical 
distance involved.  Moreover, when policies are targeting at foreign groups, while 
certain control is still indispensable, it does, however, have to be taken very skilfully 
in order to avoid unnecessary diplomatic resentment. This is because, as an important 
difference with domestic public policy, the authorities have no governing legitimacy 
over the foreign target groups – therefore, their control over the latter, particularly in 
normal/routine situations (contrary to crisis situations such as inter-state wars), has to 
be exerted in a ‘softer’ manner, for instance, more through negotiation or opinion 
exchange rather than regulation or sanctions. In this sense, it might be more 
appropriate to use ‘influence’ instead of ‘control’ when it comes to the target groups 
of an external policy. 
 
Apart from situations of recalcitrance, control is also needed in a more general sense, 
as a way of macro-steering. A typical case here is the top-down coordination of 
different implementers in face of the prevailing multi-organizational implementation 
problem (Hanf and Scharpf, 1978). The policymaking authorities then will need to 
devise and employ appropriate ‘influence strategies’ on the implementers depending 
on the different exchange relationships between one another (Scharpf, 1978: 352-8), 
in order to make them stick together, collaborate productively and thus achieve the 
policy objectives. This is also the emphasised role of foreign policies, as asserted by 
Clarke, that is, to ‘hold coalitions together in some sort of structure’ (Smith and 
Clarke, 1985: 187).  
II. Implementer 
Implementer refers to the entity who puts a given policy into practice. An important 
caveat that needs to be made beforehand is that, implementers in the context of this 
thesis include not only the formally assigned, usually governmental actors, but also 
those who may not be officially entrusted with the task of carrying out a particular 
policy but nevertheless in effect actively engage in the policy implementation process 
– the Chinese companies that are following the state-led agricultural development 
cooperation, especially that of the agribusiness sub-policy in Africa, in this paper are 
a case in point. These actors may be termed as ‘unintentional policy implementers’ in 
the sense that they seem to mostly follow their own agenda, but unintentionally also 
contribute, to different extent, to the realization of the government policy objectives. 
 
Policy implementers are seldom a unitary entity. In the domestic public sphere, back 
to the 1970s, governments in industrial societies were already increasingly confronted 
with tasks ‘where both the problems and their solution tend to cut across the 
boundaries of separate authorities and functional jurisdictions’, and thus require 
‘participants from different decision levels and from a variety of functionally 
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specialized organizational units’ (Hanf, 1978: 1-2). Indeed, as argued by Scharpf 
(1978: 347) who was among the earliest that brought the idea of ‘policy network’ into 
implementation research (Hill and Hupe, 2009: 59; Pülzl and Treib, 2007: 96), ‘[it] is 
unlikely, if not impossible, that public policy of any significance could result from 
the choice process of any single unified actor. Policy formulation and policy 
implementation are inevitably the result of interactions among a plurality of separate 
actors with separate interests, goals and strategies.’ Later on, Hjern (1981: 212-3) 
also incorporates private actors, among many other organizations that newly emerged 
after World War II, into the picture of policy implementers. 
 
Several variables are deemed particularly relevant among the diversity of explanatory 
factors for implementation results from the bottom-up point of view29, namely 
capabilities, motivations, discretions and cooperation. 
 
While many may take the capability factor as granted in an implementation scenario, 
an oft-seen problem, however, is precisely the mismatch between the implementer 
capabilities and the policy-task requirements. This is particularly so when some new 
policies are concerned where relevant experiences are lacking, and may happen even 
when implementers have been through an intentional selection procedure. One 
possible reason is the fact that in most cases implementing agencies are chosen by 
some ‘hard’ criteria (e.g. different sorts of qualifications) which give great emphasis 
to their professional abilities but tell little about other dimensions of the candidates. 
The capabilities of implementers may be able to be improved either through efforts 
from within, such as the implementers’ own learning and adaption, or from outside, 
such as different types of support from the commanding authorities. However, the 
capability improvement of implementers, particularly for new policies, may require a 
relatively longer period. This would accordingly imply that the mismatch between 
implementer capability and task requirements may stand as an obstacle to effective 
implementation for quite a while. 
  
The second factor is the motivation, or willingness, of implementers to execute a 
given policy. It is not entirely impossible to expect voluntary compliance of the 
implementing agencies out of pure obligation. On this point, organization type does 
matter. State actors, either governmental or corporate, are understandably more 
inclined to faithfully carry out a government policy, due to their legal or even moral 
commitment, than non-state actors, say, private companies or NGOs. The shadow of 
control, of course, also hangs over the implementers. However, as has already been 																																																								
29 Other variables being discussed in the PPI literature include, for instance, “complexity of joint 
action” (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973); “characteristics of the implementing agencies” (e.g. the 
competence and size of the staff, the degree of hierarchical control, an agency’s political resources, the 
vitality of an organization, the degree of open communications within an organization, or the agency’s 
linkages with the policy-making body), “disposition of implementers” (e.g. cognition of the policy, the 
direction of their response toward it, and the intensity of that response), and “inter-organizational 
communication and enforcement activities” (Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975: 465-74); 
“implementation games” (e.g. the stakes, strategies, tactics, resources of players, the rules of play and 
fair play, the nature of communications among players) (Bardach, 1977); “discretion” and “autonomy” 
and “resources for resistance” (Lipsky,1980); “organizational processes and outputs”, “complexity of 
joint action”, “discretion”, and “coalition and bargaining” (Elmore, 1979); “supportive agencies” and 
“skilled agency leaders” (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979: 487, 494); “multi-actor environment” 
(O’Toole, 1986: 182); “inter-organisational policy/policy network” (Scharpf, 1978; Kickert, Klijn and 
Koppenjan, 1997); “implementation structure” (Hjern and Porter, 1981); “advocacy coalition” 
(Sabatier, 1986); “policy-action continuum (Barrett and Fudge, 1981). 
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widely acknowledged, even for those obligatorily bound state bureaucracies, they are 
never acquiescent puppets of government. Driven by their disparate organization 
interests and agendas, they apparently do not always follow the instructions only 
because they are supposed to do so (see e.g. Hanf and Scharpf, 1978; Lipsky, 1980); 
and it may even be so for those only loosely bound, non-state actors, or those 
‘unintentional implementers’ who have no legal obligation to the government at all. 
 
Therefore, it is perhaps more realistic to stick to the self-interested human nature 
assumption, and reaffirm that, for the most part, it is the congruity of objectives, or 
more pertinently, compatibility of the underlying interests, that determines 
implementers’ motivation. Leaving aside the factor of external control, it is assumed 
that implementers, like any individuals in an organisation, tend to pursue first and 
foremost their own interests and aims. Therefore, the argument is that, the more 
compatible the implementers’ interests are with those of the policy-making authority, 
and thus the more the objectives of the two tend to overlap, the more the 
implementers may feel like faithfully carrying out a given policy. On the contrary, if 
there is not much in common in terms of the two parties’ pursuits, or even there are 
contradictory aims, it would be naïve to expect implementers to automatically follow 
the order; they may do so, but quite likely only in a half-hearted, less-motivated way, 
and they may even choose to disregard the ‘national interests’ that are supposed to 
underpin the government policy objectives.   
 
Implementer discretion is another widely recognized phenomenon. Sticking to its 
dictionary meaning, discretion is defined here as the ability and right to decide 
exactly what should be done in a particular situation. The discretion of implementers 
can be seen as a kind of ‘informal authority that derives from expertise, skill, and 
proximity to the essential tasks that an organization performs’ (Elmore, 1979: 606). 
In addition, implementers may have certain levels of resources, allocated by the 
policymakers or self-owned, which make it possible to carry out their discretionary 
decisions when they feel necessary. The limitations of policy control, furthermore, 
open opportunities of discretion exertion.  
 
There are different situations where discretion may be exercised and accordingly may 
have both positive and negative effects. It may happen when the policies formulated 
by ‘the top’ are rather ambiguous, particularly in terms of the specific action plans, 
and thus leave space and also make it necessary for implementers to reify the policies 
in order to put them into practice. It may happen when the given policies are not well 
designed – for instance do not fit the implementers or the implementation 
environment – and thus implementers have to modify it to make it implementable or 
have a better effect. It may also happen, linked to the motivation factor discussed 
earlier, when implementers’ objectives conflict with those of their order-givers and 
adequate supervision is not in place, and thus implementers may intentionally distort 
the initial policies. In either case, exercising discretion can be seen as a process of 
policy reshaping or even reformulating. The outcome of this reshaping process – can 
be good but also possibly harmful – and varies according to the specific context.  
 
As mentioned earlier in defining ‘implementation structure’, multi-organizational 
implementation has become a prevailing phenomenon; that is, ‘both the formulation 
and implementation of public policy increasingly involve different governmental 
levels and agencies, as well as interactions between public authorities and private 
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organizations’ (Hanf, 1978: 1). What is naturally inferred from this then is the need 
for cooperation among all the actors involved in order for a satisfactory 
implementation result. Cooperation could happen as kind of spontaneous pursuits of 
the implementers as long as there are certain objective/interest congruities in terms of 
conducting cooperation among the different implementers. As observed by Hanf 
(1978: 2), whilst admitting the difficulties of voluntary cooperation, ‘indeed, much 
coordination results from the voluntary interactions among the individual units, 
without any conscious or deliberate steering by a more inclusive decision maker or, in 
some way, through the system as a whole’.  
 
Cooperation problems, however, will arise when there is competition or even 
conflicts between the different implementers; or, even when there is a need for 
cooperation from one implementer, the demand may only be unilateral and thus the 
condition of ‘exchange’ is lacking for that cooperation to be able to take place. In 
addition, similar to the case for discretion, cooperation also implies certain 
requirements for the implementers’ capability. To work as a team and meanwhile 
have a view to effectiveness is never an easy job. Collaborative problem-solving, for 
instance, requires the implementers to be adept at communication and trust building, 
among other public relations skills, and this tends to be even more necessary and also 
more demanding in cases of foreign policies where, aside from internal cooperation, 
the implementers also need to cooperate with their foreign counterparts.   
III. Environment 
Environment, or structure, in the sphere of social sciences, generally means the 
setting or context - tangible or intangible - wherein an agent acts and that would 
inevitably place certain constraints on the agent’s behaviours. In the broadest sense, it 
can include all the factors that could possibly exert some sort of influence on an 
agent’s behaviours (e.g. see Anderson, 1979: 27). Environment here, limited more 
specifically to the implementation environment of an external public policy, is 
defined as the setting/context wherein the implementation takes place and that could 
have effects on the implementers’ behaviour. In the present analytical framework, 
two dimensions concerning the implementation environment of an external policy are 
to be looked at, i.e. static environment and dynamic environment30.  
 
Static environment indicates all sorts of (natural, political, economic, social, cultural) 
circumstances that are relatively stable within a period of time and may impose 
constraints on the implementation of a foreign policy. Such factors include, for 
instance, political culture, administrative structure, government efficiency, economic 
development level, civil society, culture and languages. 
 
By contrast, dynamic environment focuses more on the role of actors (policymakers, 
implementers, or locals of the target country) and their actions (internal politics 																																																								
30 Other variables being discussed in the PPI literature include, for instance, “social-economic 
conditions and technology”, “media attention to the problem”, “public support”, “attitudes and 
resources of constituency groups”, “support from sovereigns”, “distribution of natural resources”, 
“fundamental socio-cultural values and social structure”, “constitutional structure/rules”, “advocacy 
coalitions” (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1980; Sabatier, 1986); “nature of public opinion”, importance of 
the related policy issue, attitudes of elites, political parties and private interest groups (Van Meter and 
Van Horn, 1975); “policy target groups” (Elmore, 1985); and “social-economic context” (Winter, 
1990). 
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within each group of those actors or interplay among different groups of actors) in 
affecting the implementation process of a foreign policy. It is worth noting that these 
actors do not have to have a direct link to the policy issue under implementation. The 
actions and interactions within and among the actors may happen independently of 
the implementation process, following their respective self-interest seeking agendas, 
but they relate to or engage with the policy implementation in certain ways31. This 
sort of environment is considered dynamic also in that it is not something, like the 
static environment, that policymakers and implementers could, to varying extent, 
foresee and thus prepare countermeasures for beforehand. Rather, it is often some 
circumstances that the implementers would be confronted with only after the policies 
have been put into practice, which therefore calls for improvisational coping solutions 
from the implementers This normally sets higher requirements, for instance, for the 
capability and discretion of the implementers.  
1.6 Chapter Plan  
The thesis consists of five chapters in total. The current chapter (Chapter 1) has 
provided the topic background and literature review of the so-called ‘emerging 
donors’ – or ‘Southern development partners’ as referred to in this thesis – in the past 
decade or so, developed the research questions concerning more specifically Chinese 
development cooperation in African agriculture, and introduced the methodologies 
and theoretical instruments adopted by the author. 
 
Chapter 2 of the thesis will offer a historical review of Chinese agricultural 
development cooperation with Africa since the late 1950s, in order to help readers to 
better understand how the contemporary models have come into being. It will go 
through the three historical phases – respectively the ‘earlier period’ in the 1960–70s, 
the ‘transition period’ during the 1980–90s, and the ‘new era’ from the 2000s until 
the present time – which are characterized by different motives, modalities and 
institutional structures. The chapter will also give a special focus on China’s foreign 
aid reforms, taking place between the 1980s and 90s, which have significantly 
informed the practice of China’s current development cooperation. In the end of the 
chapter, it identifies three specific models embraced in China’s contemporary 
‘development package’ of agricultural cooperation with Africa: namely the 
‘traditional agro-aid’, ‘innovative agro-aid’ and ‘agribusiness’ models. 
 
Chapter 3 will endeavour to investigate the ‘innovative agro-aid’ model of Chinese 
development cooperation with Africa, particularly through examining the flagship 
project of Chinese ATDC (Agriculture Technology Demonstration Centre) on the 
continent. It will first introduce the objectives, actors and mechanisms of the ATDCs, 
along with their general developments since 2006, and then provide a detailed case 
study on one of the earliest and highly ranked ATDCs – the one in Mozambique. 
Based on the case study, the chapter will give a preliminary analysis as to the actual 
results of the ATDCs, mostly drawing on the fieldwork-based observations from the 
Mozambican case but also combining other ATDC cases according to primary and 
secondary sources. 
 																																																								
31 For example, suppose there are states A and B, the deterioration of bilateral relations between A and 
B in general may cause the implementation failure of on-going aid policies of A in B; or the anti-A 
resentment may be used as a campaign tool by the opposition party of B to attack its domestic ruling 
party, and thus lead to the termination of commercial policies of A in B. 
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Chapter 4 will follow on to look at another representative model that is currently 
adopted in Chinese agricultural development cooperation with Africa, the 
‘agribusiness model’. Similarly, the chapter will first introduce the model by 
exploring the motives, actors and modalities and then further unpack the model by 
examining four fieldwork-based case studies of Chinese agribusiness projects in 
Mozambique. These four cases bring to light different types of company actors (e.g. 
private/state-owned/mixed), governmental relations (both with the Chinese and 
Mozambican), investment fields (e.g. rice/cotton) and modalities (in terms of 
financing, production and processing). At the same time, they share, to varying 
degrees, similarities with each other, and thus provide a good basis for a comparative 
integrated analysis. In the end of the chapter, there will be a preliminary analysis as to 
the up-to-now results, especially problems, of China’s ‘agribusiness model’ in Africa. 
 
The last chapter (Chapter 5) will, on the basis of the historical and empirical 
research, respond to the research questions raised in the Introduction. It will first 
conclude from the historical review that how the status of being as a developing 
country has shaped the mentalities and modalities of Chinese agricultural aid and 
development cooperation with Africa. It will then summarise the three models of 
China’s contemporary development cooperation in African agriculture and explain 
the logic of ‘development package’ behind. And most importantly, it will provide a 
synthesised explanation as to the problems appearing in the cooperation process by 
adopting the Public Policy Implementation approach introduced in Chapter 1. The 
contribution and limitation of the thesis as well as directions for future research will 
be provided in the very end of the chapter. 
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Chapter 2 Chinese Development Cooperation in African 
Agriculture: A Historical Review 
 
As noted in the Introduction, China (as well as other development partners from the 
South) has had a parallel historical trajectory and as rich experience of engaging in 
international development cooperation as that of the Northern donors. This history – 
especially some essential continuities and shifts, and key guidelines that have been 
gradually established over the past half-century – has left an indelible imprint on the 
mentality and modality of China’s contemporary development cooperation practice, 
explaining a lot about the much-debated distinctions between the Northern donors 
and Southern counterparts. However, one of the notable shortcomings of the existing 
research on development cooperation from the South, including that of China, is 
precisely a lack of a historical dimension. In light of this, the primary objective of the 
present chapter is to provide a historical review of Chinese development cooperation, 
with a typical case of that in African agriculture, thereby shedding some light on how 
the current modalities, and the ‘development package’ model in particular, have come 
into being. 
 
China’s agricultural development cooperation with Africa dates back to the late 
1950s and divided roughly into three phases: the ‘earlier period’ in the 1960–70s, the 
‘transition period’ in the 1980–90s, and the ‘New Era’ from the 2000s until the 
present time. The three phases of development cooperation are featured by different 
political and/or economic driving forces, diverse cooperation forms and evolving 
institutional structures in terms of management and implementation. Particularly 
important in this historical process are the foreign aid reforms starting from the 
1980s, which have greatly informed the practice of Chinese development cooperation 
in the ‘transition’ and especially the current stage. This chapter, therefore, will unfold 
along this line and elaborate respectively on the three historical phases as well as the 
event of China’s foreign aid reforms.  
2.1 ‘Pure Aid’: The Earlier Period of Chinese Development Cooperation 
in African Agriculture (1960–1970s)  
Chinese agricultural engagement with Africa could be traced back to the late 1950s, 
and the first wave of it covers roughly the period from the 1960s to 1970s. That could 
be fairly regarded as a form of development cooperation and indeed to a certain 
degree was more similar to the ODA-style, or ‘pure aid’ type of development 
cooperation in the sense that it was official aid – in most cases through grants – with 
a primary aim to promote the agricultural development of African countries which 
was in a rather underdeveloped status and desperately in need of external assistance. 
That said, there were very strong political motivations of the Chinese side behind the 
agricultural cooperation. That was a time for the PRC (People’s Republic of China), 
to fight for its regime survival and international recognition. The PRC was then 
confronted with tremendous challenges and difficulties in face of the comprehensive 
blockade imposed by the West against the Cold War background. In particular, with 
the deterioration of foreign relations with the Soviet Union ‘brother’ since the late 
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1950s, building a broad alliance with African and other Third World32 countries 
gradually developed into an integral part of China’s diplomatic strategy with the aim 
of countering the threats from both the Soviet and Western blocs (Fu, 2008).  
 
It is within this broader context that China-Africa agricultural cooperation started to 
unfold. China began to develop diplomatic relations with African countries and also 
provided aid to the continent after the Bandung Conference in 1955 (State Council of 
the PRC, 2011). Agricultural aid, due to its widespread popularity among African 
leaders (Jiang, 2013), soon became an important and widely adopted instrument in 
China’s dealings with African relations. In 1959–60 China donated 15,000 tons of 
rice to Guinea at the request of the Guinean president, which signified the start of 
Chinese agricultural aid towards Africa. This deserves attention given the fact that 
China itself was suffering a severe famine during 1959–1961, and thus further 
demonstrates the urgency and significance of expanding international space to the 
Chinese government at that time. In October 1959, the two countries established 
formal diplomatic relations and Guinea became the first state in the sub-Sahara Africa 
that recognized the PRC (Xiao, 2002; Meng, 2013). In 1964, a new agency, the 
Bureau of Foreign Affairs, was set up under the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture to 
take specific charge of the country’s foreign agricultural aid issues, indicating the 
beginning of the institutionalisation of agricultural aid in China (Jiang, 2013; Tang, et 
al., 2014). Throughout the 1960s, there were about seven countries33 in Africa who 
had received agricultural aid from China (Shi, 1989; Bräutigam, 1998; Jiang, 2013). 
 
Entering the 1970s, the scale of Chinese agricultural aid in Africa was massively 
increased. Apart from the consideration of solidarity and allying with African states, 
another key factor at play was the competition with Taiwan (also known as the 
Republic of China on Taiwan) in Africa. With the help of the United States, Taiwan 
had successfully provided agricultural aid to African countries since the 1960s. As a 
result, many of these countries felt hesitant to expel the Taiwanese ‘farming teams’, 
as requested by the Chinese government during the negotiation process for 
establishing diplomatic relations with the PRC. To overcome this obstacle, the then 
Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai assured the African leaders that China would take over 
all the agricultural aid projects left by Taiwan and promised to do a better job than the 
latter. This led to the so-called ‘replacement aid (dingti yuanzhu)’ which involved 18 
African countries34 and lasted for 13 years during the period 1970–1983. By the time 
the ‘replacement aid’ ended, China had replaced almost all the agro-aid projects left 
by Taiwan except for those in Côte d’Ivoire and Malawi (Shi, 1989; Jiang, 2013). 
 																																																								
32 The ‘Third World’ here is used in the sense of Mao Zedong’s Three Worlds theory, indicating the 
majority of African, Asian (except for Japan, including China itself) and Latin American countries 
during the period of Cold War, whereas the First World indicating the then superpowers, the Soviet 
Union and United States, and Second World the lesser powers including European countries, Canada, 
Australia, Japan (Mao, 1974). This usages is different from some other Western tradition of 
categorizing, for instance, that regards the United States and its NATO allies as the First World, the 
Soviet Union and its communist allies (including China) as the Second World, and those unaligned, 
often with colonial pasts, such as many of the African, Latin American, Asian and Oceanian countries 
as the Third World (e.g. see Sauvy, 1952). The latter usage is also adopted in the following section of 
this chapter (4.1.2).   
33 Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Congo-Brazzaville, Tanzania, Zambia and Somalia. 
34 Sierra Leone, Ruanda, Ghana, Togo, Congo-Kinshasa, Senegal, Benin, Gambia, Chad, Mauritius, 
Gabon, Nigeria, Niger, Madagascar, Central Africa, Liberia, Botswana, Burkina Faso.
	 42	
All through the first two decades of Chinese agricultural aid in Africa, complete 
projects35 such as farms (Table 2-1), agro-technology experiment and extension 
stations, irrigation and other agro-infrastructure were the most common types of aid 
projects. In total, China aided around 25 African countries with more than 100 or so 
agricultural complete projects, reclaiming over 40,000 hectares of farmland (mostly 
for food crops and sugarcane) (Shi, 1989; Yun, 1998). Meanwhile, thousands of 
Chinese agricultural experts and technicians were dispatched alongside the different 
projects to provide the locals with technical support and training (Shi, 1989; Jiang, 
2013). In addition, China also offered large donations of foodstuff and agricultural 
materials (Shi, 1989; Li et al., 2010). All these abovementioned project-type, 
technical and materials assistance were conducted through donations by Chinese 
government, and rarely associated with any other economic activities. This ‘pure aid’, 
as termed by some Chinese scholar (Yun, 2000a), was indeed quite similar to the 
Northern concept of ODA given some of its key features such as the official nature, 
concessionality and non-tying feature, except for one significant distinction which is 
the non-conditionality36. There was only one political condition attached to Chinese 
aid, including agro-aid, to Africa in the early days – that is to recognize the PRC as 
the one and the only one legitimate government of China. Again, this sole condition 
along with the ‘purity’ nature of Chinese earlier (agro-) aid clearly reflects the status, 
needs and thus priorities of the Chinese government at that time. 
 
Table 2-1 Examples of Chinese-aided Farms in Africa (1960-70s)37 
Country Project (Year of Establishment) 
Tanzania Wubenjia and Lufu Farm (late 1960s); Mubalali Farm (1977)  
Mali Two sugarcane farms (1970, 1976) 
Mauritania Mupoli Farm (1972) 
Uganda Qibenba Farm (1976) 
Congo-Brazzaville Gongbei Farm (1976) 
Congo-Kinshasa Two sugarcane farms (late 1970s) 
Sierra Leone A sugarcane farm (1981) 
Guinea  Keba Sugarcane Farm (1982) 
Somalia Feinuoli Farm (1987) 
Source: The author based on Shi, 1989; Yun, 2000b; Jiang, 2013.  
 
From an institutional perspective, these earlier agro-aid programmes were all 
financed and deployed by the central Chinese government, particularly through the 
Ministry of Agriculture, and implemented by the Departments of Agriculture at the 
provincial level alongside their government-affiliated institutions (Shi, 1989; Yun, 
2000a; Tang et al., 2014). Entering the 1970s, with a sharp increase of agro-aid 
projects due to the ‘replacement aid’ initiative, provincial governments were 																																																								
35 ‘Complete project’ is a term used by Chinese government to refer to the type of foreign aid project 
that involves project engineering and construction, equipment and facilities provision, and post-
construction service (MOC of the PRC, 2015).  
36 According to the authors’ interviews with several Chinese elderly diplomats in Africa, the long-held 
‘non-conditionality’ principle is deeply rooted in Chinese government’s respect for the UN Chapter 
and the Bandung Spirit in terms of respecting other countries’ sovereignty. Apart from that, the 
unhappy experience with Soviet Union trying to intervene Chinese domestic affairs in the late 1950s 
did not only directly lead to the ‘breakup’ of the two countries but also reconfirm the ‘non-
interference’ principle in PRC’s diplomatic thinking and practice (Niu, 2010). 
37 Due to the lack of and difficult access to some historical documents, especially those from the 
respective African countries, the names of the farms are presented uniformly in Chinese pinyin rather 
than their original languages.  
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mobilized and incorporated into the aid implementation process on a much larger 
scale (Shi, 1989; Xiao and Zhang, 2002). Overall, Chinese foreign aid, including 
agro-aid, in this early stage during the 1960-70s was delivered overwhelmingly by 
government agencies, central and provincial, through a strict top-down chain of 
command, which is largely in accordance with the country’s then centrally planned 
economy system in general. With little management autonomy and a tightly 
controlled budget (thus little economic incentives), the front-line implementing staff 
tended to demonstrate limited proactivity in their daily work, which was believed to 
be responsible for the often-seen low efficiency of aid projects in that period (Shi, 
1989). 
 
China’s earlier agricultural aid in Africa did help increase the food supply and boost 
the local economy in many of the recipient countries. The Mubalali Farm in 
Tanzania, for instance, used to produce one quarter of the whole country’s rice supply 
by itself during the 1970-80s (Shi, 1989; Table 2-1). In Mali where China began to 
provide agricultural aid since 1961, the Chinese indeed started the country’s history 
of producing and processing tea and sugarcane on its own, thus helping providing 
local employment, increasing government revenue and saving foreign exchange of 
the country that is used to import sugar (Wang, 2000; Han, 2011); the sugarcane 
factories, as to be picked up again later (Chapter 2.3), are still currently operational 
after almost six decades. However, one of the major problems concerning China’s 
earlier agricultural aid in Africa is that most of those aid projects was not sustainable. 
As observed by Yun (2000a), while almost all the agro-projects achieved initial 
success upon completion, they could barely survive for long after being transferred to 
the recipient governments (Yun, 2000a; Li et al., 2010). In the case of Sierra Leone, 
for example, only two years after the Chinese experts left, all the ten farms were 
flourishing with weeds (Bräutigam, 2009). Other similar cases were common at that 
time38 (Shi, 1989; also see Chapter 2.3). On top of others, the lack of technical, 
managerial and financial capability on the African (government) side was believed to 
be a main reason. Besides, the mechanized farming modality required by some of the 
Chinese-aided farms was also considered beyond the actual economic and 
productivity level of the African countries (Cai, 1992; Sun, 1996; Zhou and Wang, 
1997). 
2.2 The Foreign Aid Reforms 
After three decades of efforts, especially with the re-entry into the United Nation and 
the normalization of relations with the United States in the 1970s, the external 
environment of the PRC could been seen as much improved, either compared to the 
rather vulnerable period as a newly formed regime in the 1950s or the most hostile 
decade of the 1960s when it had to ‘fight on two fronts’ with both the Soviet Union 
and the US. By the end of 1979, China had established formal diplomatic relations 
with 120 countries around the world, including those from the Soviet, Western blocs 
and the non-aligned Third World39 (MOFA of the PRC, n.d.), and thus became an 																																																								
38 It is worth noting that this ‘non-sustainability’ problem was not only seen in Chinese agro-aid 
projects in Africa, but indeed a common problem that was also widely observed in other Western 
countries’ aid efforts in African agricultural sector (Eicher, 2003). 
39 The ‘Third World’ here, different from that in the context of Mao’s ‘Three Worlds’ theory (Chapter 
2.1), is used in the Western tradition of categorizing that regards the United States and its NATO allies 
as the First World, the Soviet Union and its communist allies (including China) as the Second World, 
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increasingly recognized and matured player in the international arena. The strategic 
needs for providing foreign aid, especially in exchange for international political 
support as conducted in the earlier period of 1950-60s, was hence relatively reduced. 
 
What is equally, if not more important, is the launch of the Reform and Opening Up 
policy in 1978. With the end of the disastrous ‘Cultural Revolution’, the CPC finally 
shifted its domestic policy priority from ‘class struggle’ to the country’s economic 
development, which was regarded, as put by Deng Xiaoping (1980), ‘the principal 
condition for solving all the problems [of China] both at home and abroad’. The 
‘domestic economy’ factor, accordingly, also began to be put onto China’s diplomatic 
agenda and has since gained increasing weight for itself. This can be seen, starting 
from the 1980s until now, from both the diplomatic efforts carried out with the aim of 
creating a peaceful and favourable external environment to guarantee China’s 
domestic economic development, and more importantly, the growing number of 
economic issues and commercial objectives that have entered the country’s foreign 
policy agendas, including that of Chinese foreign aid (see Chapter 2.4). 
 
Furthermore, the Chinese foreign aid per se was also facing problems. The 
increasingly overstretched trend of aid-giving in the 1960-70s, strongly influenced 
both by the political needs and communist ideology of proletarian internationalism, 
and ironically, the diplomatic setbacks and relation deterioration with some socialist 
‘brother countries’ who had been receiving large amount of Chinese aid for decades, 
caused the Chinese government to reflect upon its earlier aid practice (Xiao and 
Zhang, 2002; Zhou, 2008; Shu, 2009). Meanwhile, some practical problems, such as 
the lack of efficiency, profitability40 and sustainability of Chinese aid projects were 
also being gradually acknowledged to the realisation that change was needed (Shi, 
1989; Yun, 2000a).  
 
Against all these factors, a series of reform measures started to be introduced first in 
the 1980s and then in the mid-1990s by the Chinese government. Some of the most 
relevant policy changes, especially those that would help understand the evolving 
practice of Chinese agricultural development cooperation with Africa under 
discussion, will be presented as follows: namely the normalization of aid scale, the 
improvement of aid performance, the emphasis on mutual development. 
2.2.1 Normalization of Aid Scale 
While still acknowledging the strategic significance of aiding the Third World 
countries, a broad consensus was finally achieved among the Chinese leadership 
around the early 1980s that aid should be given according to China’s own actual 
strengths (Shi, 1989). As commented by Deng Xiaoping (1978),  
 
We are still very poor and cannot do much in terms of proletarian internationalism at the 
moment. We may be able to contribute more to mankind, especially the Third World, 
when we realize the Four Modernizations and have a stronger national economy in the 
future.  																																																																																																																																																														
and those unaligned, often with colonial pasts, such as many of the African, Latin American, Asian 
and Oceanian countries as the Third World (e.g. see Sauvy, 1952).  
40 Here, the ‘profitability’ refers mostly to the ability of the aid projects to bring economic benefits to 
the African locals, which is different from the more self-interested profit-seeking motive as growingly 
seen in the Chinese aid practice later on (particularly from the 1990s on) after the foreign aid reform. 
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In line with this, the Chinese government made a series of cost-effective adjustments 
to the aid-giving practice, particularly during the 1980s when the government had a 
relatively tight budget. These adjustments included, for instance, strengthening aid-
provision towards the least developed countries, increasing medium/small-sized 
society-oriented projects (e.g. agricultural demonstration bases, hospitals and schools) 
and symbolic projects (e.g. conference centres, stadiums), and accordingly reducing 
large-scaled productive projects (Shi, 1989; Zhou, 2008; State Council of the PRC, 
2011). As a result, the aid scale was dragged back to a more acceptable level, with the 
share of aid in the government fiscal expenditure falling from the record high of 6-7% 
in the 1960-70s to, for instance, 0.06% in 1980-81 (Zhou, 2008; Yang and Chen, 
2010)41. 
 
This aid scale readjustment, driven partially by the constrained economic power of 
China at that time but more importantly by the changes of the country’s strategic 
needs behind, shows how its identity as a developing country would affect its foreign 
development cooperation behaviours: the limited resources it possesses would have to 
be balanced towards the more urgent policy priority – for China in the 1980s, the 
domestic economic development accordingly. At least at that stage, China by no 
means possessed the necessary strengths to keep an independent development 
cooperation agenda as that of the Northern donors which was claimed to be more 
recipient-oriented and less influenced by donors’ self-interests. 
2.2.2 Improvement of Aid Performance 
However, the efforts of trying to reduce the scale of aid provision did not indicate, as 
already noted, that the significance of foreign aid was downplayed, nor did it mean 
that the aid effectiveness could be compromised. Rather, the aim was to ‘use the 
limited foreign aid funds to achieve the best results’ (MOFET of the PRC, 1983). 
Particularly, in face of the problems such as the abovementioned lack of efficiency, 
profitability and sustainability of China’s earlier aid projects, specific measures were 
taken with an express purpose of enhancing the aid performance. Two of the 
measures that are notably relevant are discussed as follows: the introduction of 
‘contract and responsibility system’, and the strengthening of post-construction 
engagement. 
 
First, the ‘contract and responsibility system’42 was introduced to the foreign aid and 
development cooperation area from 1983. Different from the previous government-
dominated approach of delivering aid projects, according to the new system, aid 
projects were contracted to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and government-affiliated 
institutions (shiye danwei), while the government agencies were only in charge of the 
macro-planning and supervising of the projects. By separating aid planning and 
implementation, particularly through allowing for more autonomy and economic 
incentives of the implementing entities, the system was supposed to help improve the 
operational efficiency of Chinese foreign aid (Shi, 1989). It is, however, worth noting 
that at this stage the aid work contracted to SOEs or government institutions was still 																																																								
41 Even with a dramatic increase of foreign aid in absolute terms in the past two decades (1990s-
present), the proportion of that to the total government fiscal expenditure has remained reasonably 
under 1% over the same period (Li and Wu, 2009; State Council of the PRC, 2014). 
42 The ‘contract and responsibility system’ was first adopted in the rural reforms of China since the late 
1970s and later gradually extended to other areas of the Reform.  
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largely revolving around infrastructure construction of the projects. The post-
construction engagement (discussed below) was still of limited scale. It is from the 
1990s onward that the contracted aid-implementing agencies became increasingly 
involved in the project operation. 
 
Second, more emphasis was placed onto the post-construction engagement43 in order 
to ‘consolidate the aid effects’ (MOFET of the PRC, 1984), or, in other words, to 
improve the project sustainability. The Chinese aid workers had, until then, showed 
great caution in engaging with post-construction operations, especially concerning 
project management matters for fear of being thought to intervene in the internal 
affairs of the aid recipient countries. In face of the often-seen unsustainability 
problem (Chapter 2.1), however, the Chinese government began to realize that it was 
necessary to step up the post-construction engagement, both in terms of technical and 
managerial cooperation – which, as reassured by the then Premier Zhao Ziyang, 
should ‘not be taken as intervention, but to help them [African countries] achieve 
self-dependence’ (Zhao, 1982 cited in Shi, 1989). 
 
Specifically, the technical cooperation, which had been practiced since the 1960s, 
normally involved provision of technical support and training to the locals, and at 
times, establishment of technical and management regulations and/or systems for the 
aid projects with the assistance of the dispatched Chinese experts. This type of 
cooperation generally took place after the project construction was completed and 
usually lasted one to two years unless being requested by the recipient countries for a 
longer period. The managerial cooperation, on the other hand, was a new trend in 
China’s aid practice, starting only after 1983 (Shi, 1989). It required, to varying 
degrees, participation of the Chinese staff in the day-to-day management of the aid 
projects. This involvement manifested itself under different forms, such as managing 
aid projects on behalf of recipient countries, lease management and joint ventures 
(State Council of the PRC, 2011). In practice, these two methods were often 
combined together, that is, the Chinese agro-expert groups would provide both 
technical and managerial support to the recipient countries. 
 
It is worth noting that, although the abovementioned reforms in aid modalities were 
initially introduced mostly for the consideration of aid performance improvement, 
measures such as incorporating company actors and encouraging post-construction 
engagement also smoothed the way for further, more commercially-oriented aid 
reforms forthcoming in the mid-1990s (Chapter 2.2.3). As will be shown in the 
following sections, with the ‘mutual development’ idea gaining more confirmation 
from the leadership and being increasingly applied in the real development 
cooperation practice, a number of aid projects that incorporated post-construction 
engagement, especially that of management cooperation, naturally transformed to 
agribusiness projects (often in the form of joint venture) in the ‘transition period’, and 
finally converged into the so-called ‘agribusiness model’ in the ‘New Era’ after 2000 
(Chapter 2.3&2.4). 
																																																								
43 It was originally termed by the Chinese government as ‘post-construction technical assistance’ (Shi, 
1989). To avoid confusion with another phrase, ‘technical cooperation’, which is to appear and going 
to be repeatedly mentioned from this paragraph on, the author uses ‘post-construction engagement’ 
instead of ‘post-construction technical assistance’ but indicates the same meaning. 
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2.2.3 Emphasis on Mutual Development 
Indeed, the principle of ‘equality and mutual benefit’ was proposed as early as 
Premier Zhou Enlai visited Africa in 1964, whereby it was already attenuated that 
‘China does not regard aid as an one-side donation, but rather that, aid is reciprocal’ 
(Zhou, 1964). However, in practice, as seen in the case of Chinese agro-aid during the 
1960-70s, the Chinese government did not make own development, especially in 
economic terms, a major pursuit in its aid-giving process towards Africa. Against the 
background of foreign aid reforms in the early 1980s, the then Premier Zhao Ziyang, 
proposed a new ‘Four Principles of Conducting Economic and Technical Cooperation 
with African countries’ 44 , which therefore reinforced Zhou’s statement by 
emphasizing reciprocal benefits and mutual development, and more importantly 
involved the pragmaticism entailed by Deng Xiaoping’s reform spirit by highlighting 
the necessity of adopting diverse forms and pursuing actual effects. Ten years later in 
1994, with the deepening of Chinese reform process, Wu Yi, the then Minister of 
Commerce of China, further introduced the ‘Grand Economic and Trade 
Development’ policy that aimed to boost the domestic economy through combining 
diverse types of economic activities – such as international trade, foreign investment, 
foreign contracting and labour cooperation, utilization of external capital, as well as 
foreign aid – and seeking a synergetic effect among them. Until then, the self-
development dimension and thus the mutual development role of aid, could be seen 
as having gradually acknowledged and established by the Chinese leadership.  
 
A very important progress occurring at this time was the emergence of so-called 
‘development package’ at mid-1990s. That is, China intentionally started to promote 
the combination of aid, trade, investment and other possible economic forms with an 
express mutual development objective to boost both the economies of recipient 
countries and that of China itself (Liang and Wang, 1995). This marks the moment 
when Chinese development cooperation began to go beyond mere aid but to embrace 
all possible forms that could effectively promote development and especially 
economic development and importantly, that of both sides. To give one example, 
Chinese aid projects were in most cases contracted to Chinese companies and 
accompanied by export of Chinese equipment and labour, thus paving the way for the 
‘Going Out’ strategy 1995 (Zhou, 2010; Zhou, 2013; Luo, 2014). This sort of ‘tied 
aid’, however, is precisely what the traditional Northern donors have been trying to 
avoid or reduce in their aid-giving practice in the past two decades or so (Clay et al., 
2009). 
 
In tandem with the ‘development package’, China also started to increasingly 
mobilize capital resources from market, instead of only from the government fiscal 
system, and channel it into the development cooperation area45. From 1995, the 
Chinese government started to provide Government Medium/long-term Concessional 
Loan to aid-recipient countries via the newly established Export-Import Bank of 
China (State Council of the PRC, 2011). Later, since the 2000s, the EXIM bank also 																																																								
44 Include ‘equality and reciprocal benefits’, ‘pursuing actual effects’, ‘diversity of cooperation forms’, 
and ‘mutual development’. 
45 While these methods have tremendously scaled up the aid funds, they have also caused confusion as 
to how to distinguish aid from investment projects as well as how to calculate the amount of Chinese 
aid. In practice, while all the projects using the government concessional loans tend to be regarded as 
aid projects, only the part subsidized by the government for the discounted interests would be counted 
as aid (Zhou, 2008). 
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began to offer Preferential Export Buyers’ Credit (together with the Government 
Concessional Loan, referred to as ‘two preferential loans’ hereinafter). The two 
preferential loans are made ‘concessional’ through lower interest subsidized by the 
Chinese government. Also, through the different types of ‘management cooperation’ 
over aid projects, as discussed earlier (Chapter 2.2.2), the self-owned capital of 
companies has been becoming another important financing source of Chinese 
external development cooperation projects.  
2.3 Consolidation and Transformation: The Transition Period of Chinese 
Agricultural Development Cooperation with Africa (1980s–1990s) 
With the completion of the ‘replacement aid’ phase and the launch of the foreign aid 
reforms, from the early 1980s onward, Chinese agricultural development cooperation 
with Africa entered what can be termed, notably in retrospect, as a ‘transition period’. 
It is so called both because of relatively less clearer motives or development agenda 
compared to the earlier period, and also the transitional feature of cooperation forms 
from the ‘pure aid’ type gradually into mutual-benefit oriented business nature which 
is going to feature more prominently in the later phase (Chapter 2.4). While the 
foreign aid reforms had for the first time brought the idea of reciprocal benefit and 
mutual development into China’s course of international development cooperation 
back to the early 1980s, a few factors effectively constrained this from being put into 
practice. The external economic interactions between China and Africa were still 
rather moderate and unbalanced given the constrained national power as well as the 
limited degree of ‘opening’ of China at that time. China’s ‘opening’ before mid-
1990s concentrated more on inward resource flows, that is, ‘introducing in (yin jinlai)’ 
different sorts of foreign resources such as capital, technology and indeed also 
increasing aid finances, but relatively less on outward movement especially in terms 
of financial flows. The main economic partners in terms of trade, investment as well 
as aid (with China as the FDI and aid recipient) then were largely Western advanced 
countries; Africa, on the other hand, particularly in the middle of the debt crisis and 
‘structural adjustments’, could offer relatively less to China. Indeed, the economic 
drivers of Chinese development cooperation with Africa, including that in the 
agricultural area, did not become very evident until the turning of the new century.  
 
Against this background, Chinese agricultural cooperation, still very much in the 
traditional aid form, in Africa then just continued to be delivered largely following 
the general reform directions, i.e. scale reduction, performance enhancement and 
commercial orientation (Chapter 2.2). Consolidation and gradual transformation of 
the earlier agro-aid projects, therefore, seemed to constitute the main themes of 
Chinese agricultural aid in Africa in this transition period. Accordingly, there were 
not many newly launched agro-aid projects or programs in this transition period. In 
terms of consolidation, as mentioned in the earlier section, the Chinese government 
started to strengthen the more traditional technical cooperation and meanwhile 
introduce a new method, namely managerial cooperation, in the post-construction 
phase, in order to cope with the commonly experienced project unsustainability 
problem (Chapter 2.2). For example, at the request of the African side, the Chinese 
government sent back agro-expert groups to previously established farms (in the 
1960-70s), such as those in Mali, Mauritania, Congo-Brazzaville, Sierra Leone. The 
aim was to help deal with the degradation problems occurring after the Chinese 
experts left and try to reinvigorate those aged projects through the provision of 
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technical (and some managerial) support (Shi, 1989; also see Table 2-1). In Tanzania, 
for instance, in the case of the Chinese-aided Mubalali Farm, immediately after the 
completion of the project construction, an eight-year-long technical cooperation 
(1977-85) agreement was signed with the aim of consolidating the aid effects. The 
project entailed a much longer period of time, compared to the more common one to 
two years, but proved to have good results (Shi, 1989; also see Table 2-1). Apart from 
this case, some African governments, as seen in the case of Mali, Congo-Brazzaville 
and Sierra Leone, invited the Chinese experts to play the main role in the project 
management, asking them to take charge of all the important activities concerning the 
project operation (e.g. agro-production, sales, finances and labour management). The 
African governments, instead, played more a secondary or supporting role in this 
process (Shi, 1989). 
 
Entering the 1990s, the deepening of the domestic market-oriented reforms, along 
with those enacted more specifically in the foreign aid area, provided opportunities 
for a gradual transformation of Chinese agricultural development cooperation in 
Africa. This mainly took two forms. The first form is a few newly launched 
agribusiness projects through utilising the ‘two preferential loans’. This trend started 
mostly since the 1990s but developed only on a very limited scale at that time 
compared to that occurred in the ‘New Era’ particularly after 2006 (Chapter 4). 
Examples of these newly built agribusiness projects are, for instance, the sisal farm 
and rice farm set up in the 1990s in Tanzania and Guinea by the state-owned 
company CSFAC (China State Farms Agribusiness Corporation)46. Another form is 
the transformation of previous agro-aid projects into agro-investment projects. 
 
A typical example of this second form of transformation is the case of the sugarcane 
project in Mali. China started to provide agricultural aid to Mali since the 1960s: in 
1962 China successfully tested the growing of sugarcane in Mali, and then helped to 
build two sugarcane farms (1970, 1977) and two sugar mills (1966, 1976) in the 
country while providing several rounds of ‘technical cooperation’ (Chapter 2.2.2). 
However, the projects still fell into degradation after the Chinese agro-technical team 
left. The Chinese, therefore, were invited again in 1982 to go back to Mali and help 
revive the sugarcane projects. Soon after that, the Malian government decided in 
1984 to combine the two sugarcane farms and two mills so to establish as a unified 
state-owned enterprise while the Chinese agro-experts were employed as the 
enterprise managers (i.e. ‘managerial cooperation’, see Chapter 2.2.2). This move 
proved to be very effective, not only greatly enhancing the project productivity and 
profitability but also contributing to the job creation and people’s welfare in the local 
neighbourhood (Shi, 1989). One decade later, in 1996, the enterprise was further 
transformed into a joint venture, Complexe Sucrier Du Kala Superieur SA, with the 
Chinese state-owned CLETC47 holding 60% of the share and taking the major 
responsibility of the company’s management, and the Malian government holding 40% 
of the company’s stake48 (CLETC, n.d.). By then, the three-decade-long Chinese 
																																																								
46 For more details about this company and the relevant projects, see Chapter 4.1.2. 
47 CLETC is short for China Light Industrial Corporation for Foreign Economic and Technical Co-
operation, which was established in 1983 and from then started to take over the agro-aid projects in 
Mali that had used to be undertaken by the then China’s Ministry of Light Industry in the 1960-70s. 
48 Based on that, CLETC invested another sugar joint venture in Mali (CLETC 60%, Malian 
government 40%) in 2009. 
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agro-aid projects had finally developed into jointly owned agribusiness projects 
between China and Mali.  
 
At least two lines of change were experienced in this process: first, the change of 
project implementing agencies from Chinese government (China’s Ministry of Light 
Industry) to Chinese companies (CLETC); and accordingly, the change of 
motivations lying behind from a more politically driven to an increasingly business-
oriented approach49. In a similar vein, Chinese-aided sugarcane projects in Sierra 
Leone (Table 2-1), Togo and Madagascar were also converted into agribusiness 
projects starting in the 1990s. These, however, operated on a lease management basis 
by COMPLANT50, another Chinese state-owned enterprise. 
 
Different from the 1960-70s when government agencies took a predominant role in 
the implementation process, with the introduction of the ‘contract and responsibility 
system’ (Chapter 2.2), from the 1980s onwards aid projects started to be contracted to 
company entities who thus gained increasing implementing power – first in the 
construction, later also in the operation phase. The government agencies, on the other 
hand, played more a supervising and coordinating role. The abovementioned CSFAC, 
for instance, was established under the then Ministry of State Farms and Land 
Reclamation (which later merged to form the Ministry of Agriculture) and took 
charge of a number of aid projects. At provincial levels, many Foreign Economic and 
Technical Cooperation Companies were established under provincial governments 
and mandated to carry out aid, including agro-aid projects, in other developing 
countries. That said, during the 1980–90s, only state-owned enterprises were allowed 
to participate in the delivery of government aid projects. 
 
In terms of aid performance in this transition period (1980-90s), despite the measures 
taken according to the aid reforms, the thorny problem of project unsustainability still 
persisted. The ‘success story’ of the Mubalali Farm in Tanzania noted earlier did not 
continue after the eight-year-long technical and managerial cooperation came to an 
end, but gradually fell into disrepair as the Chinese agro-experts and workers left. 
The Mubalali Farm, together with Lufu, another Chinese-aided farm (Table 2-1), was 
finally sold out by the Tanzanian government in the early 2000s (ECCO in Tanzania, 
2004a/b). A similar case is the agro-technology experiment station in Guinea, which 
was transferred to the Guinean government in 1982 but could not sustain on its own. 
In 1989, the Chinese government started to re-inject funds and re-send agro-experts 
in order to rehabilitate the station. These renewed efforts, however, only managed to 
sustain the station for another ten years – it shut down almost immediately after the 
Chinese left in 1999 (Yun, 2000b). 
																																																								
49 This latter change was a more progressive process. That is to say, the change of implementing 
agencies did not immediately bring about the change of motivations, for the former was a more direct 
reflection of the functional separation of government agencies and enterprises as required by the 
domestic market-oriented reforms, but the latter grew more evidently only as the reforms deepened 
and thus the companies, especially those state-owned enterprises, truly gained more autonomy and 
discretion over company operation matters rather than acting merely as a government instrument. 
50 COMPLANT is short for China National Complete Plant Import & Export Corporation, which was 
established in 1959 and had since played a predominant role in implementing Chinese government aid 
projects abroad. 
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2.4 Time For Mutual-Development: China-Africa Agricultural 
Development Cooperation in the New Era (2000s–present) 
Over the years from the 1980s till the present time – from Deng through Jiang, Hu to 
Xi – the CCP has stuck firmly with its outward-oriented economic development 
policies and the efforts to restore China’s global status. The ‘Reform and Opening Up’ 
policy, accordingly, remained among the top agenda of Chinese domestic and foreign 
policies, and grew even more profoundly in the 1990s featured by an increasing 
proactive posture in participating international economic dealings and finally the 
launch of  ‘Going Out’ strategy around the 200051. At the same time, though at a 
lesser pace, the African continent had also achieved steady economic growth and 
recovery particularly since the new millennium, thus positioning itself a better 
economic cooperation partner in the international arena. The past two decades, 
therefore, have witnessed a dramatic development of bilateral relations between 
China and Africa, especially in economic and commercial terms, with China’s 
African policy acquiring an unprecedented economic dimension compared to all its 
earlier engagement with the continent through the 20th century. Particularly, the 
establishment of FOCAC (Forum on China-Africa Cooperation) since 2000 has been 
a significant milestone in contemporary China-Africa relations and served as a main 
catalyst, through its continual proposals and follow-up measures every three years, to 
push forward a comprehensive and sustained cooperation between the two sides.  
 
From the agricultural perspective, more specifically, different from the previous two 
stages (Chapter 2.1&2.3), at least two new factors have opened opportunities for 
China and Africa to continue and deepen their agricultural cooperation. First, China’s 
domestic agricultural sector has achieved a widely-renown success, which did not 
only ensure food security of 1.3 billion people, but also uplift millions of people from 
the extreme poverty (Huang, 2010; Li et al., 2013). This success story of Chinese 
own agriculture has put China in a favourable position in the agro-cooperation 
process with Africa, for it used to have similar starting point, face similar problems, 
and enjoy similar-level agricultural technology to those of Africa, and thus may 
possibly provide more suitable experiences to its African counterparts52. Second, 
while the largely stagnant development of African agriculture per se still remains an 
important concern for Chinese government, it also started to apply domestic 
agricultural policies to its development cooperation with African countries. Given a 
number of development challenges along with other medium/long-term pursuits53, 																																																								
51 In 2001 the “Going Out” strategy was formally proposed and written into the country’s 10th Five-
year Plan of the National Economy and Social Development, which was further enriched in the 11th 
and 12th Five-year Plans in 2006 and 2011 respectively (People’s Congress of the PRC, 2001, 2006 
and 2011). Specifically, by promoting the “Going Out” strategy, the Chinese government actively 
encourages and supports the Chinese enterprises to conduct foreign project contracting and labour 
services cooperation; exploit foreign resources that are domestically lacked; conduct processing and 
trade abroad, create international marketing networks and brands; set up overseas Research & 
Development (R&D) agencies and design centres; conduct transnational operation and develop 
towards transnational companies. The core objectives of the “Going Out” strategy, therefore, are 
largely to gain access to foreign resources, markets and technology through primarily conducting FDI 
but also other modalities. 
52 That said, Chinese scholars have clearly realized that the success story and experiences may not be 
copied by African states for distinct policy environments and so on (Li et al., 2013). 
53 For instance, to strengthen the structural adjustment of China’s agricultural industry and climb up 
the agribusiness global value chain. 
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China’s agricultural sector has been increasingly opening up to the external world, 
welcoming and encouraging mutual exchange of products, capital, technology, and 
human resources. Around the year of 2006, Chinese government formally launched 
the ‘Agriculture Going Out’ policy that aims primarily at utilizing overseas 
agricultural resources (Chapter 4.1.1). 
 
Against this context, the past one and a half decades since the new millennium have 
witnessed a new and high wave of agricultural cooperation between China and Africa, 
compared with the rather moderate, more ‘consolidation’-oriented interactions two 
decades of the 1980-90s. At the policy level, agricultural development cooperation 
measures with Africa started to be detailed at the Beijing Summit of the 3rd FOCAC 
(2006). Since then they have been modified and strengthened at every FOCAC (2009, 
2012, 2015), including the specific forum on agriculture (FOCAAC, 2010). 
Particularly, the four principles set up by Premier Zhao Ziyang finally began to be 
substantialized given a more mature point of time (Chapter 2.2.3). Inspired by the 
new mentalities, China’s development cooperation practice in African agriculture, 
while maintaining certain continuity, has undertaken a great change since the 2000s. 
Most notable is the ‘development package’ adopted in the agricultural cooperation 
with Africa. There are three distinct models within the ‘development package’, 
respectively the ‘(technology-centred) traditional agricultural aid model’, the 
‘innovative agricultural aid model’ and the ‘agribusiness model’.  
 
In the first place, many traditional forms, often grant-funded types of agricultural aid 
(‘traditional agro-aid model’ hereinafter), as practiced in the 1960-90s, still remain 
and constitute a significant part of China’s contemporary agricultural development 
cooperation with Africa. Having said that, there has seen an important shift of focus 
from more ‘complete project’ oriented type of aid (Chapter 2.1) to that of 
increasingly ‘technical assistance’ centred. This has much to do with Chinese own 
experience in agricultural development in the past few decades. China established a 
comprehensive agro-technology extension system from as early as the 1950s, and by 
they year of 2015 technological advances had contributed more than 55% to the 
growth of China’s agriculture (Yu and Wang, 2015). It is widely acknowledged that 
the utilization and dissemination of agro-technology has played an essential role in 
transforming the country’s agricultural sector (Huang, 2010). In light of this, 
technical assistance has also been established as the cornerstone of China’s current 
agricultural aid to Africa, which further takes a number of specific forms. 
 
First, the Chinese government has launched a new round of expert dispatch. On the 
Beijing summit of FOCAC in 2006, China pledged to assign 100 senior agro-experts 
specializing in diverse areas to assist African countries with agricultural development 
(FOCAC, 2006). In 2009, it promised to send a further 50 agro-technical groups to 
the continent (FOCAC, 2009). The main task of the expert dispatch, as explained by 
the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), is to ‘participate in the formulation of aid-
recipient countries’ agricultural development plan, assist with the establishment of 
agricultural technology extension system, offer technological consulting and services 
for their agricultural production, and eventually enhance the capabilities for 
agricultural macro-control and self-development’ (MOA of the PRC, 2008).  
 
There have also been constant exchange and training programs held by Chinese MOA 
for African farmers, technicians, students, officials and others, either in China or the 
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related African states. More than 20 different training programs in agro-technology 
and management are held every year. During the period 2004–2010, around 4,200 
agro-technicians and managerial officials from Africa received this sort of training 
through both bilateral and multilateral channels54 (MOA of the PRC, 2010). The 
China-Ethiopia Agricultural Vocational Education Program stands out as a typical 
example in this regard. From 2001 to 2010, China had sent more than 300 teachers to 
Ethiopia while around 66,000 local students been trained under the program; more 
importantly, this program has helped Ethiopia to establish from scratch its own 
agricultural vocational education system, building up in total about 28 training 
institutions all over the country (Li, 2010). In 2012, furthermore, the Chinese 
government proposed to help set up agricultural vocational education systems on the 
whole African continent (FOCAC, 2012). 
 
In addition, China also provides technical support to African countries under diverse 
multilateral cooperation frameworks. For instance, China has played, since 1996, an 
active role in the South-South Cooperation (SSC) program, one of the Supporting 
Programs for Food Security launched by the Food and Agricultural Organization 
(FAO) of the UN. In 2006, a further partnership was established between China and 
FAO whereby China pledged to offer 30 million USD trust fund and dispatch 3,000 
agro-technicians and experts between 2006–2012 to support the SSC program, with a 
prioritized focus on Africa (i.e. Ethiopia, Mauritania, Ghana, Nigeria, Mali, Sierra 
Leon, Gabon) (Han, 2011). Also, China has been working together with the Northern 
donors, especially the DAC under the OECD. In 2009, for instance, a study group 
between China and OECD-DAC was set up with a primary goal of facilitating mutual 
learning on poverty reduction among developing countries (China-DAC, 2009). In 
the agricultural sector specificallythe group has conducted a series of research with 
a view to transferring the successful experience of agricultural development in China 
to the African continent (China-DAC, 2011).  
 
Despite a particular focus on technical assistance, other more traditional forms such 
as infrastructure and materials support remain an integral part of Chinese 
agricultural aid to Africa. For example, in terms of agricultural infrastructure, by the 
end of 2009, China had helped build 215 agricultural ‘complete projects’, including 
168 general agro-projects (such as farms and technology extension stations) and 47 
irrigation projects, in different developing countries. Most of these projects are 
located in Africa, with a large part of them being built during the early years between 
the 1960-90s though (State Council of the PRC, 2011; Li, 2010). Some more recent 
examples include, for instance, the Chinese-aided grain barns in Zambia and the rice-
processing factories in Mozambique. On a yearly basis, the Chinese government also 
earmarks a certain amount of funds for purchasing agricultural materials for African 
countries, including agro-inputs such as seeds, fertilizers and pesticides, as well as 
small- and medium-sized farm implements and some agro-processing equipment. 
This sort of materials donation is often provided alongside other Chinese agro-aid 
projects, or separately upon request from the aid-recipient countries. Besides, China 
is also very active in providing emergency humanitarian aid to Africa. For instance, 
in 2011 the Chinese government donated 70 million USD and food to those famine-
plagued countries in the Horn of Africa (Chinese Embassy in Tanzania, 2011); and 																																																								
54 For more fieldwork-based details and some critical views about Chinese agro-training programs for 
African agriculture, see Tugendhat, 2015.  
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according to the World Food Program (WFP) under the UN, China has been one of 
the leading contributors in the developing world (WFP, 2015).  
 
The second model of Chinese contemporary agricultural development cooperation in 
Africa is termed as ‘innovative agro-aid model’ in this thesis. It is so called because 
of its inherent dualistic nature; that is, on one hand it still resembles the ‘traditional 
agro-aid model’ in many respects and so that is often regarded as Chinese aid projects, 
but on the other hand, it has effectively brought in the idea of ‘mutual development’ 
to the practice of China’s agricultural development cooperation through introducing 
some innovative mechanism design. Most typical of this would surely be the ATDCs 
(Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centres), the flagship project of China’s 
agricultural development cooperation with Africa in the new millennium. 
 
The ATDCs have been launched for more than one decade since the Beijing Summit 
of the 3rd FOCAC in 2006. As will be elaborated in Chapter 3, the ATDCs, at the first 
glance, are a combination of all the abovementioned agro-aid forms (agro-technology 
assistance, infrastructure support and materials donation). However, the incorporation 
of corporate actors as project implementing agencies and accordingly the expected 
commercial operation model in the mid-/long term, makes them essentially distinct 
from projects under the ‘traditional agro-aid model’. This special design is very much 
in line with the ‘mutual-development’ idea, with both developmental and commercial 
implications. By 2012, there had been in practice at least 23 Chinese-funded ATDCs 
all over the African continent, with the first batch of 14 centres having finished 
construction and been transferred to the host governments, while 9 others still in the 
process of completing the feasibility study or construction. 
 
Lastly, there is also the ‘agribusiness model’ that features tapping into the potential 
of agribusiness investment in promoting the development of African agriculture. The 
developmental impact of agribusiness could be exerted in two ways. First, through 
the natural, spill-over effect of the development of agribusiness, particularly in terms 
of enhancing food security (when grain crops are concerned), boosting job creation 
and accordingly promoting poverty reduction. Second, through intentional, extra 
efforts that are made either by governments (through the PPP mechanism) or by 
companies themselves (out of CSR consideration) to further strengthening the 
developmental impact of agribusiness, such as the scaling up of projects through 
financial support from government or national banks or free training programs for 
agro-technology transfer provided spontaneously by companies. In line with the 
overarching guideline of pursuing mutual development and reciprocal benefits, the 
‘agribusiness model’ also fits well in China’s ‘Agricultural Going Out’ strategy that 
was launched in mid-2000s and with a clear view to stimulating Chinese companies’ 
overseas agro-investment. 
 
As will be further detailed in Chapter 4, by the end of 2011, Chinese agribusiness 
investment in Africa had amounted to around 400 million USD, with a diversity of 
Chinese companies – state and private, central- and provincial-level, agricultural and 
non-agricultural – involved across a number of different African countries. According 
to the author’s own calculation, by 2016, there had been at least 100 or so Chinese 
agribusiness projects operating in Africa, with about 30 sizable ones that occupies up 
to at least 1,000 hectares. Most of these projects, as the typical examples of the newly 
emerging ‘agribusiness model’ started only from the recent decade.  
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As already shown above, from an institutional perspective, both the management and 
operational mechanism of Chinese agricultural development cooperation projects in 
the New Era (2000s-present) have undergone important changes. This is particularly 
notable at the operational level wherein an increasing diversity of non-governmental 
actors, especially companies, starts to actively engage in the enterprise of Chinese 
international development cooperation. However, despite the general image of greater 
efficiency and important financer that is often associated with corporate actors, their 
disparate motivations, capabilities, discretions and cooperative tendencies all 
potentially impose great challenges to their implementation results. Even at the 
management level, due to the growing agency awarded to non-governmental actors 
and some market-based mechanisms adopted such as that under the ‘innovative agro-
aid’ and ‘agribusiness model’, it is becoming more and more challenging for Chinese 
government to exert effective control over the actual implementation and thus the 
ultimate outcomes of the new ‘development package’. No less importantly, given the 
typical ‘trial and error’ nature of Chinese policy making, the country’s development 
cooperation strategy per se is still largely a policy in-the-making, and thus will no 
surprisingly suffer from certain loopholes and immaturity.  
 
The question, then, is how will the new and supposedly different (from the DAC-
donors) ‘development package’ model of China’s development cooperation perform? 
To what extent is it going to be more, or less, effective? And how will it be 
constrained by the aforementioned potential challenges? All these questioned will be 
examined in the following two empirical chapters (Chapter 3&4) and synthesized in 
the final conclusive chapter (Chapter 5). 
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Chapter 3 Development Cooperation in Agriculture: The 
Innovative Agro-aid Model 
In the previous chapter, I have outlined the historical trajectory of Chinese half-
century-long agricultural cooperation with Africa with the hope to demonstrate the 
roots and logics for its contemporary practice. I have also briefly introduced the three 
distinctive models of China’s current development cooperation in African agriculture, 
and already expanded on the ‘traditional agro-aid’ model. The present chapter and the 
one that follows will examine, respectively, the ‘innovative agro-aid’ and the 
‘agribusiness’ models that feature most prominently in the current phase of China-
Africa agricultural cooperation. To start with, this chapter is going to first investigate 
the ‘innovative agro-aid’ model, and specifically, China’s flagship ATDC 
(Agriculture Technology Demonstration Centre) project that stands out as the very 
epitome of this model. 
 
As distinct from the earlier ‘pure aid’ period (1960-70s) and transition period (1980-
90s), the agricultural cooperation in the new century entails more clearly the ‘win-
win, mutual-development’ concept, combines both development and commercial 
objectives and activities, and accordingly involves a diversity of public and private 
actors. That said, as noted in Chapter 2, the evolution of Chinese international 
development practice has not only been a response to the changing priorities of the 
government’s foreign policy in different time periods, but also a reflection of the 
more internally-driven process of China’s foreign aid reforms. In this regard, the 
ATDCs, while clearly demonstrating certain historical continuity through a hybrid of 
agro-aid forms adopted before (e.g. farms, agro-technology demonstration/extension 
stations, experts dispatch), involve as well some of the mechanisms are intentionally 
designed to avoid problems experienced in the past few decades. 
 
The ATDCs also differ from the ‘agribusiness model’ that is to be discussed in 
Chapter 4 where the corporate actors take a more proactive part while the government 
only an assisting role. The ATDCs, however, are still largely regarded as government 
aid projects, especially in the early stage of the centres, considering the evident 
financial and supervision responsibilities borne by the government, and the Chinese 
companies involved in theory only the implementing agencies. In line with this, the 
‘development’ dimension is supposed to overweigh the ‘commercial’ one for the 
ATDCs; as will be shown later in more detail, the commercial gains are moderate in 
the near term, only in terms of business introduction, and even in the long run when 
the centres enter into fully commercial operations they are nonetheless still expected 
to perform ‘public-interest functions’. 
 
There are two parts in this chapter. The first part (Chapter 3.1) will introduce the 
objectives, actors and mechanisms of the ATDCs, along with their general 
developments since 2006. The second part (Chapter 3.2) will flesh out the ATDC 
story by providing a detailed case study on one of the earliest and highly ranked (by 
Chinese government) centres – the one in Mozambique. It will examine and evaluate 
the actual performance of the Mozambican ATDC in terms of the three key 
dimensions – respectively the technical transfer, business introduction and project 
sustainability – against the objectives set for the ATDCs by the Chinese government. 
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3.1 ATDC: The Flagship Project of China’s Innovative Agro-Aid in Africa 
The project of Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centre (‘ATDC’ hereinafter) 
was first proposed at the Beijing Summit of the 3rd FOCAC in 2006. The Chinese 
government pledged to build 10 ATDCs in different African countries (FOCAC, 
2006). The number was then increased to 20 during the 4th FOCAC in 2009 (FOCAC, 
2009). By 2012, there had been in practice at least 23 Chinese-funded ATDCs on the 
African continent, with the first batch of 14 centres having finished construction and 
been transferred to the host governments, while 9 others still in the process of 
completing the feasibility study or construction (Table 3-2).  
3.1.1 Objectives: A Strong Mutual-Development Feature 
In line with the ‘core spirit’ of China’s contemporary (agro-)development cooperation 
with Africa (Chapter 2.2&2.4), the ATDCs have carried an evident feature of 
pursuing mutual-development objectives through the implementation of the projects. 
According to the key official document that guides the practice of the ATDCs 
(‘ATDC Guidance’ hereinafter), issued jointly by China’s Ministry of Commerce 
(MOC) and Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), the purposes of the ATDCs were 
explained as follows (MOC and MOA of the PRC, 2011): 
 
I. To serve China's foreign strategy and promote bilateral relations with the recipient 
countries; 
II. To help increase grain production, improve agricultural technology, and enhance 
food security of the recipient countries; 
III. To provide a platform for Chinese companies to develop business in Africa, and 
promote China's ‘Agriculture Going Out’ policy; 
IV. To build the ATDC into a base for agro-technology experiment and research, 
demonstration and extension, human resources training, and display. 
 
There is, first and foremost, a clear Africa-oriented development objective involved 
in the ATDCs. The limited input as well as the low level of agro-technology has been 
one of the biggest hindrances to the productivity enhancement of African agriculture, 
whereas in China the success story of agricultural development in the past decades 
has been greatly attributed to the rapid advancement of agro-technology underpinned 
by the government’s accentuated efforts to strengthen agro-technology education, 
research as well as extension system across the country (Huang, 2010). An important 
objective of the ATDCs, therefore, is to promote the transfer of Chinese advanced 
agricultural technology to Africa through the realisation of the four tasks designed for 
the centre, namely demonstration, training, research, and display55 (Objective IV), 
with an ultimate aim to help increase the grain production and thus enhance the food 
security of the recipient countries (Objective II). It is also hoped that by achieving 
these ends, the bilateral diplomatic relations between China and African countries 
could meanwhile be bolstered (Objective I). This dimension, therefore, is termed by 
the Chinese government as the ‘public-interest function’ of the ATDCs, for all the 
																																																								
55 Among the four tasks, demonstration and training, mostly targeted at agricultural producers and 
technicians, are more central to the technology transfer purpose and therefore the main focus of the 
ATDCs. Research is more a supportive function that is often carried out alongside and closely serves 
the aim of demonstration and training. And display, open to the broader public, usually involves a 
general introduction to Chinese agro-technology and experience, among others (MOC and MOA of the 
PRC, 2011; Interview, 8 Nov 2013). 
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activities in this line are supposed to be non-commercial and purely for the 
developmental benefits of the recipient countries.  
 
Particularly worth noting here is also Objective III, which differentiates ATDCs from 
those more traditional forms of Chinese agro-aid in Africa (Chapter 2.4), that is the 
intention of the project designers trying to make the ATDCs in the meantime a 
platform for Chinese agro-companies to ‘go out’ and conduct agribusiness abroad. 
The ATDCs, therefore, also serve the function of introducing Chinese companies to 
Africa and facilitating their agribusiness on the continent. This dimension, termed as 
‘business introduction’ in this thesis, explicitly demonstrates the self-oriented 
development agenda entailed in the ATDC project; that is, more specifically, the 
seeking of business opportunities for Chinese companies. In addition to that, similar 
to the practice of other Chinese aid projects nowadays, the ATDCs are accompanied 
by, and also expected to promote, export of Chinese agro-equipment and materials56, 
among other things (MOC and MOA of the PRC, 2012). 
 
A last dimension that is not shown in the statement of purposes of the ATDCs but 
surely bears considerable significance in terms of the pursuits of the centres is the 
project sustainability concern. The sustainability issue derives from China’s decades-
long practice of agricultural aid on the continent (Chapter 2) and has been widely 
observed by practitioners and scholars (Shi, 1989; Cai, 1992; Sun, 1996; Zhou and 
Wang, 1997; Yun, 2000; Bräutigam, 2009). Almost all the Chinese earlier agro-aid 
projects could not escape the cycle that, no matter how successful the initial period of 
the project proved to be, the project would soon fall into disrepair once the Chinese 
team left57. In most cases, the reason for this resides in that the aid-recipient countries 
lacked the financial, managerial and technical capability to keep the projects going on 
their own (Shi, 1989; Cai, 1992; Sun, 1996; Zhou and Wang, 1997). Against this 
background, the sustainability issue was brought to the fore in the designing process 
of the ATDCs (Xu and Qin, 2011). The emphasis on sustainability can be seen from 
the performance evaluation system of the ATDCs, in which the planning and 
realization of sustainable development occupies 45% of the total scores, more than 
any other indicators (Table 3-1). And the sustainability concern per se is also for the 
benefits of both, a sustainable developmental effect for the recipient countries as well 
as ‘value for money’ for the Chinese side. 
 
Table 3-1 Evaluation Indicators of the ATDC 
Diplomatic Influence Improvement of the 
Agricultural 
Development and Food 
Security of the Host 
Country 
Promotion of China’s 
‘Agriculture Going-out 
and Inviting-in’ Policy 
Sustainable 
Development 
15% 25% 15% 45% 
Source: The author based on the Evaluation Plan of the ATDC (MOC and MOA of the PRC, 2012). 
 
																																																								
56 Most of these equipment and materials are donated by the Chinese government, and in most cases 
exempt from tariffs due to their aid nature. 
57 Few exceptions exist, for instance, in Mali and Sierra Leone, where the Chinese-aided agro-projects 
during the early years are still operational now; however, in these two countries, the projects have 
since been managed by the Chinese whereas the host governments act only as shareholders. 
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Table 3-2 Chinese Agriculture Technology Demonstration Centres in Africa 
No Host Country Chinese Implementing Agent(s) Operational 
Stages 
Area 
(Ha) 
Cooperation Fields 
The 14 ATDCs that have been transferred to the host governments 
1 Benin China National Agricultural Development Group Co., Ltd. 
 
C: 2009–2010 
T: 2010–2013 
B: 2014– 
51.6 Grains (e.g. maize), vegetables, livestock 
(e.g. chicken) 
 
2 Cameroon Shanxi province 
Shanxi State Farms and Land Reclamation Group Co., Ltd. 
[TS: Northwest Agriculture and Forestry Technology 
University] 
C: 2009–2010 
T: 2013–2016 
B: 2016– 
 
100 Rice, etc. 
3 Republic of 
Congo 
Chinese Academy of Tropical Agricultural Sciences C: 2009–2011 
T: 2012–2015 
B: 2015– 
59 Grains (e.g. maize, cassava), vegetables, 
livestock (e.g. chicken); fodder production 
and processing; agricultural mechanisation 
4 Ethiopia Guangxi province 
Guangxi Bagui Agricultural Science and Technology Co., 
Ltd. [TS: Guangxi Agricultural Vocational College] 
C: 2010–2012 
T: 2012–2015 
B: 2015– 
52 Grains, vegetables, and livestock (e.g. 
pigs, cows and chicken) 
 
5 Liberia Hunan province 
Longping High-tech Agriculture Co., Ltd. 
C: 2009–2010 
T: 2010–2014 
B: 2014– 
32.6 Hybrid rice, etc. 
6 Mozambique 
 
Hubei province 
Lianfeng Overseas Agricultural Development Co., Ltd. 
C: 2009–2010 
T: 2012–2015 
B: 2015– 
52 Grains (e.g. maize and rice), vegetables, 
livestock (e.g. pigs); agro-processing 
7 Rwanda Fujian province 
Fujian Agriculture and Forestry University 
C: 2009–2011 
T: 2011–2014 
B: 2014– 
22.6 Grains, mulberry plantation and silkworm 
keeping, jun-cao cultivation, water-
conservancy 
8 South Africa China National Agricultural Development Group Co., Ltd. 
[TS: Chinese Academy of Fishery Sciences] 
C: 2009–2011 
T: 2014–2017 
B: 2017– 
0.47 Freshwater aquaculture 
9 Sudan Shandong province 
Shandong International Economic and Technical 
Cooperation Group Co., Ltd. 
[TS: Shandong Academy of Agricultural Sciences] 
 
C: 2009–2011 
T: 2012–2015 
B: 2015– 
65 Grains (e.g. wheat, maize), vegetables, 
cotton, peanuts; water-conservancy 
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10 Tanzania Chongqing Municipality 
Chongqing Seed Group Co., Ltd. 
[TS: Chongqing Academy of Agricultural Sciences] 
C: 2009–2010 
T: 2011–2014 
B: 2015– 
62 Grains (e.g. rice, maize, soybeans), 
vegetables, flowers, livestock (e.g. 
chicken) 
11 Togo Jiangxi province 
Huachang International Economic and Technical 
Corporation 
C: 2009–2011 
T: 2012–2015 
B: 2015– 
10 Rice, maize, etc. 
12 Uganda Sichuan province 
Huaqiao Fenghuang Group, Co., Ltd. 
 
C: 2009–2010 
T: 2011–2014 
B: 2015– 
0.3 Freshwater aquaculture 
13 Zambia Jilin province 
Jilin Agriculture University 
C: 2010–2011 
T: 2012–2015 
B: 2015– 
120 Grains (e.g. wheat, maize, soybeans), 
vegetables; agricultural mechanisation 
14 Zimbabwe Chinese Academy of Agricultural Mechanization Sciences  
(Menoble) 
C: 2009–2011 
T: 2012–2015 
B: 2015– 
109 Agricultural mechanisation and irrigation 
The 9 ATDCs that are still under negotiation or construction 
15 Angola Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps Memorandum of Understanding singed in 2012 
16 Central Africa Republic TBC Memorandum of Understanding singed in 2012 
17 Cote d’lvoire TBC Feasibility study conducted in 2012 
18 Democratic Republic of the 
Congo 
ZTE Energy Foundation ceremony held in 2012 
19 Equatorial Guinea Ganliang Co., Ltd. Feasibility study conducted in2011 
20 Eritrea Shanghai Foreign Economic & Technological 
Cooperation Group Co., Ltd. 
Feasibility study conducted in 2012 
21 Malawi China Africa Cotton Co., Ltd. Foundation ceremony held in 2012 
22 Mali Zijinhua Co., Ltd. Agreement signed in 2012 
23 Mauritania Mudanjiang Yanlinzhuanyuan Technology 
Co., Ltd. 
Foundation ceremony held in 2012 
Source: The author based on media reports and fieldwork, updated by 2015. 
(C: Project Construction, T: Technology Cooperation, B: Business/Commercial Operation, TS: Technical Support)  
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3.1.2 Actors: Government-Firm Cooperation 
In most cases, the ATDCs were run by Chinese agro-companies58. While it is not 
entirely new for the Chinese government to incorporate company actors into aid 
projects, which could be traced back to the 1980s, it is something new however to 
have private firms involved, such as in the ATDCs in Ethiopia, Liberia and Togo 
(Table 3-2). Considering the origin of this type of practice, the primary reasons for 
including company actors are for greater efficiency and sustainability of the projects 
(Chapter 2.2&2.3). To be qualified to operate and manage an ATDC, the companies, 
in principle, have to be national or provincial-level leading agro-companies in China, 
which should have strong financial, managerial, and technical capabilities (MOC and 
MOA of the PRC, 2011). The companies need to go through a bidding process, 
though this is not fully open or competitive, given that the local and central Chinese 
governments have significant influence over the decision-making (Tang et al., 2014).  
 
While the companies are the main role players in the daily management of the 
ATDCs, government actors especially those from the Chinese side still take a great 
responsibility in planning, supervising, and particularly in the first three years of the 
project, financing the operation of the ATDCs. The Ministry of Commerce (MOC) 
and the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) are the most involved central-level 
government actors on the Chinese side. They cooperatively macro-plan, facilitate and 
supervise the ATDC project. In most cases, each of the ATDC-hosting countries is 
twinned with one specific province (or provincial-level city) in China (Table 3-2), as 
designated by the central government. Apart from providing general support to the 
project-implementing company, the local Chinese governments are also expected to 
play a leading role in promoting agro-companies from their province to invest in the 
twinned African country (MOC and MOA of the PRC, 2011). On the recipient side, 
various counterpart government agencies are also involved in the implementation of 
the ATDCs, but played only an assisting role. 
 
Comparatively, the government-firm cooperative form as shown in the ATDCs bears 
certain similarity to the PPP (Public-Private-Partnership) model that recently emerged 
in the Northern development cooperation field (Chapter 1.2). It is similar to the PPP 
model for its inclusion of partnership with a range of non-public actors, typically the 
private companies but also other sorts of corporate and/or non-for-profit entities 
(Table 3-2). It, however, could be regarded at best as a sort of quasi-PPP 
arrangement. That is firstly because business model – the defining feature of 
‘development PPP’ – is only visible in the final ‘Commercial Operation Stage’ of the 
ATDCs (Chapter 3.1.3). And secondly, the non-public actors involved in the ATDCs 
play to a much lesser extent a role of ‘resource partner’ that is often highly 
emphasized in the Northern development PPP model; in the ATDC project, however, 
the non-public actors act largely as the ‘implementers’ of the government project, and 
it still remains to see whether and to what extent they would put in more resources, 
particularly in financial terms, in the ‘Commercial Operation Stage’.  
																																																								
58 There are also several cases, for instance, in Congo, Rwanda, Zambia and Zimbabwe (see Table 4-
2), that the ATDCs are run by Chinese universities or research institutes. They sometimes also register 
a company under their names to operate the Centre. 
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3.1.3 Modalities: A Mix of Technical Assistance and Business Model 
Corresponding with the multi-dimensional motives and the diversity of actors 
involved in the ATDCs are the mixed modalities that combine both more traditional 
aid form of agro-technical assistance as well as an innovative element of commercial 
operation. Each ATDC has three operational stages: Project Construction Stage, 
Technical Cooperation Stage and Commercial Operation Stage. The Project 
Construction Stage normally takes about one year. While the host governments need 
to offer the required logistical support such as providing land, electricity and water, 
the Chinese side is in charge of the construction of infrastructure, as well as the 
provision of any needed agro-equipment and materials. In most cases, the 
construction is contracted to Chinese companies, but involves employment of local 
workers in the host countries. The majority of the fees incurred in this stage are paid 
by the Chinese government, averaged at about 40 million RMB (approx. 660,000 
USD) for each of the ATDCs. (MOC and MOA of the PRC, 2011; the author’s 
fieldwork) 
 
Once the construction is completed, the ATDCs are transferred to the host 
governments and become the state assets of the latter. This also usually indicates the 
commencement of the three-year Technical Cooperation Stage. The main tasks for 
the ATDCs in this stage are to perform the four ‘public-interest functions’ as 
mentioned earlier, i.e. agro-technology research, demonstration and extension, 
training and display. A Chinese technical team is assigned to the ATDC to undertake 
these tasks. Moreover, in fulfilment of the 'business introduction' objective, the centre 
also acts as a platform for Chinese agro-companies, who are seeking agribusiness 
opportunities into the host country. This latter dimension is fundamental because 
through it the centre starts planning and setting the basis for the succeeding 
Commercial Operation Stage. To do that, many of the ATDCs set up small-scale 
agribusinesses based on the Centre in preparation for the business-oriented operation 
in the future (MOC and MOA of the PRC, 2011; the authors’ fieldwork). In this 
stage, the implementing companies designated by the Chinese government take the 
lead in managing the centres on the daily basis. Financially, the Chinese government 
covers most of the Centres’ daily operations, including the funds needed to carry out 
the routine activities such as agro-research, demonstration and training, as well as the 
salary of the Chinese staff (MOC and MOA, 2011; the author’s fieldwork). The host 
governments instead play a facilitation role in this stage, assisting, to varying degrees, 
with the technical and management issues and also sharing a small part of the 
financial responsibility (The author’s fieldwork). 
 
After the three-year technical cooperation ends, the ATDC then enters the 
Commercial Operation Stage. In this stage, the ATDC is expected to be able to 
establish a market-oriented, integrated agribusiness value chain. Meanwhile, the 
original ‘public-interest functions’ are supposed to remain and even to be expanded 
and diversified. As far as it was designed in the ATDC Guidance, the Chinese 
companies will continue taking full charge of the Centre’s management at the 
Commercial Operation Stage. Financially, it is hoped that the Chinese government 
only covers the operational fees of the ATDCs for the first three years of technical 
cooperation; afterwards, the Centre should try to fund itself through incomes from the 
commercial operation (Xu and Qin, 2011). The specific roles and responsibilities of 
the local partners were not specified in the ATDC Guidance and thus need to be 
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further negotiated on the ground on a case-specific basis. (MOC and MOA of the 
PRC, 2011) 
 
While this stage is in line with the 'business introduction' objective, the purpose of 
having this prolonged cooperation period and adopting the business model is also, 
and perhaps more importantly, to ensure the sustainability of the ATDCs. As 
mentioned in Chapter 2, one of the important reform measures adopted in the 1980s 
that aimed to improve aid sustainability was to strengthen ‘management cooperation’ 
in the post-construction phase, which may take different forms such as: 1) sole 
management by the Chinese side on a entrustment or lease term (given that after 
transfer the project is part of the host country’s assets), or 2) co-management through 
joint venture created by both sides (Shi 1989; State Council of the PRC, 2011). Either 
a Chinese-led or joint venture way of management could be applied to the ATDC 
project. It could also be, in theory, an independent management by the recipient side 
as long as they are considered capable of operating the centre on their own. The 
specific cooperation model, particularly the unspecified responsibilities of the local 
partners, will be negotiated between the two sides as the Technical Cooperation Stage 
nears the end. The original plan as seen in the ATDC Guidance (MOC and MOA of 
the PRC, 2011), however, seems to suggest a Chinese-led management model. 
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3.2 Case Study: Chinese ATDC in Mozambique 
The Chinese ATDC in Mozambique (‘Mozambican centre’ or ‘centre’ hereinafter) 
was launched by the then Chinese president Hu Jintao during his state visit to 
Mozambique in 200759 and became one of the earliest ATDCs that were put into 
practice after the 2006 FOCAC pledges. It was also regarded and promoted as one of 
the most successful cases by the Chinese government in different occasions; for 
instance, according to an evaluation jointly conducted by Chinese Ministry of 
Commerce (MOC) and Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) in 2013, the Mozambican 
centre was ranked the 1st among the 15 Chinese ATDCs in Africa that were under 
examination (Zhang and Zhang, 2015). Also, considering the fact that Mozambique is 
one of the key cooperation partners with China in the agricultural field in Africa as 
well as the centre’s close links with other Chinese agribusiness projects, the 
Mozambican centre is hence a fairly representative example for one who aims to 
investigate China’s contemporary agricultural cooperation – particularly the 
‘innovative agro-aid model’ of that – with Africa. 
 
Soon after the centre launch in 2007, a delegation was assigned by the Chinese MOA 
to Mozambique to conduct a feasibility survey on the project. With the assistance of 
the Ministério de Agricultura (MINAG) and Ministério de Ciência e Tecnologia 
(MCT) of Mozambique, both sides finally chose a location for the centre in Boane, 
approx. 23km southeast of Maputo, with an area of 50 hectares. The construction of 
the centre started in 2009 and finished in 2010. In July 2011, the centre was formally 
transferred to the Mozambican government and thereby became national assets of the 
latter. From April 2012, the centre entered into the Technical Cooperation Stage. 
According to the initial design for the ATDCs, the Mozambican centre should in 
theory start its Commercial Operation Stage from 201560. 
 
 
 
The Chinese ATDC in Mozambique, Boane, 18 Oct 2013.  
																																																								
59 That was thus a very high-level project launch among all the ATDCs in Africa. 
60 The first-time fieldwork on the Mozambican centre was conducted by the author during the period 
of September–December 2013 in Mozambique, and the second-time during December 2014 and 
January 2015 in Mozambique. After that I have maintained constant contacts with some of the key 
informants working in the centre through telephone, messages and meetings (in a third city) from 2015 
until June 2017 to keep updated on the developments of the centre. 
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Lianfeng Overseas Agricultural Development Company (‘Lianfeng’ hereinafter), a 
Chinese state-owned farming company61 affiliated with the Bureau of State Farms 
and Land Reclamation (BSFLR) under the Hubei provincial government of China, 
was selected as the implementing agent to take full charge of the centre's construction 
and the succeeding management activities on the day-to-day basis. On the 
Mozambican side, MCT was the designated authority in charge of assisting in 
technical and managerial issues. In addition, the MINAG and the associated IIAM, 
Instituto de Investigação Agrária de Mozambique, also played an important 
facilitating role, particularly in the initial phase; for instance, the centre’s land was 
actually provided by the IIAM and they were in reality neighbours to each other62 
(Interview, 14 Nov 2013).   
 
As mentioned in Chapter 3.1, the ATDCs bear two key responsibilities, development-
oriented agro-technology transfer and commercially oriented business introduction. 
Apart from that, project sustainability also stands as an important concern, which has 
both development and commercial implications. The following section, therefore, 
will be dedicated to examine how these three functions and concerns have been dealt 
with in the operation of the ATDC in Mozambique. 
3.2.1 Agro-technology Transfer 
The main areas of the Mozambican centre for agro-technology transfer concentrated 
on crop farming (e.g. rice, maize, vegetables) and animal husbandry (e.g. pig 
farming). These were largely decided according to the local conditions and based on 
negotiations between the Mozambican and Chinese sides. For instance, rice and 
maize were chosen because they form the main types of staple foods in Mozambique, 
though rice is more prevalent in urban areas; and the idea of developing pig farming 
came from the fact that standardised pig farms were still largely underdeveloped 
despite a growing demand for pork consumption in the country. Specifically, some of 
the key agro-technologies targeted include, for instance, rice direct-seeding, 
mechanical harvesting, chemical weed control, water-saving irrigation, fertilizing, 
plastic mulching, integrated pest prevention and control, and live pig keeping. 
(Interviews, 4 Nov 2013-b and 8 Nov 2013) 
 
Vegetable fields and reservoir in the ATDC, Boane, 18 Oct 2013. 																																																								
61 For more background information about Chinese state-owned farming companies, see Chapter 4.1.2. 
62 For more details on the mechanisms and politics of the Mozambican government actors surrounding 
the ATDC issue, see Chichava et al., 2014. 
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The agro-technology transfer was conducted mostly through demonstration and 
training. The trainees were selected from the ten provinces across the country by the 
Mozambican government, specifically through the MCT and MINAG63, and largely 
fell into three major categories: farmers, technicians, and officials. Among them, 
ordinary smallholder farmers were given the greatest emphasis because it was 
believed by the Chinese staff that, by training the actual front-line ‘agricultural 
producers’, the technology transfer could achieve the most direct and beneficial 
effects (for they could learn the agro-techniques and then use them immediately). 
Around 6-7 training sessions were arranged every year for the small farmers, with 
each session lasting for 10 days and focusing on one specific agro-technique (e.g. 
direct rice-seeding or chemical weed control, as listed above). They were taught some 
very basic and practical farming techniques in order for them to easily put what they 
learned at the centre into practice at home. The second group was agricultural 
technicians. There were 3 sessions for them per year and each of those lasted for one 
month. The training courses for technicians were designed at a higher level, covering 
agro-techniques such as rice breeding and pad management, among others. The 
centre also offered courses for agricultural officials. These courses were at a lower 
frequency compared to the others, only one 3-to-5-day session per year and revolving 
mostly around management matters such as introducing the experiences of running 
state farms in China. At times, the centre also provided study or internship 
opportunities to college students upon requests from the Mozambican side, which 
may last from several weeks up to 6 months. (Interviews, 18 Oct 2013, 4 Nov 2013-a, 
and 14 Nov 2013) 
 
The training adopted a combined method of in-class teaching and fieldwork. Due to 
the fact that none of the Chinese agro-experts at the centre could speak English, 
Portuguese or any local language, the teaching process had to go through a translator; 
however, there was only one Chinese-English translator and none Chinese-
Portuguese translator before 201664. In practice, in order to counter the language 
barrier, what happened more often was a sort of ‘collaborative teaching’ conducted 
by the Chinese experts together with their Mozambican colleagues. Specifically, the 
Chinese experts would first explain in English (through the Chinese-English 
translator) to the Mozambican staff from MCT or IIAM who usually had some 
agricultural background, and then let the latter take the lead in teaching the trainees in 																																																								
63 In terms of selection of the smallholder farmers, the MCT partner said that they would choose 
(through the local branches of MCT and MINAG) from those who registered with agricultural 
associations, and there was no specific criteria for the selection expect for an acceptable health 
situation (Interview, 14 Nov 2013). As will be mentioned later in the training model, the Chinese 
experts felt that maybe the Mozambican partner should select some relatively educated and 
experienced farmers, for they found a big knowledge gap when teaching the local farmers, which made 
the training process rather difficult, though they had later adjusted the course design to address the 
problem (Interview, 18 Nov 2013). The Chinese experts, however, did not communicate this trainee 
selection issue with the Mozambican side. 
64 After 2016, the centre finally managed to hire some Chinese-Portuguese translator (first a 
Mozambican national who used to study in China and later a Chinese national), but according to the 
centre director, there were still communication problems particularly in daily work, both due to the 
mistrust between each other (for the former) and the less-qualified level of language (for the latter) 
(Interviews, 19 Oct 2015 and 23 June 2017). Indeed, even for the Chinese-English translator (a 
Chinese national) before 2016, the Mozambican partner reflected that they found language a big 
barrier between the two sides and they could not always understand each other in day-to-day 
communications (Interview, 14 Nov 2013). 
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Portuguese or local languages. They also used bilingual (English/Portuguese) 
handouts and picture illustrations to make the contents easier for the trainees to 
understand. After that, the Chinese experts would demonstrate the agro-techniques 
just taught in the outdoor paddy fields and guide the trainees to apply the techniques 
by themselves. Given the smallholder farmers often had little agro-technology or 
even education background, the experts sometimes faced difficulties in explaining to 
the farmers some of the agro-technologies, especially when accompanied by 
theoretical contents. To counter this problem, the training was re-tailored to the actual 
abilities of the farmers by the Chinese experts, whereby theoretical contents were 
greatly reduced and correspondingly the time spent in the fields was much increased. 
(Interviews, 4 Nov 2013-a and 14 Nov 2013) 
 
The training was mostly funded by the Chinese government during the three-year 
Technical Cooperation Stage (TCS), while the Mozambican side shared some 
financial responsibility in covering some of the logistics fees, such as the 
transportation and accommodation costs of the trainees (Interview, 14 Nov 2013). 
During the first two years of the TCS, in 2012 and 2013, more than 600 Mozambican 
smallholder farmers, technicians and officials received training at the centre 
(Interview, 18 Oct 2013). There, however, was not yet any formal follow-up or 
feedback mechanism for the training results, mainly due to the lack of financial 
means (Interview, 14 Nov 2013). However, basic feedback from the farmer trainees 
showed that they found the techniques that they learned at the centre useful for their 
production increase (e.g. the technique of plastic mulching). Some of the farmers 
reported a yield increase by 2-4 times through applying the Chinese technology to 
their farming practice; furthermore, these trained farmers were also able to play a 
demonstration role in their local areas (Interviews, 4 Nov 2013-a and 14 Nov 2013). 
The Mozambican workers hired by the ATDC to grow rice. They were trained by the Chinese experts 
first and were now being able to work independently in the rice paddies. Boane, 28 Oct 2013. 
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Apart from demonstration and training, the Mozambican ATDC also conducted some 
research activities, to a much lesser extent though65, which was concentrated 
primarily on seed testing. The centre served as one of the experimental stations of the 
Chinese ‘Green Super Rice’ initiative66 that was taking place in a number of Asian 
and African countries. By 2013, the centre had tested more than 100 different crop 
varieties, both Chinese and local types (e.g. rice and cotton mostly Chinese; maize 
and vegetables mostly Mozambican), and reported the results to both governments 
(Interview, 8 Nov 2013).  
 
Unexpectedly, the seed testing conducted by the centre turned out to become a 
subject of disagreement and controversy between the two sides. The Mozambican 
side called for more tests of Mozambican varieties as they would probably be better 
suited to the local taste and were also more affordable to the local people (Interview, 
14 Nov 2013; Chichava and Fingermann, 2015). The Chinese experts, on the other 
hand, believed that their main responsibility revolved around introducing better, 
higher-yield Chinese varieties into the host country in order to realize the ‘technology 
transfer’ objective; in light of this, the aim of seed testing was to examine whether 
certain Chinese varieties were suitable to be grown and extended in Mozambique 
(Interview, 8 Nov 2013). Also, they expressed the difficulty in procuring local 
varieties given that there were very few seed suppliers on the market. And they did 
not think that their Mozambican partners had committed adequately to providing the 
centre with, or at least facilitating its procurement of, the local varieties needed for 
testing (Interviews, 4 Nov 2013-a and 8 Nov 2013). There was also speculation that 
links the centre to a greater strategy of the Chinese government trying to distribute 
Chinese seeds in the global market for commercial benefits (Chichava et al., 2014). 
Despite the disagreement around the seed testing, there did not seem to be adequate 
communication between the two sides; while the Mozambican requirement seemed to 
be somehow ignored, the Chinese did not express their concerns and difficulties to 
their counterparts either. 
 
Overall, the transfer of Chinese agricultural technology as conducted by the ATDC in 
Mozambique proved to be beneficial to the local communities. The training courses 
were designed by the Chinese agro-experts according to the specific needs of the 
different types of trainees, and tailored to the actual abilities of the latter due to the 
knowledge gap between the trainers and trainees. Moreover, the participation of the 
local partners helped overcome the language barrier, and improved the effects of the 
technology transfer. As well, from the feedback perspective, the farmer trainees, for 
instance, confirmed that the Chinese agro-techniques were useful and could help 
increase the outputs, sometimes by 2-4 times, compared to their previous unit output 
not using Chinese techniques, according to both the Chinese and Mozambican sides 
(Interviews, 4 Nov 2-13-a; 14 Nov 2013). 																																																								
65 To recall the introduction of the main tasks of the ATDCs in 3.1.1, ‘research’ was designed as one of 
the key functions of the centres but not treated as important as ‘demonstration’ and ‘training’. This is 
partly because the capital and human resources that pure agricultural research requires is far beyond 
what the centres could effectively offer (Interview, 8 Nov 2013). Thus ‘research’ is usually constrained 
to a few limited areas that closely links and contributes to the ‘demonstration’ and ‘training’ activities 
of the ATDCs. 
66 The initiative was a joint program by the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences and the Bill 
Gates Foundation. 
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Nevertheless, the impacts of the technology transfer were also to some extent limited, 
mainly for three reasons. The first problem concerned the design of the training 
model. As noted before, the majority of the trainees in the Mozambican centre were 
smallholder farmers. This was surely sensible in that by transferring farming 
techniques to the actual agricultural producers, it would have the most direct results. 
However, the potential benefits were reduced both in quality and quantity terms as 
the technology transfer was largely not connected to the host country’s agro-
technology extension system. Indeed, by training more local agro-extension officers, 
they could better digest the Chinese techniques given their professional backgrounds 
and thus have a greater impact on disseminating the information to farmers due to the 
elimination of communication barriers (between the extension officers and local 
farmers) and the links to their broader extension networks, including follow-up 
extension and support services. However, as seen in the Mozambican case, where a 
long-standing national agricultural extension system did exist, the Chinese ATDC did 
not seem to be linked to it in any meaningful way: no extension officers had been 
involved in the training (Interview, 14 Nov 2013);  and even the 'agro-technicians' 
who received the training were mostly office staff without a mandate to work in the 
fields (Interview, 18 Oct 2013). The detachment with the country’s extension systems 
implied that the effects the centre might be only moderate and less durable, despite 
the fact that hundreds of small farmers were being trained each year. A comparison 
example that could be provided here is the Chinese ATDC in South Africa67 where a 
number of local extension officers and technicians also received the training and 
turned out to have played a positive role in coordinating the technology transfer 
between the Chinese and local farmers (Interview, 29 Jan 2015). 
 
Another problem concerned the post-training application. Even if the technology 
transfer process per se could be successful, it may not necessarily change the 
livelihood of the farmers, unless they have an enabling environment whereby they 
can put the learned techniques into application. In Mozambique, unfortunately I did 
not manage to interview the farmer trainees of the ATDC as they were scattered all 
over the country, but a very useful reference example could be provided here given 
the very similar scenario: a Chinese agro-firm, Wanbao, who was engaged in 
agribusiness and transfer of Chinese rice-farming techniques to the locals in the Gaza 
Province of Mozambique68. In that case, despite the specially designed training 
sessions for the local farmers, the techniques taught by the Chinese experts could not 
be implemented on a daily basis simply due to a lack of tools and irrigation 
equipment on the farmers’ own lands, thus the training courses had no sustainable 
effects on the farmers’ livelihood (Interview, 18 Nov 2013). Indeed, this problem was 
not only seen in the Mozambican case. In the ATDC in South Africa, for instance, the 
heating systems on the six government-backed fish farms, which were fundamental to 
apply the techniques that were taught at the centre, were left broken for months, 
causing stunted growth of the fish and thus reduced profits (Interview, 30 Jan 2015-c). 
 
A potential challenge also lied in the different farming cultures. According to the 
Chinese experts involved in the training activities, it really took time for the African 
smallholder farmers to learn and get used to the Chinese way of intensive cultivation 																																																								
67 The focus of the South African ATDC was on freshwater aquaculture. The author went to visit the 
centre and conduct some comparative fieldwork in January 2015. 
68 For the full case study of the Wanbao project, see Chapter 4.2.1. 
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that emanated from, among others, the land constraints in China (Interview, 18 Oct 
2013). Similar problem was also observed in the Wanbao agribusiness project where 
the local trainee farmers showed little interest in learning the very laborious Chinese 
farming techniques (Chapter 4.2.1). Furthermore, it was even more difficult for the 
African farmers who were used to an extensive way of farming to stick to the much 
more technically-demanding and time-consuming Chinese techniques on their own 
and especially for a long time – the dilapidation of the Chinese-aided farms in Sierra 
Leone during the 1970-80s after the leaving of the Chinese aid workers provides a 
vivid illustration to this point (Bräutigam, 2009). Therefore, training only focusing on 
agro-technology transfer but without full consideration (and corresponding 
countermeasures, if any) of the farming culture differences, as showed in the case 
study, may inevitably reduce the potential, especially long-term effects of the 
technology transfer. 
 
Although the 'research' aspect of the technology transfer was not treated as the main 
focus of the centre, the problems as emerged from the ‘seed testing’ issue were 
particularly worth noting, for it represents a dangerous tendency of the ATDC to 
neglect the local suitability. Despite all the good intension of introducing high-
yielding Chinese varieties in order to upscale the outputs, the centre neglected the 
simple fact that even if the selected Chinese varieties could be successfully grown 
and extended in the Mozambican rural and even proved to be very productive, they 
may not be well received in the markets for the local people simply dislike the types 
of grain. Again, similar case was also observed in the Chinese ATDC in South Africa 
where freshwater aquaculture, an expertise for the Chinese, was the main promotion 
area of the centre but freshwater fish enjoyed a rather small share in South African 
domestic market (Interview, 29 Jan 2015). 
3.2.2 Business Introduction 
In terms of the ‘business introduction’ dimension of the centre, the ATDC in 
Mozambique seemed to have quite successfully brought Chinese agribusiness into the 
host country. Their efforts could be seen from three aspects. First, Lianfeng, the 
project-implementing company, had started agribusiness based on the centre. Along 
with performing the centre’s technology transfer functions, Lianfeng also developed 
crop and animal production by using the land of the centre (approx. 50 ha; see Table 
3-3) and already distributed the output into the local market. The main products were 
rice, vegetables (particularly some Chinese varieties) and pork. Much of these 
products were sold to the Chinese community in Mozambique such as the Chinese 
supermarkets and Chinese companies based in Maputo (The author’s fieldwork69). 
The products were also popular among Mozambicans due to the lower prices and 
different varieties (Interviews, 18 Oct 2013, 4 Nov 2013-a, and 23 June 2017). Seed 
production, both Chinese and Mozambican varieties, was also deemed promising and 
regarded by the Chinese as another possible business option in the future (Interviews, 
18 Oct 2013 and 8 Nov 2013). The seed sector of Mozambique, as briefly mentioned 
earlier, was not well developed and there was inadequate seed supply on the local 
market. Lianfeng, along with its shareholder Hubei BSFLR, on the other hand, had 
special expertise in seed production. In addition, the company also was considering 																																																								
69 Some of the information was gained through the author’s site visits and general conversations with 
people on the sites, but not through formal interviews; these are referenced to as ‘the author’s 
fieldwork’ in the present chapter and also hereinafter.  
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the possibility of providing paid agro-technical extension services, which was already 
common practice in China, once the three-year technical cooperation was due to end. 
However, for that to happen, support from the Mozambican government, for 
example, in the form of giving agro-subsidies to the farmers, was required – as it was 
envisaged by the Chinese experts that these services would be uneconomical to the 
majority of the local farmers (Interview, 18 Oct 2013).   
 
 
People queuing to buy the produce from the ATDC and to sell on the local markets. 
Boane, 18 Oct 2013. 
 
Table 3-3 Initial Plan of Land Use for the Centre’s Future Agribusiness (Unit: Hectare) 
Total Rice Vegetables Animal and Aquaculture Cotton Seed Production 
50 25 5 10 10 
Source: Interview, 8 Nov 2013. 
 
Second, Lianfeng had expanded its agro-investment in Mozambique. Apart from the 
business enterprises based on the ATDC, Lianfeng had also participated in a couple 
of agribusiness projects in other provinces of Mozambique in collaboration with 
some private agro-companies from Hubei (The author’s fieldwork). Third, the 
Mozambican ATDC had served as a platform to introduce and assist other Chinese 
agro-companies to invest in agriculture in Mozambique. They had worked closely 
with several Chinese agro-companies and individuals, providing information and 
technical support that facilitates their investment. An individual agro-investor from 
Shandong province of China, for instance, visited the centre regularly to seek 
technical guidance on his 300-ha rice field near Maputo (Interviews, 29 Dec 2014 and 
14 Jan 2015). Wanbao, as mentioned earlier, also gained plenty of assistance from the 
centre, particularly in its initial period of investment, including the selection of the 
project site and rice varieties; it has since maintained constant contacts with the 
centre (Interviews, 4 Nov 2013-b and 23 June 2017). The same happened also to 
Hefeng, another Hubei company producing rice in the central province of Sofala (23 
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June 2017). As commented by the manager of a state-owned agricultural enterprise, 
‘If we find our investment work a bit easier here, this should be attributed to the 
ATDC’ (Interview, 10 Jan 2015). 
 
In short, from what we’ve seen in the case of Mozambique, the results of the ATDC 
in terms of business introduction seemed to have been fairly good. Indeed, available 
data suggested that at least 9 out of the first batch of 14 Chinese-aided ATDCs in 
Africa, specifically in Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Sudan, Mozambique, Cameroon, 
Liberia, Malawi, Benin, have successfully established their independent agribusiness 
outside the ATDCs. Even for those which haven’t formally started with agribusiness 
–that in South Africa, for instance – the Chinese staff have been collecting 
information on the local investment environment and keeping their Beijing-based 
headquarter regularly updated (Interview, 8 Mar 2015), which may help smooth the 
way for their future investment in South Africa. Considering the difficulties of the 
first-time entry into a foreign market, the ATDC project did seem to make it easier 
for the companies to get into, and invest in, the host countries, with the assistance and 
facilitation from both the home (China) and local (host country) governments. It was 
also relatively easier for these companies to start separate agribusinesses due to their 
identity as the implementing agents for a government aid project, for instance, in 
terms of land lease or tax exemption. Moreover, it seemed that the participation or 
intervention of the Chinese government agency could make a big difference as to 
how much an ATDC can exert its influence. The provincial government of Hubei, for 
example, had definitely played an essential role in magnifying the platform function 
of the Mozambican ATDC by establishing contacts and forging cooperation between 
the centre and other companies from Hubei province.  
3.2.3 Project Sustainability 
The three-year Technical Cooperation Stage for the Mozambican ATDC was due to 
end in May 2015. Future development plans for the centre, once the technical 
cooperation phase ends, had yet to be finalized between the two governments by the 
time the second-time fieldwork was conducted in early 2015. The general feeling 
from the Chinese side, however, was that the Mozambican counterpart was not 
capable of operating the centre independently. A very likely scenario seemed to be 
that the Mozambican ATDC would have an extension of the Technical Cooperation 
Stage for another three years, as already requested by the Mozambican government, 
and in that case, Lianfeng would continue to run the centre. (Interviews, 18 Oct 2013, 
4 Nov 2013-a and 29 Dec 2014)70 
 
First, financially, although the centre had been able to earn economic profits on its 
own terms and had conceived a business expansion plan for the future, the profits that 
had been gained from the commercial operation were not sufficient to cover the 
running costs of the centre. Similarly, it was foreseen by the Chinese staff that future 
profits would not be adequate to run the centre, which was primarily due to the 
limited resources the centre had – only around 50 hectares of land and a handful of 
staff (Interviews, 8 Nov 2013 and 29 Dec 2014). From the managerial point of view, 
although the Mozambican side had contributed greatly to the centre’s training 
activities, it had not fully participated in the management process. Although positions 																																																								
70 As confirmed by a recent interview, Lianfeng has continued to run the centre after May 2015, but 
not received funding from the Chinese government. (Interview, 23 June 2017) 
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were opened and offices were made available to the Mozambican staff, they only 
engaged on a part-time basis (as they also worked for the MCT). Seemingly they 
went to the centre only when they had specific problems that needed to be addressed. 
While the Mozambican partners sometimes complained that they did not know what 
was happening at the ATDC (Interviews, 4 Nov 2013-a and 14 Nov 2013), the 
Chinese felt helpless as they surely could not force their Mozambican colleagues to 
work with them on a daily basis – although to them, working together seemed to be 
the most effective way to keep the centre’s operation transparent to their Mozambican 
counterparts (Interview, 4 Nov 2013-a).  
 
In fact, in response to the abovementioned ‘lack of transparency’ complaint, the 
Chinese negotiated with the Mozambican government several times and finally 
managed to persuade them to assign at least three staff to the centre. However, due to 
a number of bureaucratic reasons, there was in effect still no Mozambican staff 
working at the centre. For instance, the Mozambican staff considered Boane too far 
out, especially given their government did not pay for the petrol; also, the lack of 
Internet at the centre was a deterrent (Interview, 4 Nov 2013-a)71. The Chinese 
travelled to the MCT two to three times per week, but mainly to address 
administrative affairs, such as visa and invitation issuing, rather than management 
issues (Interviews, 18 Oct 2013 and 4 Nov 2013-a). This lack of participation raised 
doubts concerning the ability of the Mozambican side to operate the ATDC on its 
own. To the least, it is seemingly challenging for them to do so.  
 
In short, from what we’ve seen from above, despite the ‘company and commercial 
operation’ countermeasure was introduced on purpose, the long-standing project 
sustainability problem seemed to be still quite worrying. First of all, as shown in the 
Mozambican case, although some business attempts were made, the centre was still 
not able to achieve financial independence simply by selling self-produced agro-
products. This was despite the fact that the production costs had been much lowered 
since the land, water and electricity were provided by the host country, for free, 
during the Technical Cooperation Stage (Interview, 14 Nov 2013). In fact, most of 
the ATDCs were facing similar constraints: limited land, capital and human resources, 
among others. Therefore, it did not seem very likely that the ATDCs would be able to 
sustain themselves financially through commercial operations, or at best, they may 
just manage to make the ends meet but with very limited profit margins, particularly 
given the current production scale72. In order to achieve financial independence, an 
expansion of investment inputs, and thus production scale, is necessary. This can 
either be based on the centre or a separate business outside the centre. However, two 
main challenges emerge here.  
 
First, how likely is it that the bolt-on investment will be successful? The question 
then is translated into another issue: feasibility and profitability of conducting 																																																								
71 According to a more recent update, the situation has improved with a few Mozambican colleagues 
now working at the centre full time; that said, things remain the same in that the two groups of people 
(Chinese and Mozambican) worked in a rather independent way (e.g. separate offices), without too 
much interactions or ‘collaboration’ in the real sense (Interview, 23 June 2017).  
72 This has been confirmed at least by the case of Mozambican ATDC two years after the completion 
of the Technical Cooperation Stage since 2015; the centre has been just able to cover the day-to-day 
operation fees while always trying to save costs (e.g. through hiring even fewer working staff). 
(Interview, 23 June 2017) 
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agribusiness in Africa. The thorniest problem affecting Chinese agro-investors seems 
to be the financing of investment, given their usually limited self-owned capital and 
difficulties to raise money in China (Chapter 4.2.3). No less importantly, it also 
depends on the motives of the implementing firm – to what extent and even whether 
they would like to invest self-owned capital at all into this sort of ‘development 
cooperation’ rather than a real ‘agribusiness’ project; the Mozambican case has so far 
shown limited signs of Lianfeng being interested in so doing (Interview, 29 Dec 
2014)73. Even if they are truly interested and could manage to raise the required 
money, they would meet a range of practical problems in the agro-investment process 
in Africa, such as land ownership, labour regulation, market channels, government 
efficiency, and natural disasters, among others. According to the author’s interviews 
with a number of existing and potential Chinese agro-investors in Mozambique, they 
have expressed without exception that the difficulties in operating in Africa were far 
beyond their expectations before they came to the continent. None of the existing 
investors has managed to make any profits to date after years of operation. This may 
cast some doubts on the prospect of the ATDCs’ commercial development in the host 
countries.  
 
Second, even if the company could make good profits, to what extent would the 
company financially support the ‘public-interest functions’ of the centre? Although it 
was, in essence, the application of the government-firm cooperation, or a quasi-PPP 
model in development aid, the Chinese government and the companies had not 
concretely entered into any formal agreement that would regulate each other’s rights 
and obligations. It is unrealistic to expect the company actors to willingly fulfil, by 
default, the public-interest functions of the ATDCs, especially given the generally 
low-profit margins. This leaves the situation uncertain as to whether the public-
interest functions of the ATDCs would be fully performed in the Commercial 
Operation Stage, as the designers had envisioned; or, it is also not unlikely that these 
aid-type functions gradually diminish while the ATDCs transform into a pure 
commercial project. 
 
In terms of managerial and technical sustainability, while the immediate danger of 
project failure does seem to be mitigated with the continuing stay of the Chinese team, 
potential problems are still visible. For instance, the lack of effective participation of 
the local partner in the daily management of the ATDCs, compounded by the typical 
Chinese-dominated structure of governance (Jiang et al., 2016), run the risk of 
leaving the local partner incapable of operating the ATDCs independently if the 
Chinese team pulls out of the project. Technically, the overwhelmingly farmer-
centred training model also makes it less likely for the local agro-technicians to 
conduct the extension of Chinese farming techniques on their own.  
 
Alternatively, as mentioned before (Chapter 3.1.3), the ATDCs could also be 
operated through joint venture, or independently by the host government, instead of 
following the Chinese-led management model. As to the option of the joint venture, 
based on the common practice of this type of ‘management cooperation’ since the 
1990s, it is quite likely that the joint venture would be formed between a Chinese 
company and the host government, with the latter holding a share as per its ownership 																																																								
73 This has been confirmed again two years later – Lianfeng has indeed not injected extra capital into 
the ATDC; the centre has been kept running only by its limited scale of market-oriented production. 
(Interview, 23 June 2017) 
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of land or other assets, whereas the management responsibilities would still largely 
rely on the Chinese side74. In that case, the actual operation, as well as the challenges 
of the ATDCs for sustaining its development, would be similar to what has been 
discussed above. Or, independent management by the host government is also a 
possibility, which was confirmed by the case of South African ATDC (Interview, 8 
Mar 2015). However, given the general financial constraints of African states, it 
remains questionable whether the ATDCs would become financially stable without 
external support. In addition, the lack of technical and managerial capability building 
for the local counterparts, during the Technical Cooperation Stage, increases the 
likelihood that the ATDCs will not be sustainable under independent operation. 
 
To sum up, while admitting some of the positive outcomes, the investigation of the 
ATDCs – mostly through the case of Mozambique but also combining some other 
cases – has revealed much gap between the expected objectives and the actual results, 
which is particularly evident in terms of technical transfer and project sustainability. 
The dimension of business introduction proved to be relatively successful, but it is 
worth noting that the introduction of Chinese firms is only the first step. As will be 
demonstrated in the following chapter (Chapter 4), there are a number of practical 
obstacles that greatly affected the survival and profitability of the Chinese 
agribusiness projects in Mozambique after being introduced to the country. The 
‘innovative agro-aid’ model of development cooperation as embodied by the ATDC 
project, therefore, still needs much reflection and improvement before being able to 
realising the ‘mutual-development’ goals as designed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
																																																								
74 There have been very few cases till now of local private actors participating in an agricultural joint 
venture with the Chinese side. 
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Chapter 4 Development Cooperation in Agriculture: The 
Agribusiness Model 
As has been argued in the Introduction and repeatedly demonstrated in the previous 
chapters, one of the most outstanding features of China’s contemporary development 
cooperation lies in its flexibility in terms of the cooperation modalities through the 
‘development package’ model, and more essentially, the pragmaticism in terms of the 
underlying ‘mutual development’ pursuits. It is because of this sort of mentality and 
guidelines that Chinese development cooperation can comfortably go beyond (the 
constraints of) the Northern ODA or its own ‘pure aid’ as practiced in the earlier 
years and choose from a much broader range of cooperation forms. In the area of 
agriculture, more specifically, we’ve already seen that, while more traditional aid 
forms such as technical assistance and infrastructure projects remain (Chapter 2.4), 
Chinese government has also started to try out some more innovative ways in 
conducting agricultural aid, typically the ATDCs (Chapter 3). The present chapter 
will continue to investigate another important modality of China’s agricultural 
development cooperation with Africa, that is, the ‘agribusiness model’. 
 
By ‘agribusiness model’, it basically means the incorporation of Chinese agro-firms 
and their commercial operation models into the development cooperation field in 
order to enhance the performance of the agricultural sector (e.g. agro-productivity 
and value-added of agro-products) and the livelihood of the rural population in Africa. 
The developmental impact of the ‘agribusiness model’ could be understood at two 
levels. In a narrower sense, similar to the PPP scheme that has been gaining 
increasing popularity in the Northern donor community (Chapter 1.2), agribusiness 
projects are often partially supported by government finance and thus expected to 
bear more developmental responsibilities, such as creating more jobs, providing free 
trainings and helping build schools etc.– in other words, efforts are intentionally 
made to create more developmental impacts (i.e. ‘additionality’) on the local 
communities where the agribusiness is located. In a broader sense, however, 
especially in the case of those purely self-financed agro-firms, the developmental 
impacts are demonstrated more as a natural spill-over effect of agribusiness given the 
very nature of agricultural sector that feed and sustain the largest population in Africa, 
and especially those extremely poor. 
 
Equally important, linked to the core argument of this thesis, the agribusiness model 
also fully demonstrates the idea of ‘mutual development’. The chapter, therefore, will 
discuss how China’s agricultural cooperation with Africa has been enmeshed with its 
own agricultural development agenda, namely the ‘Agriculture Going Out’ strategy, 
and meanwhile with Chinese agro-firms’ attempts of investing abroad.  
 
The chapter is composed of two main sections. Section one (Chapter 4.1) will first 
provide a brief introduction to the general developments of Chinese agribusiness 
investment in Africa in the recent decades. It will then introduce the ‘agribusiness 
model’ of development cooperation by exploring its motives, actors and modalities. 
The second section (Chapter 4.2) will further unpack the model by examining four in-
depth case studies of Chinese agribusiness projects in Mozambique – one of the most 
significant partner countries of China’s agricultural development cooperation on the 
continent. A preliminary analysis as to the results, especially problems, of China’s 
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‘agribusiness model’ – as has been implemented in Mozambique so far – will be 
provided at the end of the chapter. 
4.1 Chinese Agribusiness Investment in Africa 
The earliest practice of Chinese agribusiness investment in Africa started in the 1980s 
in a few West African countries such as Senegal and Guinea-Bissau in the fishery 
area (CNFC, n.d.). With respect to crop farming, the early investment attempts started 
in the early 1990s, mostly carried out by Chinese SAEs75 (Chapter 2.2&2.3). The 
scale of investment, however, had remained at a very low level both in terms of the 
total value of the investment and the number of the participating companies. A few 
private individuals also invested, but at a much lower rate.  
 
Entering the new millennium, while agricultural cooperation has always been 
prioritized under the FOCAC (Forum on China Africa Cooperation) framework, it is 
only from the Beijing Summit of FOCAC in 2006 that the Chinese government began 
to formally encourage Chinese companies to invest in the agricultural sector in Africa. 
This occurred at a time when the Chinese government was in the process of initiating 
its overseas agricultural investment policy, or, as termed ‘Agriculture Going Out’ in 
alignment with the country’s broader ‘Going Out’ strategy (Table 4-3). In 2010, the 
Chinese government convened a high-profile agricultural forum and invited official 
representatives from 18 African countries to Beijing to discuss the possibilities of 
deepening the bilateral agricultural cooperation. On this occasion, the Chinese 
government, again, placed special emphasis on the role of corporate actors in the 
‘new era’ of agricultural cooperation and called for joint efforts from both Chinese 
and African sides to create a favourable environment that could facilitate the 
investment activities.  
 
By the end of 2011, Chinese agricultural FDI in Africa had amounted to around 400 
million USD, not a significant figure in a comparative sense. It represents about 12% 
of China’s overall overseas agricultural FDI in the world and only 2.5% of China’s 
total investment in Africa (Table 4-1 and Figure 4-1). In terms of companies’ 
involvement, one source estimated that around 78 Chinese companies were involved 
in agro-investment in Africa by May 2012, standing roughly as 13% of the total in the 
world (Table 4-2).  
 
Table 4-1 China’s Outward FDI Stock in Africa in Selected Years (Unit: Million USD) 
 Agriculture Total Share 
2009 289 9,330 3.1% 
2011 406 16,250 2.5% 
Source: The author based on the China-Africa Economic and Trade Relations Reports (MOC of the 
PRC, 2010 and 2013). 
 
  
																																																								
75 State-owned Agricultural Enterprises, see Chapter 4.1.2. 
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Figure 4-1 China’s Agricultural FDI Stock by Region by 2011 (Unit: Million USD) 
 
Source: The author based on the Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment 2011 
(MOC, 2011) and China-Africa Economic and Trade Relations Reports (MOC of the PRC, 2010 and 2013). 
 
Figure 4-2 Geographical Distribution of Chinese Agro-investment Companies in the World 
Continent Number Percentage Main Countries 
Asia 354 59.2% Laos, Indonesia, Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, 
Thailand, Myanmar,  
Europe 80 13.38% Russia, France, Germany, UK,  
Africa 78 13.03% Zambia, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Mozambique, Mali,  
Australia 34 5.75% Australia, New Zealand,  
North America 30 5.02% USA, Canada,  
South America 20 3.34% Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela 
Source: The author based on Yang, et al., 2012. 
 
4.1.1 Motives: Mutual-Development Pursuits, Tripartite-Interest Balances 
 
Chinese investment, particularly in financial terms, is very much needed for African 
agriculture. Despite a great potential of agricultural sector in economic growth and 
poverty reduction, African agriculture has virtually been stuck in a lengthy stagnation 
in the years following the continent’s independence. While agricultural 
transformations have achieved great success in Asia and Latin America since the 
1960s, Africa still suffers from severe backwardness in terms of agricultural 
production; the per capita output in sub-Saharan Africa fell by around 5% between 
1980 and 2001 whilst in developing counties as a whole it increased by about 40% 
during the same period (EC, 2005). It is reported to have less irrigation, less fertilizer 
use, less soil and seed research, less mechanization, less rural financing and poorer 
infrastructure than any other farming region in the world (Thurow, 2008; Harsch, 
2004). Capital injection is thus of crucial importance to the improvement of the 
agricultural production conditions and thus productivity on the continent, which 
however is hampered by the often limited financial strengths of the African 
governments. 
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Agriculture and agribusiness together account for nearly half of the GDP in Africa, 
and is further projected to be an industry of one trillion USD in sub-Saharan Africa 
by 2030. In particular, the more market-oriented agribusiness (in contrast to the basic 
production agriculture) is believed to have an essential role to play in jump-starting 
economic transformation through the development of agriculture-based industries that 
creates jobs and incomes. Thus it is suggested that the recently renewed interests and 
attention from governments and other actors in African agriculture should be 
extended to the agribusiness (World Bank, 2013). And foreign investments can be 
useful upstream and downstream of agriculture to overcome the weaknesses of 
African industries, as well as in infrastructure to complement public funding 
(NEPAD, 2013). As a result, African governments are all very keen to introduce 
agro-FDI, including that from China, in order to boost the development of domestic 
agricultural sector. At the 2010 China-Africa Agriculture Forum, a sub-forum of the 
FOCAC, for instance, many African leaders expressed their interests in inviting 
Chinese investment to help with infrastructure, research, experience sharing (Xinhua, 
2010). 
 
Meanwhile, as repeatedly brought up through the thesis as a key feature of China’s 
contemporary development cooperation, such investment is expected to fulfil mutual-
development objectives of both African countries as development cooperation 
recipients and China as the provider. In the ‘agribusiness model’ under discussion, 
although Chinese government does not explicitly link its self-interested motives to its 
agricultural development cooperation efforts, these motives are almost self-evident 
and fairly justifiable within the mutual-benefit framework. Different from the 
‘innovative agro-aid model’ of the ATDC wherein company actors play more an 
implementing role, they are not only the ‘front fighters’ but also decision makers as 
to the business plan, thus leaving much room for their own corporate interests. 
Therefore, in understanding motives of the Chinese side under the ‘agribusiness 
model’, one has to distinguish that of the government and that from the companies’ 
point of view. 
 
In the first place, the ‘agribusiness model’ of development cooperation, characterised 
by its agro-FDI element, fits well into China’s current internationalization strategy of 
its domestic agricultural sector. The so-called ‘Agriculture Going Out’ policy was 
formally launched by the government in 2006, with a strong mandate to promote and 
facilitate Chinese agro-companies to ‘go out’ and conduct agricultural investment 
abroad (Table 4-3). Despite other important considerations76, this state-led overseas 
agricultural strategy is largely resource-oriented (Zhai, 2006; Ye, 2007; Zhang, 2009; 
Wan, 2011 and 2012). There has been high tension between the increasing demand 
for the major agricultural products, including both grain crops and cash crops, and the 
actual capability of the domestic supply. This is primarily attributed to the low 
people-to-land ratio in China, wherein the arable land area per capita is only about 
0.08 hectares, less than half of the world average of 0.2 hectares (World Bank, n.d.). 
Even with great efforts made by the Chinese government, including strengthening 
farmland protection and increasing unit yield, it still appears rather difficult for China 
to fulfil the needs for all the major agricultural products solely through domestic 
production. Filling this gap between demand and supply by utilizing external 																																																								
76 For instance, to optimize and upgrade the agro-industrial structure through growing crops of 
comparative advantages, e.g. labor-intensive vegetables and fruits, and accordingly, developing land-
intensive crops in suitable foreign countries. 
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agricultural resources, either through imports or agricultural FDI, is almost an 
inevitable course of action for China. 
 
That said, it is however worthwhile to clarify the target crops of China’s agricultural 
imports and FDI, which seems particularly necessary in face of the often emotionally-
fuelled debates that frequently assume that ‘China is laying an expansive agricultural 
cooperation framework across Africa, tapping into the continent’s immense potential, 
as a means of securing long-term domestic food security’ (Freeman, et al., 2008). In 
fact, for a series of strategic considerations, the Chinese government has made every 
effort to try to maintain a high-level self-sufficiency rate (SSR) for some of the key 
grain crops, especially those for human consumption and thus are considered 
essential in food security terms (Jiang, 2015; Appendix 1). As a result, the SSRs for 
rice, wheat and maize have stabilised at around 98–100% both in total and separate 
terms (Appendixes 2, 3&4). Meanwhile, the Chinese government has also developed 
an integrated grain reserves system across the country in order to further strengthen 
the national food security. 
 
Indeed, largely because of this policy priority given to grain crops farming at home, 
which has consequently occupied up to 80–90% of the country's total arable land, it is 
made an almost inevitable choice for China to resort to international trade and FDI in 
order to ensure effective supply of other important types of agricultural products, 
especially those land-intensive cash crops like soybeans, cotton, and rubber. It is 
hoped by the Chinese government, for instance, that through agricultural FDI, China 
could have access to overseas equity holdings of soybeans, cotton, sugar crops, palm 
oil and rubber amounting to respectively 20%, 40%, 30%, 15% and 20% of their total 
imports by the year of 2020 (NDRC and MOC of the PRC, 2013). This trend is also 
widely seen in China’s actual practice of overseas agricultural investment, and that in 
Africa as well (Appendixes 5, 6, 7&8; Box 4-1). Therefore, instead of importing or 
growing grain crops that are of significant food security implications (FAO, 2003), 
the main focus of Chinese agricultural imports and FDI is effectively different types 
of cash crops. 
 
From a corporate point of view, furthermore, there is also an urgent need for many of 
Chinese agriculture-based companies77 to start seriously considering their overseas 
strategies, particularly in face of the mounting costs and unstable supply of 
agricultural raw materials which, among other things, have continually reduced the 
companies’ profit margin. 
 
To give some examples for this case: in the grain industry, for instance, the Chinese 
government has set minimum prices for agro-companies to purchase certain types of 
grains from farmers in order to protect the interests of the latter. These prices are 
usually much higher than that of those produced in some other countries, e.g. the 
Southeast Asian neighbours, due to China’s increasing land constraints and growing 
costs of labour and agro-inputs. The rational choice, therefore, would be to buy raw 
materials from abroad. However, under the government’s Grain and Cotton Import 
Quota System (‘Import Quota System’ hereinafter), agro-companies are not allowed 
to conduct imports of rice, wheat, maize and cotton unless they can obtain the quota 
required, which nevertheless is often awarded in favour of the SAEs (state-owned 																																																								
77 For more details about Chinese ‘agriculture-based companies’, see 4.1.2. 
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agricultural enterprises). For the majority who cannot obtain the ‘import quota’, they 
would have to bear the high costs of raw agro-materials, which makes them less 
profitable and also less competitive compared to their foreign counterparts operating 
in China. Furthermore, despite the high prices, it is not guaranteed that companies can 
secure the raw materials they need. The large number of Chinese agro-processing 
companies, compounded by the massive intrusion of powerful transnational agro-
firms after China’s entry into WTO since 2001, has created a rather grim scenario in 
every harvest season in which numerous agricultural companies – state or private, 
domestic or foreign – scramble for the relatively limited supply of agro-products from 
Chinese farmers. For those who are not able to obtain the raw materials, processing 
lines may have to be shut down.  
 
Another example would be the soybean industry, where the problems experienced are 
different but equally challenging. Because soybean is not under the Import Quota 
System, Chinese companies are free to purchase soybeans from foreign traders. 
However, it is precisely because of the absence of strict protective measures, and 
consequently the high dependency upon imports – nearly 80% of the soybeans 
consumed in China in recent years were imported from abroad – that Chinese 
soybean processing firms became increasingly subject to the price fluctuations on 
international markets. During the soybean price fluctuation in 2004, for instance, 
more than half of Chinese medium/small-sized soybean processing firms shut down 
or went bankrupt, and 70% of those affected Chinese firms were purchased by 
transnational grain giants, whereby leading to a total of 60% of China’s soybean 
processing volumes to be purchased and controlled by foreign enterprises (Comnews, 
2014).  
 
Against this background, the primary and most direct motives for Chinese 
agricultural enterprises to ‘go abroad’ is to offset the disadvantageous business 
conditions at home with a view to maintaining and maximizing their profitability; 
specifically, they need to secure cheaper and stable sources of agricultural raw 
materials through conducting agro-FDI. Meanwhile, the government motive for 
promoting ‘Agriculture Going Out’ is to assure adequate supply of major agricultural 
products; and it is for that purpose that the government started to encourage Chinese 
agro-companies to gain access to overseas agricultural resources via investing abroad. 
Furthermore, on the African side, the underdeveloped agricultural sectors in many 
African countries are calling for FDI both as a capital catalyst and a growth engine of 
agriculture and agribusiness industry, with a view to uplifting people from hunger 
and poverty to the greatest degree possible. There is, therefore, considerable 
compatibility among the tripartite interests of the Chinese government, Chinese agro-
firms and African states; indeed, this potentially ‘win-win-win’ scenario could serve 
as an indispensible cornerstone for the ‘agribusiness model’ to truly fulfil its 
envisioned mutual-development pursuits. That said, the too many actors and interests 
co-existing will inevitably entail the problem of interests balancing and actions 
coordination, as will be shown in the forthcoming case studies (Chapter 4.2). 
	 82	
Table 4-2 China’s ‘Agriculture Going Out’ Policy 
Policy 
Objectives 
• Guarantee the adequate supply of the major agricultural products by utilizing 
overseas agricultural resources 
• Explore and expand international markets for China’s advantaged agricultural 
products and technology 
• Utilize advanced foreign agro-technology   
• Enhance the international competitiveness of Chinese agricultural enterprises                                                                                      
(Song et al., 2012) 
Investment 
Destinations 
*Principle: prioritize neighbouring countries, countries rich in agricultural 
resource, and countries with good investment environment 
• Neighbouring countries  
(Russia, Central/Eastern Europe, Central/Southeast Asia) 
• Latin America  
• Africa 
• The West (Europe, America, Australia, etc.) 
(NDRC and MOC, 2013; Song et al., 2012) 
Investment 
Fields 
*Principle: prioritize cash crops of high import-dependency, and develop grain 
crops in appropriate regions 
• Crop farming 
o Southeast Asia: palm oil, rubber, rice, maize,  
o Russia, Central Asia and Central/Eastern Europe: soybean, rape, 
cotton, wheat, barley, maize,  
o Latin America: soybean, cotton, sugar products,  
o Central/Southern/Eastern Africa: cotton, grain crops,  
o Central/Western Africa: cotton, palm oil, rubber,  
o South Asia, Australia, North America: soybean, cotton, rape, wheat, 
sugar products,  
• Animal husbandry 
• Fishery 
(NDRC and MOC, 2013; Song et al., 2012; Ye, 2007) 
Investment 
Value Chain 
*Principle: start from and focus mainly on storage and logistics, complementing 
by production, processing and international trade,  
• Production 
• Processing 
• Storage 
• Logistics 
• Trade                                                                        
 (NDRC and MOC, 2013; Wan, 2012) 
Investment 
Modalities 
• Greenfield investment: to start a new enterprise (farm and/or progressing 
factory) in the investment destination country 
• Equity investment: to participate in the corporate operation by the form of 
share purchase or M&A (Mergers and Acquisitions) with established agro-
enterprises in the investment destination country 
(Wan, 2012; Zhang, 2009) 
Investment 
Entities 
• To support some central enterprises and large-scale agricultural enterprises to 
become the main force of China’s overseas agricultural investment 
• To encourage non-agricultural, private and medium/small-sized firms to 
participate in the agricultural foreign investment process 
(NDRC and MOC, 2013; Wan, 2012) 
Supporting 
Measures 
• Policy encouragement and investment guidance 
• Financial support 
• Insurance and tax measures 
• Diplomatic backup 
(NDRC and MOC, 2013; Ma et al., 2014) 
Source: The author based on the documents as indicated above. 
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4.1.2 Actors: Firm-Government Cooperation 
Corporate Actors 
In the ‘agribusiness model’, where foreign investment in local agricultural industry is 
treated and utilized as a means of development cooperation, the different types of 
Chinese agriculture-related firms naturally take a leading role. Currently, there are 
four major types of companies that have been actively engaged with overseas 
agricultural investment, namely the central SAEs, local SAEs, private agro-companies 
and some non-agricultural but agriculture-based firms. As observed from the ground 
(Chapter 2, 3&4.2), these four kinds of companies have all been involved in Chinese 
agricultural development cooperation with Africa, particularly under the ‘agribusiness 
model’. 
 
Specifically, central SAEs refer to those state-owned agricultural enterprises that 
operate at the central government level, and in most cases, under the direct governing 
of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State 
Council (SASAC)78. Currently, there are around six central SAEs in China, three of 
which – respectively China National Agricultural Development Group Corporation 
(CNADC), China National Cereals, Oils and Foodstuffs Corporation (COFCO) and 
Chinatex Corporation (Chinatex) – have been more active in conducting agro-foreign 
investment, whereas the others tend to focus more on their domestic business (see 
Appendixes 5&6). Local SAEs, on the other hand, indicate state-owned agricultural 
enterprises operating at the local, mostly provincial, government level and thus 
accountable to the local SASAC. Among them, the state-owned farming and 
reclamation enterprises (‘state farming enterprises’ hereinafter) as well as the local 
grain groups have played a pioneering role among the diverse types of local SAEs 
who are engaged in overseas investment.  
 
Particularly, with specialist expertise in land reclamation and cultivation, the state 
farming enterprises have long taken an important part in the agricultural cooperation 
area between China and Africa, which could be dated back to the 1960s (Chapter 2). 
In the new era, the state farming enterprises of Shanxi (shǎnxī) and Hubei provinces, 
for instance, are still currently undertaking Chinese government’s flagship agro-aid 
projects of the ATDC, in Cameroon and Mozambique respectively (Chapter 3). 
Against the background of the country’s ‘Agriculture Going Out’ policy, the state 
farming enterprises also play a leading role in the process of overseas agricultural 
exploitation. By the end of 2013, the Chinese state farming enterprises had 
established 113 agro-investment projects in 42 countries across the Americas, 
Australia, Europe, Africa and Southeast Asia (Ding, 2014). And the country’s state 
farm system in total owned approximately 266,000 hectares (including 233,000 of 
grain crops and 20,000 of rubber) of farmland abroad and about one million tons of 
grain crops were produced overseas, for instance, in 2013 (Yu, 2014; see also 
Appendix 7).  
 																																																								
78 This is a very important government agency in China. Authorized by the State Council, the SASAC 
is entrusted with investor's responsibilities on behalf of Chinese people and government, supervising 
and managing the state-owned assets of the enterprises under the supervision of the Central 
Government (excluding financial enterprises), thus enhancing the management of the state-owned 
assets. 
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Together, the central and local SAEs basically constitute the ‘Chinese national team’ 
that, allowing for their self-interested pursuits, assumes the main responsibility of 
implementing the government’s FDI-oriented ‘Agriculture Going Out’ policy. That 
said, private agro-companies also participate, and indeed may occupy a much larger 
proportion of the total engaged in agricultural foreign investment, given the limited 
number of the SAEs in absolute terms (see Appendix 8). One of the major differences 
between the two lies in the fact that the SAEs are often involved in those relatively 
more sizable projects due to their company strength, ownership nature as well as the 
government support, whereas the project size of private agro-firms is usually more 
moderate. Also, unlike the SAEs whose foreign investments tend to be more strategic, 
in the sense of keeping strict alignment with the government priorities – for instance, 
land-intensive cash crops is among one of them – the fields that private agro-
companies have set foot in are obviously much more diversified, ranging from major 
food crops like rice and wheat to relatively random types of cash crops such as coffee, 
sesame, Chinese medicine, and anything that is considered profitable to them. 
 
Apart from the majority of agro-companies, either state-owned or private as discussed 
above, a number of companies that are not directly associated with agro-industry but 
agriculture-based have also joined the team of ‘Agriculture Going Out’, which can be 
further grouped into three categories. The first group concerns those manufacturing 
companies that are heavily dependent on agricultural raw materials. The second group 
of non-agricultural companies are those who were closely linked to Chinese earlier 
agricultural aid during the 1960-90s – for instance, SINOLIGHT and COMPLANT, 
who used to implement agro-aid projects in Africa and transformed them later on into 
commercial operation for the purpose of project sustainability (Chapter 2.3). Lastly, 
there are also some who are investing or intend to invest in foreign agriculture either 
as a way to diversify their business or simply due to the promising profitability of 
certain specific projects, among other motives. They are, therefore, not particularly 
driven by agriculture-oriented, state or company strategies as most of the others are. 
 
In Africa, more specifically, there were around 185 Chinese companies involved in 
agribusiness by 2014, encompassing all the different company types mentioned above 
and investing in a diversity of sub-sectors (Table 4-4). Among them, 101 companies 
focused their core business on crop farming, equalling to 54.6% of all Chinese agro-
firms, while other 41 focused on fishery, 33 on forestry and 11 on animal husbandry. 
For the purpose of the thesis, this section concentrates only on the 100 or so crop-
farming companies: Most of these crop-farming companies were located in East 
Africa, with Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Madagascar hosting the 
largest number of Chinese companies (Table 4-5). About 25% of these companies 
were doing cash crop farming, primarily cotton, but also other types like rubber, 
sugarcane, sisal, palm oil and so on. The majority of the companies were engaged 
with food crop farming, mostly grains and vegetables. In terms of the enterprise 
ownership, up to 80% of the projects were by private Chinese companies; state-
owned/controlled companies and those mixed with state element represented only a 
small percentage. Most of the Chinese agro-investment projects in Africa were 
medium/small-scaled. There were only about 30 relatively sizable projects with at 
least 1,000 hectares of land or 1 million USD of investment involved (Box 4-1).   
 
As far as these sizable projects are concerned, however, they showed some different 
features compared to the general trend: almost two thirds of these projects were 
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invested by Chinese state-owned companies (including SAEs as well as joint venture 
with some state element). And the majority of these sizable projects were concerned 
with cash crops; there had been very few Chinese companies that were engaged with 
large-scale food crop farming in Africa. 
 
Table 4-3 Chinese Agro-investment Firms in Africa 
Region Number 
of 
Countries 
Number of Chinese Agro-firms Chinese 
Firms of 
all kinds 
Share 
of 
Agro-
firms 
in all 
Crop 
Farming 
Animal 
Husbandry 
Forestry Fishery 
East 
Africa 
17 73 1000 1.7 
53 9 4 7   
West 
Africa 
16 57 761 7.5 
25 0 11 21   
Central 
Africa 
9 34 388 8.8 
12 2 17 3   
North 
Africa 
7 17 439 3.9 
7 0 1 9   
Southern 
Africa 
5 4 294 1.4 
4 0 0 0   
Total 
(Share in 
all agro-
firms, %) 
54 185  
2882 
 
6.4  101
54.6 
11 
(5.9%) 
33
17.8 
41
22.2 
Source: The author based on the MOC online database, updated by 8 August 2014. 
 
Table 4-4 Top Ten African Countries Hosting Chinese Agro-investment Firms 
Rank Country Number of Chinese 
Agro-firms 
Number of Chinese 
Companies of All Kinds 
Share 
1 Zambia 23 187 12.3% 
2 Gabon 12 
11 in forestry and fishery 
33 36.4% 
2 Mozambique 12 81 14.8% 
3 Ghana 12 
(7 in fishery and forestry) 
142 8.5% 
4 Tanzania 12 147 8.2% 
5 Mauritania 8 
(All in fishery) 
21 38.1% 
6 Liberia 8 
(6 in forestry and fishery) 
34 23.5% 
7 Sudan 8 91 8.8% 
8 Angola 8 116 6.9% 
9 Madagascar 7 32 21.9% 
10 Zimbabwe 7 94 7.4% 
Source: The author according to the MOC online database, updated by 8 August 2014. 
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Box 4-1 Some of the Sizable Agro-investment Projects by Chinese Companies in Africa 
Source: The author based on Chinese media reports, company websites and the author’s fieldwork. 
Notes: SAE – State-owned Agricultural Enterprise; SOE – State-owned Enterprise; SFE: State 
Farming Enterprise. 
Central-level	SAEs	and	SOEs:	1.	CAAIC	–	Tanzania	(1999)	–	Sisal	–	6,900ha	–	EXIM	concession	loans	2.	CAAIC	–	Zambia	(1994)	–	Wheat,	Maize	–	3,600ha	3.	CAAIC	–	Madagascar	(2014)	–	Hybrid	rice	–	CADFund	4.	CSFAC	–	Zambia	(1990,	1999)	–	Grains,	Vegetables,	Animals	–	3,200ha	(in	cooperation	
with	Jiangsu	SFE)	5.	SINOLIGHT	–	Mali	(1960-70s,	2009)	–	Sugarcane	–	30,000ha	–	EXIM	concessional	loans	6-9.	COMPLANT	–	Togo,	Benin,	Sierra	Leone,	Madagascar	–	Sugarcane	–	18,000ha	10.	China	SDIC	International	Trade	(2012)–	Central	Africa	Republic	–	Cotton			
Provincial-level	SFEs	and	SOEs:	11.	Jiangsu	SFE	–	Zambia	–	Grains,	Vegetables	–	2,300ha	(in	cooperation	with	CSFAC)	12.	Shanxi	SFE	–	Cameroon	–	Rice,	Cassava	–	10,000ha	–	CDB		13.	Anhui	SFE	–	Zimbabwe	–	Wheat,	Maize,	Soybean,	Tobacco	–	50,	000ha	–	EXIM	concessional	loans	(in	cooperation	with	private	Tianrui)	14.	Hubei	SFE	–	Mozambique	–	Rice	–	22,000ha	(in	cooperation	with	private	Wanbao	and	Hefeng)	15.	Hubei	SFE	–	Zimbabwe	–	Tobacco,	Vegetables	–	3,000ha	16.	Hainan	Rubber	Group	–	Sierra	Leone	–	Rubber,	Rice	–	135,000ha	–	EXIM	concessional	loans	17.	Xinjiang	Production	and	Construction	Corps	–	Angola	–	Maize,	Soybean,	Rice,	Vegetables	–	17,000ha	18.	Jilin	Overseas	Agricultural	Investment	and	Development	Group	–	Zambia	–	2,000ha		
Mixed-ownership	Companies	with	State	Element:	18.	SDIETC	Group	(Shandong)	–	Sudan	–	Cotton,	6,700ha	19.	Tianli	Group	(Shanxi)–	Madagascar	–	Cotton	–	60,000ha	–	CDB/CADFund	20.	ZTE	Energy	–	DR	Congo	–	Palm	oil,	Maize,	Cassava	[Biofuel]	–	5,300ha	21.	COVEC	–	Nigeria	–	Rice	–	2,000ha		
Private	Companies:	22.	China-Africa	Cotton	Company	(Shandong)	–	Zambia,	Mozambique,	Malawi,	Zimbabwe	–	Cotton	–	CDB/CADFund	23.	Lianfang	(Shandong)	–	Zambia	–	Cotton	–	beyond	10,000ha	28.	Junde	(Shandong)	–	Zimbabwe	–	Cotton		29.	Jinfang	(Shandong)	–	Zimbabwe	–	Cotton		24.	Wudi	(Hubei)	–	Zambia	–	Cassava,	Soybean,	Maize	[Biofuel]	–	80,000ha	25.	Wanbao	(Hubei)	–	Mozambique	–	Rice	–	20,000ha	–	CDB/CADFund	(in	cooperation	
with	Hubei	SFE)	26.	Hefeng	(Hubei)	–	Mozambique	–	Rice	(sugarcane)	–	2,000ha	(in	cooperation	with	
Hubei	SFE)		27.	Haode	(Henan)	–	Mozambique	–	1,000ha		30.	Tianrui	(Anhui)	–	Zimbabwe	–	Maize,	Tobacco	–	3,000ha	(in	cooperation	with	Anhui	
SFE)	31.	Tianyuan	(Shandong)	–	Sudan	–	Cotton	–	1,300ha	32.	Fenghui	(Shandong)	–	Sudan	–	Cotton	–	3,000ha	33.	Yingma	(Hunan)	–	Madagascar	–	Hybrid	Rice	–	7,000ha	34.	Yuemei	(Zhejiang)	–	Nigeria,	Tanzania,	Togo,	Sierra	Leone,	Mali	–	Cotton			
	 87	
Governmental Actors 
Despite the leading role naturally taken by the different types of agriculture-related 
companies, Chinese government actors also play a part, particularly in terms of 
mobilizing, supporting and supervising the company actors in a range of ways, in the 
‘agribusiness model’ of development cooperation with Africa. While this is to certain 
extent similar to the role played by the public sectors under the Western ‘development 
PPP’ model, what distinguishes it from the latter is it also serving as policymaker and 
business facilitator under the ‘Agriculture Going Out’ agenda. 
 
The Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) and Ministry of Commerce (MOC) at the central 
government level, along with the Department of Agriculture and Department of 
Commerce at the provincial government level, take the main responsibilities on behalf 
of the Chinese government to formulate and implement the country’s agricultural 
foreign investment policy. At the central level, while the MOA, given its specialist 
expertise, is usually involved in formulating action plans, providing suggestions and 
coordinating matters that require specific agricultural background, the MOC 
facilitates the process in a more general commercial sense, such as approving and 
registering agro-investment projects and firms, providing country-specific investment 
guides to the investors. The two systems, agricultural and commercial, of both central 
and provincial governments closely work with each other in promoting and regulating 
China’s agricultural foreign investment on a day-to-day basis. 
 
More specifically, three entities under the MOA play important roles in agro-
investment related matters. The Department of International Cooperation acts like the 
policy-making body, the Foreign Economic Cooperation Centre is largely in charge of 
policy implementation, and the Research Centre for Rural Economy serves as a think 
tank that provides reports and drafts policies for the Ministry. On the MOC side, the 
most relevant entities include the Department of Outward Investment and Economic 
Cooperation who is the main implementing body of the government’s ‘Going Out’ 
strategy, regional departments – in the case of Africa, for instance, the Department of 
West Asian and African Affairs – which are in charge of drafting and implementing 
regional economic cooperation policies, and very importantly, the Economic and 
Commercial Counsellor’s Offices, the MOC’s overseas branches (often located within 
Chinese embassies) that play an assisting role to help Chinese agro-companies with 
local issues such as boosting public relations and solving business-related conflicts of 
the companies.  
 
Apart from these two systems, some other Chinese government agencies also to 
different degrees participate. The National Development and Reform Commission 
(NDRC)79, for instance, played an important part in drafting the Suggestions on 
Overseas Agricultural Investment and Cooperation (Suggestions hereinafter, Table 4-
5), one of the most important official documents on overseas agro-investment. To 
achieve a better coordination result, there are also two inter-ministry cooperation 
mechanisms in place, both of which are led prominently by the MOA and MOC. One 
is called “Agriculture Going Out” Inter-ministry Coordinating Leading Group, made 
up of 10 different central ministries and established in 2006; the other is Inter-
ministry Working Mechanism on Overseas Agricultural Resources Exploration 																																																								
79 NDRC is the key ministry under the State Council that is responsible for monitoring and guiding the 
national macro-economy and social development. 
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formed by 14 different ministries and established in 2008 (Table 4-5). These two 
mechanisms, however, do not seem to have played an active or adequate role in real 
practice (Jiao, 2013).  
 
In addition, some policy-oriented national banks and insurance companies have 
worked closely with the government in facilitating Chinese agro-companies to invest 
abroad. The most relevant ones include the Export and Import Bank of China (EXIM 
Bank), the China Development Bank (CDB), and the China Export & Credit 
Insurance Corporation (SINOSURE). 
 
Table 4-5 Policy and Institutional Developments of China’s ‘Agriculture Going Out’ Policy 
2006 Suggestions on Hastening the Implementation of the “Agriculture Going Out” Strategy by 
the Ministry of Commerce (MOC), the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) and the Ministry of 
Finance 
Development Plan of the “Agriculture Going Out” Strategy by the MOA 
*Founded the “Agriculture Going Out” Inter-ministry Coordinating Leading Group made up 
of 10 different central ministries and led by MOA and MOC 
2007 No. 1 Document of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
- Hasten the implementation of the “Agriculture Going Out” strategy (focusing more on the 
agricultural trade aspect). 
2008 
  
Decisions on Several Key Issues of Promoting the Rural Reform by the CCP 
- Expand the “Agricultural Opening Up”: combine ‘inviting in’ and ‘going out’; strengthen the 
capability to utilize the “two markets” and “two resources” both at home and abroad; develop 
the agricultural international cooperation; foster the development of transnational agricultural 
firms; gradually build up an international integrated system for agricultural production, 
processing, storage, logistics and trade. 
Medium/Long-term Plan of China’s Grain Security (2008-2020) by the State Council 
- Strengthen the international cooperation in the grains and oils area; implement the 
“Agriculture Going Out” strategy; encourage Chinese enterprises to invest abroad; establish 
stable and reliable guarantee system for grain imports; enhance the capability of ensuring grain 
security. 
*Set up the Inter-ministry Working Mechanism on Overseas Agricultural Resources 
Exploration formed by 14 central ministries and led by MOC and MOA 
2010 No. 1 Document of the CCP 
- Enhance the level of the “Agricultural Opening Up”; strengthen the international cooperation 
on agricultural technology and resources; formulate encouraging policies and promote 
qualified enterprises to invest abroad. 
2011 The 12th Five-year Plan of the Food-processing Industry by the National Development and 
Reform Commission (NDRC) and the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) 
- Develop international grain cooperation, encourage Chinese enterprises to go abroad and 
establish processing firms for rice, cotton and soybean; encourage qualified enterprises to 
invest abroad in palm, soybean, sunflower seeds and other oil products, and establish overseas 
edible oil production and processing bases; build up the guarantee system for diverse types of 
oil products and editable vegetable oils. 
Development Plan of the Agricultural Investment and Cooperation by the third conference of 
Inter-ministry Working Mechanism on Overseas Agricultural Resources Exploration 
2013 Suggestions on Overseas Agricultural Investment and Cooperation by the NDRC and the 
MOC (for more, see Table 6-2) 
2014 No. 1 Document of the CCP 
- Utilize the international agricultural product market; hasten the implementation of the 
“Agriculture Going Out” strategy; foster the development of large-scale, internationally 
competitive enterprises of grains, cotton, oils; support the agricultural production and 
export/import cooperation especially with the neighbouring countries; encourage the financial 
agencies to innovate in financing types and methods for agricultural international trade and 
“Agriculture Going Out”; explore the feasibility of establishing special fund for international 
trade and overseas agricultural development. 
Source: The author based on the relevant official documents during 2006–2014. 
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These government and related agencies have made a joint effort, through a diversity 
of methods from policy encouragement, financial support, tax and insurance measures 
to diplomatic backup, to mobilize and support Chinese agro-companies’ FDI activities. 
The Chinese government has, since the mid-2000s, issued a series of policy 
documents and statements that highlight the necessity of conducting overseas agro-
investment and encourage Chinese enterprises to take an active role in this process 
(Table 4-5). These policies, although still relatively rough, do help bolster the 
confidence of domestic investors and also lay the foundations for relevant agencies to 
put forward more concrete measures. The abovementioned Suggestions made by the 
NDRC and MOC in 2013 set out for the first time the principles, destinations, fields 
and methods for the country’s foreign agro-investment, which can meanwhile serve as 
a general guidance for Chinese companies. Notwithstanding these advancements, 
there is still the need of more detailed, country-specific or industry-specific 
investment instructions, which could ensure that the companies are well informed 
beforehand and hence able to make successful investments abroad (Song et al., 2012). 
 
In terms of financial support for agricultural foreign investment, the two national 
banks mentioned earlier have both established cooperation partnerships with the 
Ministry of Agriculture. The EXIM Bank, for instance, signed an agreement with the 
MOA in 2008, promising to offer up to 8 billion USD credit during 2009–2013 to 
support the agro-investment projects recommended by the MOA (MOA and EXIM 
Bank of the PRC, 2008). The agreement was then renewed in 2014. The CDB also 
signed an MOU with the MOA in 2011 on supporting the country’s agricultural 
development, including overseas agro-investment. By the end of 2010, the CDB had 
provided a total of 420 million USD to finance Chinese foreign agro-investment 
projects (Zhao and Tao, 2011). There have not been any special financial facilities 
that are designed specifically for agricultural foreign investment purposes. In early 
2014, the leading Communist Party started to encourage the relevant financial 
agencies to explore the possibility of establishing an Overseas Agricultural 
Development Fund (CCP, 2014).  
 
Another source of financial support for overseas agro-investors is from state subsidies. 
There are both direct subsidies and loan discounts under the so-called Special Fund 
for Foreign Economic and Technological Cooperation (SFFETC), a government 
preferential package sponsored by the state fiscal system and set up specifically for 
backing up Chinese enterprises in “Going Out”. Agricultural overseas exploration is 
one of the most supported areas by the SFFETC80. To be eligible to apply for the fund 
as an agricultural project, the minimum investment value of the project should be no 
less than one million USD (MOF and MOC of the PRC, 2012). 
 
That said, in general, the financial support, either by policy-oriented banks (e.g. bank 
loans) or state finances (e.g. government subsidies), is limited in type and scale. More 
importantly, such financial support tends to be biased towards a minority of agro-
companies, particularly SAEs or large-sized private firms, due to the closer link to the 
state strategy and greater significance of their projects. The larger proportion of 
medium/small-sized private agro-companies, on the other hand, is generally facing 																																																								
80 Others also include general foreign investment, foreign engineering project contracting, and foreign 
labour cooperation. 
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financial difficulties in the operation of their overseas agribusiness (Song et al., 2012; 
Jiang, 2014). 
 
Concerning insurance services, due to a number of constraints such as the high risks 
of foreign investment and the inadequate experience in insuring this kind of 
investment, there have not been many insurance providers or choices available for 
Chinese companies engaged in overseas investment. SINOSURE, the policy-oriented 
insurance company, seemed to be the only agent, so far, with the ability of providing 
insurance services for Chinese companies’ foreign investment including investment in 
agriculture. In 2014, for instance, SINOSURE offered insurance to over 30 overseas 
agro-investment projects, with the total value amounting to 1 billion USD (Economic 
Information, 2015). Yet, SINOSURE insures the investors against a very limited 
number of risks including only currency exchange ban, war or political turmoil, and 
requisition or breach of contract by the foreign government (SINOSURE, n.d.). 
Natural disaster, for example, which stands as one of the biggest risks facing 
agricultural investors, is not covered.  
 
In terms of tax measures81 , Chinese agro-companies can benefit from general 
preferential policies, such as the export tax rebate, as all foreign investment-involved 
companies do. Also, the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture has signed bilateral 
agreements with a number of countries in order to prevent double taxation upon 
Chinese agro-companies. However, there have not been many special tax incentives 
for the agricultural enterprises. Particularly, under the current Grain and Cotton 
Import Quota System, only a limited number of agro-companies, mostly the SAEs, 
are able to gain the import quota; the others have to pay high tariff if they want to 
import their products to China from their overseas bases. This has actually become a 
big obstacle for many Chinese agro-investors. Notably, there have been a few number 
of exceptional cases wherein the government granted extra quotas to agro-companies. 
For instance, Jilin Overseas Agricultural Exploration Group Corporation (JOAEC), a 
provincial SAE, shipped back around 30,000 tons of rice from its overseas farms in 
Russia in 2013. The normal tariff standard for this type of rice import is 65% but with 
the granted quota, JOAEC paid only 1% of the tariff (Observer, 2013). This kind of 
quota allocation and tax advantage can potentially serve as a very useful economic 
incentive to Chinese overseas agro-investors, but it is nevertheless only an 
exceptional occurrence at the present stage. 
 
Finally, the Chinese MOA has established bilateral working mechanisms with more 
than 50 countries in the world, signed a series of agreements on agricultural 
international cooperation, and helped launch a number of agricultural investment 
projects (Yang, 2012). According to the “Suggestions” disclosed in 2013, the 
government will further strengthen cooperation with the most important agricultural 
partners in a wide range of areas, such as investment protection, avoidance of double 
taxation, inspection and quarantine, in order to better protect the overseas interests of 
Chinese enterprises (NDRC and MOC of the PRC, 2013). However, this sort of 
diplomatic backup seems to better work in the pre-implementation stage, i.e. 
establishing business partnership through diplomatic channels, while it is less visible 
after the projects are settled and put into actual operation (Chapter 4.2).  																																																								
81 There are mainly three types of taxes applied in the overseas investment area, namely business 
income tax, goods and labor tax and import and export tariff. 
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4.1.3 Modalities: Agribusiness and Its Development Implications 
The discussion about modalities of the ‘agribusiness model’ of Chinese development 
cooperation in this section mostly revolves around the key aspects of the agro-
investment activities in Africa by Chinese investors – from financing, value chain, 
production models to market allocation – as well as some of their developmental 
implications. 
Financing 
Under the ‘agribusiness model’, financing for the agro-investment projects launched 
in different African countries largely comes from the Chinese side, which may to 
certain extent help alleviate the widely experienced financial bottleneck in the 
agricultural sector in Africa. In most cases, the investments are financed by Chinese 
companies’ self-owned capital as well as state supports particularly from the two 
policy-oriented national banks, i.e. the EXIM Bank and CDB (Chapter 4.1.2). Apart 
from general financial facilities, agro-investment projects in Africa can benefit also 
from some preferably or exclusively Africa-focused financial facilities such as the 
Government Medium/Long-term Concessional Loan and Preferential Buyer’s Credit 
of the EXIM Bank (the often-called ‘two preferential loans’, see e.g. Chapter 2.2&2.3) 
and the China-Africa Development Fund (CADFund) provided by the CDB (Box 4-2). 
It is, however, worth noting that, given the ‘policy-oriented’ nature of the two banks, 
they tend to offer financial support to the SOEs (State-Owned Enterprises), or in the 
case of private firms, to those relatively larger-sized companies or projects engaging 
with agro-products that are of strategic importance to China (Chapter 4.1.1&Box 4-1).  
 
Box 4-2 The China Africa Development Fund (CADFund) 
Source: The author based on CADFund website and media reports. 
Value Chain 
 
There are different stages along the agribusiness value chain that could potentially be 
the targets for foreign investors, from the upstream input supply and seed 
propagation, to the primary stage of agro-production, until the downstream trading 
and logistics, processing, and retailing (UNCTAD, 2009). Chinese investors in Africa 
have so far mostly focused on the production segment of the value chain, mostly 
through ‘greenfield’ investment, but in some fewer cases also by M&A (mergers and 
acquisitions). Many Chinese agro-projects do involve some processing activities, but 
in most cases are limited to preliminary rather than deep processing, which is largely 
The	China-Africa	Development	Fund	(CADFund)	was	established	in	2007	as	one	of	the	measures	pledged	by	the	Chinese	leaders	during	the	2006	FOCAC	to	boost	China-Africa	economic	relations.	Specifically,	it	is	aimed	to	support	Chinese	companies	entering	African	markets	and	conducting	foreign	investment.	As	a	sovereign	fund,	CADFund	is	provided	by	China	Development	Bank	and	adopts	the	PE	(private	equity)	model	in	financing	the	targeted	projects,	which	is	different	from	the	traditional	free	aid	or	loan	
model.	By	2014,	CADFund	had	financed	more	than	70	projects	across	30	African	countries,	with	investment	value	totaling	at	approx.	3	billion	USD.	The	cooperation	partners	have	mostly	been	large-scale	Chinese	enterprises,	both	state-owned	and	private.	In	terms	of	project	size,	the	CADFund	normally	chooses	projects	that	are	at	least	beyond	5	million	USD	of	investment	value.	The	funding	scale	is	expected	to	reach	5	billion	USD	in	the	future.		
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attributed to the high costs involved. There have been very few Chinese companies at 
the current stage who are investing in other upstream or downstream agribusinesses in 
Africa.   
 
The idea of investing in agro-production abroad, or overseas plantation, used to be 
advocated by many from the academia and policy circles in China, especially during 
the early years after the ‘Agriculture Going Out’ policy was launched (for example, 
see Wan, 2011). The argument was straightforward and logical: given China’s 
domestic land constraints, Chinese companies should go abroad, buy or lease land, 
and establish overseas agricultural production bases in relatively land-abundant 
countries. There have been some subtle shifts, however, in terms of the agro-
investment value chain focus in the recent years, as seen at both policy and practice 
levels. According to the Suggestions released in 2013 (NDRC and MOC of the PRC), 
Chinese companies now are more encouraged to invest in the downstream activities 
of foreign agribusiness, such as the storage and logistics, with other segments 
including production only as complementary. While being in line with the common 
practice of transnational agro-companies for the consideration of higher economic 
returns (UNCTAD, 2009), this policy modification might also be related to China’s 
own agro-FDI experience in the past decade – particularly that of the setbacks and 
accusations triggered by some land deals in Africa and Latin America. 
 
Yet, the new policy rests on the precondition that the host countries must have a 
relatively mature domestic agricultural production system, which is however very 
much lacking in the context of most African countries. This means that even though 
this modified policy may be increasingly seen in Chinese overseas agricultural 
investment practice in the future, it would still be difficult to be applied in African 
environments. The land-involved, production-based type of agro-investment, 
therefore, is to some extent an inevitable choice for foreign investors, including the 
Chinese, who are operating on the continent. Despite the often-controversial land 
deals for the locals as well as the relatively lower profits for the investors, the upside 
of this sort of agro-investment is that it could make a direct contribution to the 
productivity increase of the agricultural sector, and in the case of grain crops, 
enhancement of food security of the recipient countries. 
Production Model 
 
There are mainly three production models currently being adopted by Chinese agro-
investors (especially Greenfield-type investors) in Africa, namely farm/plantation 
production, contract farming and a combination of both82. The main differences 
between the three largely revolve around the usership (ownership or terms of lease) of 
land and thus different implications to the landowners, especially those more 
vulnerable smallholder farmers. That said, under all these three production models, a 
large number of locals are hired to work in these projects and often offered with free 
training; this may to certain extent help boost employment and thus reduce poverty in 
the rural areas of the investment recipient countries. 
 
The farm/plantation production model has been the most commonly seen model 
among Chinese agro-investment projects in Africa. Under this model, Chinese 																																																								
82 In less-common cases of agro-investment through M&As, the Chinese may not be directly involved 
in the production process. 
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investors need to either buy or lease land from the local governments, or private 
owners, to build their farms. They can be small farms of only several hectares or big 
plantations up to tens of thousands of hectares. The length of the lease also varies 
from 15, 20 years up to 99 years or more, on a country-specific basis. The 
farms/plantations are usually run by a small Chinese management team and employ 
local workers to crop on them. The number of local employees range from dozens to 
hundreds, depending on the size of the project. For instance, the sisal farm developed 
in Tanzania through CAAIC’s investment - one of the Chinese central SAEs - 
operates on a 99-year lease of 6,900 hectares of land obtained from a local Tanzanian 
in 1999 (Box 4-1). The farm is run by a small top-level management team of 6 
Chinese people along with a larger middle-level management team of 100 local staff 
working in different areas such as production, administration, accounting, 
safeguarding, engineering, and medical care. The local staff is hired on a permanent 
basis - formal labour contracts are signed with the farm. In addition, the farm also 
employs hundreds of farm workers (700 long-term, 500 temporary in 2013) who are 
working on a seasonal basis. The output of this sisal farm has amounted to one tenth 
of the total production in Tanzania, ranking 3rd in terms of asset value (Chen, 2013; 
Yuan, 2013). 
 
Contract farming normally features in the contract agreement signed between the 
farmers and the companies. It clearly specifies the obligation of the former to produce 
agricultural commodities of certain quality and quantity, and the obligation of the 
latter to off-take the goods and realize the payment as earlier as agreed. The 
companies also often provide embedded services such as agro-inputs, pre-financing 
and other non-financial services to the contracted farmers (Will, 2013). Different from 
the farm/plantation model, contract farming usually depends on the land of the 
contracted farmers and does not necessarily require the investors to have their own 
land for production purposes. In the case of Chinese agro-investment in Africa, 
contract farming has not been widely adopted except for some cotton projects in 
which the contract form seems to have worked quite effectively. A typical case is the 
private China-Africa Cotton Company (CACD) which has established affiliates in 
seven African countries, working with more than 200,000 contracted cotton farmers 
(Wang, 2014; see also Chapter 4.2.2).  
 
For the combined form of farm production and contract farming, Chinese companies 
source the agricultural produce both from their own farms and the contracted local 
farmers. The main efforts are usually put into their own farms over which they have 
greater control and thus could ensure the basic production output (Interview, 18 Nov 
2013). They also work with the neighbouring local farmers mainly for the purpose of 
expanding production but also in some cases as a way to benefit the local community 
(Interviews, 18 Nov 2013 and 14 Jan 2015). This combined production model can be 
seen in the cases of several rice farms run by Chinese private companies in 
Mozambique, and the sugarcane and rubber plantations run by Chinese SAEs in 
Madagascar and Sierra Leone (Box 4-1). 
Market 
As mentioned earlier, the large majority of Chinese crop farming projects are food 
crop projects focusing on different types of grains and vegetables (Chapter 4.1.2). 
However, in most cases, they are relatively small-scaled, except for the few bigger 
ones run by Chinese SOEs (Box 4-1). These food crop projects usually adopt the 
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farm/plantation production model – run by a Chinese management team that employs 
local workers to crop the farm. Due to their limited scale, they mostly serve the local 
markets only and thus play a positive role in increasing food supplies of the recipient 
countries. 
 
In Zambia, for instance, the Chinese farms run by the central SAE, CSFAC, since the 
1990s supply all of their outputs to the locals, including the Zambian government, 
local agro-processing firms and the open markets. One of these farms alone used to 
occupy 20% of Lusaka’s agro-market share (Chen, 2006; Sun, 2007). The farms, in 
Angola, in which Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps invested, one of 
China’s provincial state farming companies, have become the largest supplier of 
vegetables for Luanda (Chen et al., 2012). Several rice projects in which Chinese 
private companies invested in Mozambique have also targeted mainly the local 
market, through different channels such as own outlets, small convenience stores or 
big local supermarkets (Interviews, 18 Nov 2013, 29 Dec 2014 and 14 Jan 2015).  
 
Meanwhile, an often-neglected fact is that the ever-expanding Chinese community in 
Africa has also been a key selling audience for these Chinese farms. Chinese people 
are used to eating rice and Chinese varieties of vegetables, instead of other staple 
foods typical of Africa such as maize or cassava. Many of these farms, especially 
small-scaled farms, were actually initiated with the aim of supplying the large number 
of Chinese engineering and construction companies. Fenghui, a private firm in Sudan, 
for example, has become the largest food supplier for Chinese companies. Fenghui’s 
chief executive officer used to work for CNPC when the oil giant began its oil 
exploration in Sudan between the late 1990s and early 2000s, and started his 
agribusiness in that period (Niu, 2013). Some of these farms are even run by the 
construction companies themselves. For instance, the rice project by COVEC in 
Nigeria is an industrial diversification attempt by the company, after its long presence 
in the host country (Box 4-1). In Mozambique, Chinese agro-firms and some 
individual farmers supply their products to Chinese supermarkets and have direct and 
fixed selling channels to a large number of Chinese firms. Examples where this 
happens are the cities of Maputo and Beira (Interviews, 3 Jan 2015 and 14 Jan 2015).  
 
Some larger food-crop projects do consider the possibility of exporting their products 
to the neighbouring countries in Africa. Yet, the plan does not seem to be feasible, at 
least in the short run, due to a series of practical constraints like the companies’ 
limited production, the grain export and import control of the host countries, and the 
lack of selling channels abroad (Interviews, 18 Nov 2013/10 Jan 2015/14 Jan 2015). 
There is no solid evidence until now that the Chinese companies have grown food in 
Africa and have shipped it back to China. 
 
For cash crops, the market channels of Chinese agro-investment have been more 
diversified. It may target local markets of the recipient countries and thus satisfy their 
domestic demand-supply gap, or international markets including that in China, thus 
contribute to the countries’ foreign exchange earning. The local market is prioritized 
if there is demand from the host country. The three sugarcane plantations in which 
Chinese central SOE, SINOLIGHT, has invested in Mali, for instance, aim primarily 
to fulfil local needs. With the expected annual output of 140,000 tons of sugar by 
2015, these three sugarcane plantations will be able to satisfy the total demand of the 
Malian domestic market (China.com.cn, 2012). In many African countries where cash 
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crops are mostly export-oriented, agricultural commodities are also sold directly on 
the international market. The sugar products produced by the central SOE, 
COMPLANT, supply both African countries, where its four subsidiaries are located, 
and increasingly EU markets, as well as other transnational sugar traders (People.cn, 
2012). In some other cases, the cash crops are shipped back to China. For instance, 
the sisal farm in Tanzania exports 80% of its production to China (Yu, Y.Y., 2014). 
China Africa Cotton Company exports around 40,000 tons of raw cotton back to 
China every year (People’s Daily, 2013). Some other larger cotton projects have also 
expressed their intention to export cotton to China. For instance, the provincial SOE, 
SDIETC Group, and the central SOE, China SDIC International Trade Company (Box 
4-1). 
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4.2 Case Studies: Chinese Agribusiness Investment Projects in Mozambique 
Mozambique is one of the countries in Africa that hosts the largest number of Chinese 
agro-investors and the most sizable Chinese agribusiness projects (Table 4-4 and Box 
4-1). For this reason it has been chosen as the country case study to investigate 
China’s ‘agribusiness model’ of development cooperation with Africa. Specifically, 
four Chinese firms – Wanbao, Hefeng, CAAIC and CACD – and their respective 
investment projects in Mozambique are selected as the cases of the ‘agribusiness 
model’ to be examined. These four cases bring to light different types of corporate 
actors (e.g. private/state-owned/mixed), governmental relations (both with the 
Chinese and Mozambican), investment fields (e.g. rice/cotton) and modalities (in 
terms of financing, production and processing). At the same time, they also share 
certain similarities with each other, and thus provide a good basis for a comparative 
integrated analysis. Among the four cases, that of Wanbao is treated as the key case 
given its representativeness and three others as complementary cases.  
4.2.1 Wanbao: The Key Case 
 
One of the farms under Wanbao project, Xaixai, 20 Nov 2013. 
 
The agricultural project under discussion – originally called Hubei-Gaza Friendship 
Farm (‘Friendship Farm’ hereinafter) – was first set up in 2007 according to a local-
government level agreement on agricultural cooperation between the Hubei province 
of China and the Gaza Province of Mozambique. The link between the two provinces 
started in 2005 when Yu Zhengsheng, the then provincial Party secretary of Hubei, 
made his visit to Mozambique on behalf of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)83. In 
2006, another senior official from Hubei followed it up and visited Mozambique 																																																								
83 Mozambique is among a few African countries with which China also maintains good inter-party 
relations, which is surely a boost to inter-state relations of the two countries and helps pave the way for 
wider political and economic cooperation.  
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again. On this occasion the Gaza province expressed its intent to invite the Chinese to 
help build a demonstration farm in Gaza with the aim of enhancing local agro-
production and food security. To facilitate that, Gaza offered to provide 1,000 
hectares of land in Xaixai, a district under Gaza, where the farm could be built. A 
Memorandum of Understanding on agricultural cooperation was then signed between 
the two sides. (FAOHB, 2012) 
 
As one of the tangible measures, Lianfeng Overseas Agricultural Development 
Company (‘Lianfeng’ hereinafter) was created by the Bureau of State Farms and Land 
Reclamation (BSFLR) of the Hubei provincial government, and entrusted to operate 
the prospective agro-project84 (Zhang, 2008). Soon after President Hu Jintao’s state 
visit to Mozambique in earlier 2007, the Friendship Farm was formally started. The 
project, especially at its early stage, also had a close link with the Chinese Agriculture 
Technology Demonstration Centre (ATDC) in Mozambique, a Chinese agricultural 
aid project that was launched around the same period in the neighbouring province of 
Maputo (Chapter 3.2). Both projects were assigned to Lianfeng to operate and the 
Friendship Farm in Xaixai served partly as a test site for the ATDC in Boane. In 2008, 
Hubei and Gaza formally signed a five-year-long twinning agreement. (Liu, 2011; 
FAOHB, 2012; Interview, 4 Nov 2013-b).  
 
 
Wanbao project, Xaixai, 18 Nov 2013. 
 
The Gaza province initially provided 300 hectares of land for a pilot plantation and 
promised to give another 1,000 hectares at a later stage. Lianfeng tested the farming 
of rice, wheat, cotton, vegetables and others in the first year and the results proved to 
be very positive. Thanks to the perfect combination of Mozambican natural 
conditions and Chinese agricultural technology, the unit output of the rice production 
averaged above 9 tons/ha, significantly higher than local production standards, which 
vary between 1-2 tons/ha (Liu, 2011; Interview, 18 Nov 2013; FAO, 2002; Kei Kajisa 																																																								
84 19 farms were chosen from the 53 state-owned farms under the Hubei state farming system to form 
up the Lianfeng company (Zhang, 2008). 
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and Ellen Payongayong, 2013). However, due to factors such as insufficient 
machinery and capital, Lianfeng’s speed in expanding rice farming to the full land lot 
was quite slow, using only 150-80 hectares up to the year 2011/12. In 2011, Lianfeng 
had to go back to China to seek further support in order to fulfil its promise to the 
Mozambican government (Ganho, 2013). Shortly after, Wanbao Grains & Oils Co., 
Ltd (‘Wanbao’ hereinafter), a private agricultural company from the same province of 
Hubei, took over the whole project from Lianfeng. Different from Lianfeng, which is 
a typical state farming enterprise85 specialized in land reclamation and farming, 
Wanbao focuses more on downstream agribusiness including purchase, processing, 
storage, sales and logistics. With annual revenue of around 2 billion RMB in 2011 
(approx. 300 million USD) (Wanbao, n.d.), Wanbao can be considered a 
medium/large-scale agricultural company in China86, and one of the leading agro-
firms in Hubei.  
 
It is worth noting that the China Development Bank (CDB) played an important role 
in this project-transfer process. The Mozambican working group of the CDB, which is 
in charge of the Mozambique-related business and based within the bank’s Hubei 
branch, contacted Wanbao’s CEO in May 2011, introducing the Friendship Farm 
project and inviting him for a site visit. In early June, the CEO arrived in Gaza. He 
was positively impressed by the country’s extraordinary natural conditions, regarding 
that as ‘a combination of the climate in Hainan, the black soil in Dongbei, the 
typography of Hanjiang Plain, and the water resources of the Hanjiang River’ (Min 
and Han, 2012)87. Based on this observation, he believed in the project’s great 
potential and immediately signed an agreement with the Hubei BSFLR, taking over 
the project from Lianfeng. Only one month later, the first batch of machinery and 
equipment were shipped to Mozambique and the company even managed to catch the 
planting season in the same year. The process of land reclamation was significantly 
accelerated after Wanbao took over the project. The 300-ha pilot land was soon fully 
cultivated and ended up with a fairly good harvest in 2012, with a unit output 
reaching above 8 tons/ha. (Min and Han, 2012; Interview, 19 Nov 2013-c) 
 
The Gaza government was surprised by Wanbao’s speed and performance, and 
instantly expressed its willingness to provide larger tracts of land for further 
expanding the project. Wanbao then conceived an ambitious 20,000-ha development 
plan, and through the provincial governor of Gaza and the then ambassador of China, 
the proposal was handed directly to the then Mozambican president Guebuza (Min 
and Han, 2012). Soon after, the proposal was approved and a new contract was signed 
between Wanbao and Regadio do Baixo Limpopo, EP (‘RBL-EP’ hereinafter). RBL-
EP is a Mozambican state-owned irrigation company that is in charge of the 
management of the hydraulic infrastructure within the area of the lower Limpopo 
basin where the Wanbao project is located; the company is directly accountable to the 
central government of Maputo. It is worth a mention though, that the key local partner 
of the project, when still under Lianfeng’s operation, was the Direcção Provincial de 
Agricultura (DPA) under the local authority of Gaza (Ganho, 2013). This shift of 																																																								
85 For more information about state farming enterprise, see Chapter 4.1.2. 
86 This is by the Chinese standards: as set by the Chinese government, agro-companies with an annual 
revenue over 200 million RMB are considered ‘large-scale’, between 0.5-200 million RMB ‘medium-
scale’, and under 0.5 million ‘small-scale’ (NBS of the PRC, 2011). 
87 Hainan, Dongbei, Hanjiang are different regions in China that have good natural conditions for 
farming.  
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local partner, largely driven by domestic politics88, turned out to have direct impacts 
on Wanbao and its project, especially in terms of land issues (forthcoming). 
 
According to the new contract, the investment volume totals at 250 million USD 
(Wanbao and RBL-EP, 2012). The core content of the contract is the land concession 
offered by RBL-EP in exchange for infrastructure building and agro-technology 
transfer to be conducted by Wanbao89. Due to the nature of ‘exchange’, the land was 
provided to Wanbao for free. Not long after, Wanbao began to massively expand the 
project according to the new contract. However, the company was confronted with a 
severe setback in early 2013. A heavy flood, the worst in the past 50 years, hit Gaza 
and all the newly reclaimed farmland - about 3,600 hectares of rice fields that were 
almost ready-to-harvest, were inundated. The irrigation infrastructure that had been 
built since 2011 was also entirely destroyed. The direct economic loss was estimated 
to be 10 million USD (Interview, 19 Nov 2013-c). Despite the shock and financial 
loss, Wanbao decided to stay and started to rehabilitate the facilities and re-plant rice 
at once. By the time the fieldwork was conducted, in November 2013, Wanbao had 
finished the reclamation of 10,000 out of the 20,000 hectares awarded, and in total 
cultivated 7,000 hectares (Interview, 21 Nov 2013-b). Apart from conducting 
agribusiness, Wanbao also built two schools for the children and transferred to the 
local chiefs (Interview, 19 Nov 2013-a; the author’s site visits). 
Financing 
A noteworthy feature of Wanbao’s financing model is seen in its close partnership 
with the CDB. The Hubei branch of the CDB (‘CDB Hubei’ hereinafter) has long 
acted as an important financial partner to boost this private firm’s agribusiness both at 
home and abroad. Years before the takeover of the Friendship Farm project in 
Mozambique, when Wanbao was still a newly transformed, medium/small-sized 
agricultural company in Hubei, CDB Hubei had already begun to channel finances to 
support the company’s domestic development. During the period 2009-2011, CDB 
Hubei provided bank loans of 41 million RMB (approx. more than 6 million USD) to 
Wanbao (People.cn, 2013b). It is also through CDB Hubei, as mentioned earlier, that 
Wanbao was informed of the investment opportunity in Gaza, and finally sent abroad 
to start the company’s first overseas agribusiness project. In 2012, to help overcome 
the financial bottleneck confronted by Wanbao in face of the new contract, CDB 
Hubei granted the company a bank loan of 20 million USD, effectively quenching the 
thirst of capital, in the initial phase of the project expansion (People.cn, 2013b).  
 
As the project continued, particularly given the sheer size of the land areas (up to 
20,000 hectares), the corresponding large amount of capital input still stood as a big 
challenge to Wanbao. This led it to seek further financial support from CADFund, one 																																																								
88 For more about the local politics between central and provincial Mozambican authorities around this 
issue, see Ganho, 2013. 
89 More specifically, the main responsibility of RBL-EP is to grant Wanbao the concession of 20,000 
hectares of land and ensure that the land will not be given or transferred to any third-party. The land 
lease expires in 50 years. Also, RBL-EP needs to help coordinate the entire process of the project 
development. In return, Wanbao takes the full responsibility to exploit the 20,000 hectares of land. In 
addition, the company is required to transfer Chinese farming technology and provide agricultural 
services to the local agro-producers and assist in the training of RBL in the area of irrigation, 
production and improvement of the market environment. According to the contract, 10% of the 
cultivated and irrigated land within the project’s perimeter should be allocated back to the local 
producers for the purpose of technology transfer. (Wanbao and RBL-EP, 2012) 
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of the CDB’s subsidiary investment funds with a specific aim to back Chinese 
companies’ foreign investment in Africa (Chapter 4.1.2). In September 2013, 
CADFund signed an agreement with Wanbao, at the presence of the Mozambican 
ministers of agriculture and finance, to co-invest in the company’s agro-project in 
Mozambique (Xiangyang Government, 2013). According to this new agreement, the 
CDB would provide Wanbao with two types of financial support. With an estimate of 
197 million USD for the total investment, the CDB would give the company a loan of 
79 million USD while the remaining 118 million USD were to be jointly invested by 
Wanbao and CADFund (Xiangyang Government, 2013). CADFund entrusted a third-
party accountant firm to make an assessment of the money that Wanbao had already 
put into the project. CADFund would then rely on such assessment to provide the 
remainder (Interview, 19 Nov 2013-c). This injection of capital from the CDB 
significantly smoothed the way for the company’s development in Mozambique; 
indeed, it is not common for Chinese policy-oriented bank, such as CDB, to provide 
such massive financial support to a private firm like Wanbao – the commitment of 
Chinese government to agricultural development in Africa as well as Wanbao’s 
relatively larger company scale and its constant good relations with the bank may 
have played a role in here. 
Production and Processing 
Being well aware of the fundamental importance of the production aspect within the 
agribusiness value chain, which is particularly so in Africa given the continent’s 
generally low agro-productivity, Wanbao made great efforts trying to establish an 
effective production system. There were, however, some practical difficulties for 
Wanbao itself, as mentioned earlier, is an agro-processing and trading company 
thereby lacking the expertise in farming. Also, unlike in China where it can largely 
depend on purchasing agro-products directly from Chinese farmers, in Mozambique 
the outputs of the local farmers are simply too low to satisfy the needs of Wanbao. To 
overcome this, Wanbao formed partnerships with a number of Chinese state-owned 
farms from China’s domestic state farming system, namely Junken and Yunlianghu 
farms from Hubei state farming system90, and Shuangyashan and Jiangchuan farms 
from Heilongjiang state farming system. These four farms worked as Wanbao’s 
subcontractors, hired only to take charge of the project’s farming tasks. At the time of 
the author’s fieldwork in late 2013, there were around 170 Chinese farmers from the 
four farms working for the Wanbao project. (Interviews, 19 Nov 2013, 20 Nov 2013-
b and 20 Nov 2013-c). 
 
Specifically, Wanbao adopted two types of production models in their practice, 
namely plantation farming and cooperative farming (similar to contract farming). 
Plantation farming was applied mostly to the awarded 20,000 hectares of land, which 
was Wanbao’s nucleus farm, considered the core business of the company. On this 
nucleus farm, apart from the abovementioned Chinese farmers, Wanbao also hired 
hundreds of local farmers. Indeed, the medium/long-term plan was to gradually 
decrease the number of Chinese, keeping only a small number of very experienced 
Chinese farmers and agro-technicians in charge of technical training and support, 
while making use of more Mozambican farmers91. According to the calculation of 																																																								
90 These two farms are also among the 19 Hubei farms that constitute the Lianfeng company. 
91 There are several reasons for this. It is first and foremost required by the local regulations. There is a 
fixed quota for foreigners to be employed. In addition, it is also regarded by the Chinese managers as 
more costly and ‘troublesome’ to use Chinese farmers. Most of these Chinese farmers had never been 
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Wanbao’s farm manager, the ratio of Chinese-Mozambican labour in the future would 
be 1:5, more specifically, about one Chinese farmer/technician working with five 
local farmers on every 100 hectares of land (Interview, 20 Nov 2013-c). To facilitate 
this envisioned localized labour usage strategy in the future, and also as required by 
the RBL-EP for the purpose of agro-technology transfer, Wanbao worked out a two-
step action plan. 
 
The first step is called Training Stage. The local Mozambican government was fully 
in charge of the trainee selection process while Wanbao would also suggest some 
selection criteria92. The selected trainees were usually organized in households, each 
of which would be allocated 1-2 ha of land within the training area of the Wanbao 
project, which amounts to around 180 hectares clearly demarcated within the 20,000 
ha of total land. Wanbao hired an agro-expert from China who was specifically in 
charge of training local farmers. He taught and demonstrated Chinese rice-growing 
techniques (such as seed soaking, water management, weeding, fertilization) to the 
trainees. He was assisted by three Mozambican graduates in agriculture who helped 
translate between English and local dialects. It is, however, worth noting that, due to 
the language barrier and different farming cultures (between Chinese and 
Mozambican), the Chinese agro-technicians sometimes found it difficult, or at least 
quite slow, to get the Chinese way of rice-farming understood and well applied by 
local farmers. The training normally took one year; by the time I conducted fieldwork 
in late 2013, there had been around 100 households involved in this training scheme, 
25 in 2012, and 70 in 2013. The training was free of charge93. (Interviews, 18 Nov 
2013 and 19 Nov 2013-b; the author’s site visits) 
																																																																																																																																																														
abroad in their lives, not to say to places as far and tough as Africa. They tended to feel homesick, easy 
to get ill (malaria illness and even death), and violated local regulations or cultural rules unknowingly, 
which thus often caused troubles to the company. They were, therefore, regarded difficult to manage. 
92 Ganho (2013), for instance, casts doubt about the fairness of the trainee selection and suggests 
implicitly that Wanbao was involved in this unfair selection process. Indeed, as confirmed by a 
Mozambican scholar (Chichava, 2013) who is well aware of the local situation, there were a lot of 
politics at play among local actors in this process in order to benefit from it. However, to what extent 
Wanbao was involved in it was not clear. First, Wanbao did not seem to know the local situations very 
well; for instance, they did not even clearly know the background and role of RBL-EP, their main 
partner. Second, the criteria they did propose to the Mozambican government was concerned mostly 
with agro-productivity; for example, they hoped the Mozambican government to choose trainees who 
have a family rather than being a bachelor so that, out of family responsibility, they would work harder 
and better. They would also prefer to have smallholders rather than people with other sorts of 
‘background’ because the latter were often only half-hearted towards the training or even not present at 
all; this may have a direct impact on their performance and, accordingly, the productivity of Wanbao’s 
project. (Interview, 18 Nov 2013) 
93 Ganho (2013), for instance, notes in her research that the farmers had to pay for the training, which 
was not true according to the author’s interviews. She confused it with the fees the farmers were 
required to pre-pay for agro-materials and equipment in the Demonstration Stage. The training was free 
as per the ‘exchange’ clause of the new contract between Wanbao and EP-RBL in 2012. 
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One of the lands allocated for training under Wanbao project, Xaixai, 21 Nov 2013. 
 
The Chinese farm director (on the left) explained to the translator (in pink) and the three 
young Mozambican graduates (the three from the right) who were going to assist the Chinese 
agro-expert in training the local farmers. Xaixai, 21 Nov 2013. 
 
Farmers who had finished all training sessions would then enter into what Wanbao 
called the Demonstration Stage. At this stage, the land area allocated to each 
household was increased to 4-5 ha and the farmers needed to work more 
independently in the field. In order to strengthen their economic responsibility, 
farmers, in this phase, would be asked to pre-pay 50% of the basic fees, around 23 
thousand MZN (approx. 740 USD), for using the seeds, fertilizers as well as the 
equipment provided by Wanbao. The other half of the fees would be deducted from 
the final payment Wanbao would make to the farmers for purchasing rice. 
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Considering the fact that most of the farmers were too poor to afford the pre-payment, 
Wanbao negotiated and made a deal with a local bank CAPI that the bank would grant 
loans to the farmers upon the provision of a contract signed between the farmers and 
Wanbao. Wanbao would be responsible for paying back the money directly to the 
bank at an agreed time. Two female smallholders, who were among the first batch of 
farmers receiving the training in 2012 and entering the Demonstration Stage in 2013, 
reported that they did secure, without much difficulty, bank loans from CAPI by 
providing them with the contract signed with Wanbao. (Interviews, 18 Nov 2013 and 
20 Dec 2013-a) 
 
Apart from the plantation farming on its nucleus of 20,000 hectares, Wanbao also 
conducted cooperative farming with neighbouring local farmers94. There were two 
major differences between cooperative farming and plantation farming. First, the 
former is similar to contract farming whereby the farmers farm on their own lands and 
sell their products to Wanbao on a contract basis, while the latter consists of local 
farmers being employed to work on the land of Wanbao. Second, the farmers 
involved in the former are usually ‘big’ farmers (in relation to those smallholder 
framers) who owned relatively large lots of lands, while those engaged in the latter 
are mostly subsistence smallholders. However, by the time fieldwork was conducted, 
this cooperative model had not developed into larger scale, due to the fact that there 
were not many such farm owners in the proximity of the Xaixai District where the 
Wanbao project was located. With the awarding of another 300 ha of land in the 
neighbouring District of Chókwè, Wanbao planned to massively expand this sort of 
cooperative farming model. In the long run, the ambition of Wanbao is to expand the 
area of local cooperative, or contract farming, to 5 times the size of its own 20,000-ha 
nucleus farm. (Interviews, 18 Nov 2013 and 20 Nov 2013-c) 
 
 The storage facilities under construction, Xaixai, 
 19 Nov 2013. 
 
 
 																																																								
94 Having witnessed the performance of Wanbao, many Mozambican farm owners who had long 
suffered financial loss due to the low agricultural productivity expressed the interest of cooperation 
with Wanbao, and Wanbao also found it feasible thus started to cooperate with some of them since 
2008. Specifically, the cooperative farming model is very much similar with that of the Demonstration 
Stage: While the farm owners would have to pre-pay 50% of the basic fees for the agro-materials, 
equipment and services that Wanbao provided, the other half of the fees would be deducted in the end. 
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In the meanwhile, Wanbao invested a large amount of money in building agro-
processing facilities. By late 2013, three facilities for rice processing and another two 
for maize and flour processing were under construction. In addition, three high-
standard grain granaries had already been completed, each of which having storage 
capability of 8-10,000 tons. (Interview, 19 Nov 2013-a; the author’s site visits) 
Market and Profit 
By the time fieldwork was conducted in late 2013, the rice produced on Wanbao’s 
farms had served Mozambique’s domestic market only. There are two main markets: 
one in Xaixai, the capital town of Gaza province, to which Wanbao’s farms sold the 
rice to the local Mozambicans through their own shops based on the farms; the other 
in capital city of Maputo, through a couple of Chinese supermarkets which served 
mostly the Chinese communities but also the Mozambicans. 
  
 
 
Local people queuing to buy rice directly from one of Wanbao’s farms, Xaixai, 30 Mar 2013, 
by one of the accountants sent to Wanbao by CADFund.  
 
Wanbao rice sold in the Chinese supermarkets, Maputo, 
January 2015. 
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Apart from that, Wanbao also held an optimistic view as to the huge market potential 
existing in the neighbouring countries. As told by the farm manager: 
 
Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi and South Africa – these are not typical rice-producing 
countries, but they do consume rice; the neighbouring market therefore is large. We 
have no plan for now to ship our produced rice back to China due to the simple fact that 
even if there were ten more Wanbaos growing rice here, they would still not be able to 
satisfy local demands from Mozambique and its neighbours. Many Indian, Pakistani and 
also Chinese grain merchants have come to us and tried to be our sale agent, which 
clearly shows that they do see the market advantages. But we wouldn’t do that, we’d 
like to do the selling ourselves of course. (Interview, 20 Nov 2013-c) 
 
Therefore, while it is usually assumed that the rice produced in Africa would be 
shipped back to China, in the case of Wanbao, for instance, that plan did not seem 
feasible, or at least it had not been put on the agenda for the near future95. In the long 
run, however, it is possible, and it could be highly profitable, to sell the rice produced 
in Mozambique back to China. Indeed, there had already been some Chinese grain 
merchants expressing their interest to become sale agents of Wanbao’s Mozambican 
rice in China. As reported by one of the informants: 
 
If the rice could be shipped back to China in the future, the return could be really high. 
The most valuable part of the rice produced here is that it is pollution-free. The quality of 
water in Limpopo is seven times higher than the top-quality water in China, and here we 
see no industrial pollution to water or soil at all. Given the acceptable shipping costs, the 
Mozambique-produced rice would be able to occupy a large share of the market in China, 
especially if we target better-off cities like Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou. (Interview, 
20 Nov 2013-b) 
 
In terms of profits, according to the calculations made by the Wanbao management, 
they would be able to earn around 2 RMB (approx. 0.32 USD) by selling one kilo of 
processed rice at local markets in Mozambique, which was almost 100 times higher 
than the profit that they could make on the Chinese domestic market. As the company 
set the annual rice production goal at 150 thousand tons and the processing goal at 
100 thousand, the project would bring Wanbao about 200 million RMB (32 million 
USD) of return each year. Taking the 1.2 billion USD of original capital inputs into 
account, it means that within 6 to 7 years, Wanbao would be able to recover all of its 
investment costs. (Interviews, 19 Nov 2013-c and 20 Nov 2013-b) 
Land Issue 
The large amount of land involved in the project put Wanbao into a difficult 
unforeseen situation. As mentioned earlier, Wanbao was granted land concessions of 
20,000 hectares in 2012 by the RBL-EP. The company then started to massively 
reclaim the awarded land since June 2013. This, however, immediately triggered huge 
controversy within the local community. It is worth noting that the vast majority of 
the 20,000 ha of lands, before Wanbao took over, were not really used for farming 
purposes. Rather, they had been largely left idle, for decades, mostly due to the 
dilapidation of the irrigation infrastructure as well as the mass exodus of the rural 																																																								
95 Professor Bräutigam has come to the same conclusion based on her and her team’s fieldwork in 
different African countries (Bräutigam, 2016) 
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population since the country’s civil war in the 1980s (Ganho, 2013; Interview, 20 Nov 
2013-c).  
 
Yet, a number of local people were indeed affected by the project in different ways. 
The most prominent problem was that many smallholders –the exact figure varies 
significantly from one source to another96 – who had used to live and farm on areas 
scattered within the project site were now deprived of these lands as a consequence of 
the massive reclamation work by Wanbao. Also, due to the disruption caused by the 
project, some cattle herders had to change their usual routes, or travel much farther, to 
access suitable lands to graze their animals. Some cemeteries located within the 
20,000 ha were either despoiled, or had to be moved elsewhere, in order to make way 
for the project development. (Interview, 21 Nov 2013-a; Ottaviani et al., 2013)  
 
The main complaints concerned the fact that these changes mostly occurred without 
proper pre-consultation with the local people. The latter were thus largely left 
ignorant about the situation, only to find their own farmland was suddenly being run 
over by Chinese tractors and bulldozers. Many of these affected people were not 
happy with the relocation or compensation arrangement implemented by Wanbao. 
Great resentments aroused, and at least two large protests took place during 2013-14, 
organized by local NGOs (Justiça Ambiental, 2013; Ottaviani et al., 2013; MMO 
Notícias, 2014). 
 
Wanbao had not anticipated such situations. As put by one of the management,  
 
When we first came to Gaza with all the capital and equipment, they [the local 
government] thought we were serious investors and thus provided so readily the land we 
needed. They just laid out the map, demarcated areas for the project, without informing us 
of any possible scenarios like the ones we then experienced. (Interview, 19 Nov 2013-c)  
 
Wanbao’s most natural response, in face of the confrontation, was to seek help from 
the local Mozambican government. They tried to persuade the affected people to talk 
directly to their government rather than protesting against Wanbao; for Wanbao 
believed that it acted entirely with the local authorities’ approval by strictly following 
the contract signed between Wanbao and the RBL-EP, and that the responsibility had 
to rest with the Mozambican government in terms of addressing issues such as people 
relocation and cemetery moving. The company also went to talk with the local 
government many times in order to seek a solution for the problems. The negotiation, 
however, to their disappointment, did not turn out to be very fruitful.  
 
When the project really started and all the problems suddenly came up, it was so difficult 
trying to get some real help from the local government. We hoped that the government 
could be able to play an intermediary role between Wanbao and the local people, 
explaining the situation to them and coordinating the relations between us. But they don’t 
really do that. They basically just leave all the problems to Wanbao to solve: for the 
relocation compensation, they don’t want to spend one penny; for the cemetery moving, 
they asked us to negotiate with the local chiefs ourselves, despite the language barrier. 
The reason they provided to us for their passivity is that they have to take care of the 																																																								
96 As to the number of the population affected by the Wanbao project, the author interviewed people 
from RBL-EP, Wanbao, DPA and FONGA; they provided significantly different figures about that, 
varying from hundreds to tens of thousands of people (Interviews, 21 Nov 2013-a, 21 Nov 2013-b, 22 
Nov 2013, and 20 Dec 2013). 
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interests of their people and do not want to get themselves into trouble. But do they really 
care about their people’s interests? I really doubt. (Interview, 19 Nov 2013-c) 
 
In-depth interviews also revealed that the Wanbao management had actually worked 
out very concrete action plans, but the problem was, as they repeatedly emphasized in 
the interviews, they did not know who exactly – for instance, the RBL-EP, DPA, or 
the provincial government – they could talk with about their plan. Even if they 
managed to introduce their plans, they were really doubtful about the executive 
capability of the local government. 
 
We have set aside a sum of money to build at least 500 houses for the displaced people. 
We know that they do not only need a place to live but also land to farm. So our 
suggestions would be to exchange land with them. More specifically, we can build houses 
along our farms within the project site. The displaced people would then move and live in 
these houses where they can have access to all the facilities of our farms like water, 
electricity, and proper roads that would not be available for them in their previous homes. 
During the day, they can simply work on our farms as our contracted farmers, taking 
advantage of the well-built irrigation systems. They could sell the products to Wanbao 
and we will pay them. They must understand that we don’t care about the land. What we 
really care are the final products. So it doesn’t make any difference for us to exchange the 
land with the farmers and it could well solve the problems… And for the cattle farmers, 
we really don’t see that the locals are doing the pasture in an efficient way. They are 
doing it in a very extensive way that is actually a waste of grass. What we would suggest 
is to call upon all sides – we can invite the experts of the Bureau of Animal Husbandry 
from China – and discuss the arrangement plan together. For instance, we can demarcate 
specific and suitable areas nearby for the cattle herders to graze their animals. It is just a 
matter of planning. (Interview, 20 Nov 2013-c) 
One of the 20 houses (among the 500 planned) Wanhao already built for the Mozambican 
workers working on the their farm (exterior). Xaixai, 19 Nov 2013. 
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One of the 20 houses Wanhao already built for the Mozambican workers working on the 
their farm (interior). Xaixai, 19 Nov 2013. 
 
The local government actors themselves, particularly the RBL-EP and DAP Gaza, 
both believed that they had done their parts (Interviews, 22 Nov 2013-c and 20 Dec 
2013-b). Interestingly, FONGA, one of the most active local NGOs that engaged with 
this issue and helped organize the smallholders’ protests against Wanbao, told the 
author that they did not really mean to target Wanbao, but rather their own 
government. What they tried to achieve through organizing the protests was largely to 
pressure and push the government to act – there was a constant tension between 
FONGA and the Mozambican government. FONGA, for instance, even expressed 
their interest to talk and co-operate with Wanbao in order to work out some plans to 
solve the problems. Wanbao, however, did not particularly welcome the idea97 
(Interviews, 21 Nov 2013-a and 21 Nov 2013-b).  																																																								
97 This is actually also an interesting point, for Wanbao, and indeed including many other Chinese 
companies operating in Africa, normally feel hesitant to cooperate or engage too closely with local 
NGOs; instead, they tend to work more closely with the local governments. Many observers tend to 
criticize the Chinese companies for this and accuse them of nurturing corruption, which is in some 
cases true and fair, but not always. Many Chinese companies do not bribe local governments or 
officials but still tend to work closely and always in line with the local governments while keeping 
themselves at a safe distance from those civil society actors such as NGOs. A less mentioned point 
concerning this phenomenon is that these companies, to some extent, have got used to this sort of 
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FONGA and the map of the land affected by Wanbao 
(provided by FONGA), Xaixai, 21 Nov 2013. 
  
																																																																																																																																																														
behavioral pattern that is very much shaped by the domestic environment in China. It is more effective, 
given the power of the Chinese government, and also much safer.  
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4.2.2 Hefeng, CAAIC and CACD: The Complementary Cases 
1. Hefeng Oil & Grain Co. Ltd. (Hefeng) 
 
The base of Hefeng Company, Buzi, 15 Jan 2015. 
 
Hefeng Oil & Grains Co., Ltd. (‘Hefeng’ hereinafter) is another private agribusiness 
firm that also came from the province of Hubei. With reported annual revenue of 
about 3 billion RMB in 2013, Hefeng was one of the (medium/)large-scale agro-
companies in China (Hefeng, 2014). Its project in Mozambique was located in the 
Buzi district of the central province of Sofala. Through the local government, Hefeng 
was provided with 4,000 hectares of land, of which 3,000 was uncultivated virgin 
land that required a large amount of investment and time to be put into production. 
For a cheaper and quicker project kick-off, the company decided to start with the 
1,000 hectares that had used to be irrigated by the Portuguese during the colonial 
period. In spite of this, it still took an entire year - since the project started in late 
2012 - for Hefeng to reclaim the land and rehabilitate the irrigation system. They 
began with rice plantation on the reclaimed land in 2014 and cultivated a total of 300 
hectares that year. The plan was to achieve full usage of 1,000 hectares by the end of 
2015. (Interview, 14 Jan 2015) 
 
Similar to the case of Wanbao, Hefeng was also introduced into Mozambique through 
the Hubei provincial government, specifically the BSFLR. Partially to avoid 
competition with Wanbao but also following the recommendation by some 
Mozambican officials, Hefeng finally chose to settle in Sofala. Initially, Hefeng’s 
CEO was attracted by a potential investment opportunity in the sugarcane business, 
mostly for its high profitability. But the local government expressed its preference to 
set up a rice project due to the food-shortage situation in the local area. Hefeng 
agreed. The idea was that they could start with a rice project first, which, according to 
the company staff, was treated as a semi-aid undertaking for its very limited profit 
	 111	
margin, and launch the sugarcane business at a later stage (Interview, 14 Jan 2015). 
Indeed, the real focus of the investment plan is definitely on the latter: in total, the 
company had intended to lease 50,000 hectares in three northern provinces along the 
Zambezi River and develop sugarcane production and processing during 2014–16 
(Ning, 2012). However, the plan was apparently postponed since nothing had been 
finalized by the time of the interview in early 2015 (Interview, 14 Jan 2015). 
 
Hefeng had also negotiated with the provincial government of Maputo and signed an 
initial land lease agreement for an 8,000-hectare cotton project in the Marracuene 
district in 2012-13 (Ning, 2012). This project had not been initiated either at the time 
of research in early 2015 (Interview, 14 Jan 2015). It is worth noting that, according 
to the Hubei BSFLR, all the projects mentioned above, i.e. the operating rice project 
and the prospective sugarcane and cotton projects, are under the name of Lianhe, a 
joint venture by Lianfeng98 and Hefeng, although in effect, Lianfeng had not seemed 
to play a very noticeable role and Hefeng had operated quite independently.  
 
The canteen used by the Chinese and Mozambican workers (left: exterior; right: interior),  
Buzi, 15 Jan 2015.  
Financing  
For the 1000-ha rice project in Buzi, Hefeng had invested more than 20 million RMB 
(approx. 3 million USD) by early 2015, which was entirely financed by the 
company’s self-owned capital (Interview, 14 Jan 2015). The total investment value, 
including the cotton project in the Maputo province and sugarcane project in Sofala, 
was estimated at 1 billion RMB (approx. 152 million USD)(Ning, 2012), but a 
specific financing model for that had yet to be finalized. Considering the company’s 
scale and profitability, it doesn’t seem very likely that Hefeng could be able to finance 
the whole project entirely by itself. 
Production and Processing  
The production model adopted by Hefeng is also a combination of plantation and 
contract farming. However, at the time fieldwork was conducted, the bulk of the 
output had come from the 1000-ha self-owned nucleus farm. Similar to the sub-
contracting scheme used by Wanbao, though much smaller in size, Hefeng divided 
the 1,000 hectares into 20 lots of land and contracted them to 20 experienced Chinese 																																																								
98 For more information about Lianfeng, see 4.2.1. 
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farmers hired from Hubei. Each of the farmers is in charge of 50 hectares and 
required to employ at least 10 local workers to work with them in order to fulfil the 
production obligation. In total, at the time fieldwork was conducted, there were more 
than 200 Mozambican locals employed to work on Hefeng’s farm, with a monthly 
income of around 3000 MZN (approx. 75 USD) - slightly higher than the stipulated 
minimum wage standard in the agricultural sector in Mozambique. The company 
prepaid the Chinese farmers for the seeds, fertilizers, equipment, and the salaries of 
the local workers. These costs would be deducted from the payment the company 
made for purchasing the final produce from the Chinese farmers. The unit output of 
Hefeng’s nucleus farm amounted to 5-6 ton/ha during 2014-15, whereas the local unit 
output averaged only about 800kg/ha. (Interview, 14 Jan 2015) 
 
 
Land under Hefeng project, Buzi, 15 Jan 2013. 
 
Moreover, Hefeng also conducted contract farming in its neighbouring areas, 
providing agro-inputs and services to, and purchasing the rice from, the contracted 
local farmers. This, however, was still at a very limited scale, not making any 
significant contribution to the company’s entire output. The company would also have 
to differentiate the rice bought from local farmers - of lower quality - from that 
produced on its own farm, and sell them separately at lower prices. The limited 
availability of human resources made it difficult for Hefeng to provide guidance and 
conduct extensive training in local farmers’ paddies to assure the rice standard would 
be the same as that in the nucleus farm. Many smallholder farmers nearby started or 
converted to grow rice with the view to selling the produce to the Chinese company 
and earning incomes. The purchasing price in 2014, for instance, was about 30,000 
MZN/ha (approx. 750 USD/ha). (Interview, 14 Jan 2015) 
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The simple processing facilities in the Hefeng base, Buzi, 15 Jan 2015. 
 
Hefeng had a small set of semi-automatic rice processing facilities in its production 
base at Buzi, with a processing capability of about 30 tons/day. These facilities were 
then adequate to process the rice produced on the nucleus farm and that purchased 
from local farmers. However, the facilities would surely need to be expanded in order 
to match the production potential. All the farming and processing equipment as well 
as agro-materials such as seeds, fertilizers, were imported from China, which could 
enjoy tariff preference in Mozambique due to the country’s agro-FDI promotion 
policies. (Interview, 14 Jan 2015) 
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Market and Profit  
 
 
The AAA rice produced by Hefeng, Buzi,  
15 Jan 2015. 
 
By the time fieldwork was conducted in early 2015, the processed rice had all been 
sold in the domestic Mozambican market, mainly in several central and northern 
provinces including Sofala, Manica, Tete, Nampula and Inhambane. It was quite 
challenging though for Hefeng, as a newcomer, to break into the local market. Unlike 
the case of Wanbao, a series of practical factors such as the less demand of the Buzi 
town, the isolation of the production base and the poor conditions of roads leading to 
other big cities, as well as the weaker financial capability of the company itself, made 
direct selling an unaffordable option to Hefeng. Instead, Hefeng had been heavily 
dependent on local, mostly Indian/Pakistani-run, sales distributers. In the beginning, 
local agencies were not sure about the quality and market response of Hefeng’s rice 
and thus felt hesitant to buy them. Hefeng had to agree to leave its rice in the stores 
for free, without taking any deposit, as a trial sale until the rice was sold. Hefeng’s 
rice could neither be sold to big chain supermarkets, like Shoprite, due to the lack of 
smaller-sized package bags99 and its own barcodes. (Interview, 14 Jan 2015) 
 
The only positive aspect for Hefeng to sell its rice through traditional sales agencies 
(rather than supermarkets) was that it may have more competitive advantages. 
Targeting mostly middle/lower-class consumers, the Indian/Pakistani-run stores were 
dominated by cheap but relatively poor-quality, often long-stocked, rice imported 
from South and Southeast Asia. Comparatively, Hefeng’s rice was newly produced 
and sold at very reasonable prices – around 24 MZN/kilo, which is among the lowest 
price range on the local market. Unsurprisingly, Hefeng’s rice received quite positive 
feedback from local consumers, and after several months’ trial sales, the agencies 
started to order rice from Hefeng’s farm. This could be seen as a successful attempt in 
breaking into the local market, but the low price casts doubt on its profitability. 
Indeed, Hefeng hadn’t managed to make any profit from the rice selling at the time 
fieldwork for the thesis was conducted. It was expected to take at least 4-5 years 
before the company could possibly be able to recoup its initial investment. (Interview, 
14 Jan 2015) 																																																								
99 At least in Sofala where Hefeng was based, there were not factories producing that sized package 
bags. 
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2.  China Africa Agricultural Investment Co. Ltd. (CAAIC) 
A joint venture by CNADC and CADFund100, China Africa Agricultural Investment 
Co., Ltd. (‘CAAIC’ hereinafter) was established under the FOCAC framework in 
2010 and focuses on agribusiness specifically on the African continent (Chapter 
5.2.1). The company had been in touch, since 2009, with the local government of 
Gaza province for a potential agribusiness project, which eventually led to a general 
agreement in early 2015 (not yet finalized) on a 6,000-ha rice production/processing 
project in Chókwè district. The land will be provided free of charge, on the condition 
that CAAIC conducts technology transfer on the same amount of 6,000-ha of land in 
its neighbouring areas. (Interview, 10 Jan 2015) 
 
The reason for this long negotiation mainly lies with the Chinese side. The strict 
internal inspection procedure within the state-owned enterprise was identified as an 
important factor for the delay. Also, CAAIC was very cautious about all the clauses in 
the contract. For instance, whether the local partner would be able to fulfil the 
promise and provide the amount of land, which might be linked to the land 
controversy around the Wanbao project in Xaixai that is very close to Chókwè 
(Interview, 10 Jan 2015). The local partner, on the other hand, appeared to be eager to 
see the deal finalized. There was also competition between different local 
governments of Xaixai and Chókwè, both trying to attract the Chinese investor into 
their own region (Interview, 7 Jan 2014). 
 
The project was estimated to cost around 500 million RMB (approx. 80 million USD), 
of which a larger part, around 180 million RMB, would be destined to building 
infrastructure such as irrigation systems. Self-owned capital, here mainly indicating 
that from the CNADC, is a main source of the finances, making up about one third of 
the total investment. CADFund, as a major shareholder of CAAIC, will also provide a 
certain amount of money to the project. In addition, CAAIC may also try to gain 
support from SDIC (State Development & Investment Co.), a Chinese state-owned 
investment corporation that was established in the 1990s with a stated purpose to 
bolster a few key areas of the country101, and thus could be fairly regarded as an entity 
of state wealth funds. CAAIC doesn’t intend to borrow money from banks in order to 
avoid the pressure of debts as much as possible. (Interview, 10 Jan 2015) 
 
CAAIC has planed to adopt a combination model of plantation and contract farming. 
On their 6,000-ha nucleus farm, the company will employ both Chinese and local 
farm workers. Similar to Wanbao, the plan was to first use Chinese people, for their 
familiarity to the Chinese way of rice farming, and through training, gradually 
increase local labour usage. Outside the nucleus farm, CAAIC was required to 
demonstrate rice farming techniques to locals on the same amount of 6,000 hectares’ 
land surrounding CAAIC’s farm with a view to help boost the local production. Apart 
from agro-extension, the company will also conduct contract farming with the 
neighbouring areas, providing agro-inputs to farm workers - mostly imported from 
China due to the lower costs - and purchase the final produce from local farmers at a 
previously agreed price. Processing was also deemed essential given the low profit 																																																								
100 CNADC is one of the six Chinese central-level SAEs (see Chapter 4.1.2). 
101 The four key areas that SDIC has traditionally focused on are respectively infrastructure industry, 
burgeoning industries of strategic importance, financial service and other services, and international 
business. 
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margin of production per se, but CAAIC may likely not build its own processing lines. 
Instead, the company was considering the possibility of utilizing two existing rice-
processing factories nearby: one donated, years before, by the Chinese government, 
the other established by a British company. Both of them had been largely standing 
idle since being built due to the lack of agricultural output in the local area. 
(Interview, 10 Jan 2015) 
 
Concerning its future business plan, CAAIC has mainly aimed at Mozambique’s 
domestic and neighbouring markets. Different from Wanbao, CAAIC found it almost 
impossible to avoid using local sales agencies, particularly in the initial stage, given 
the fact that as a newcomer it does not have any of its own established selling 
channels in Mozambique. Although having yet to work out a specific marketing 
strategy, CAAIC is well aware of the potential fierce competition, especially with the 
Indian and Pakistani traders who massively import cheap rice from South and 
Southeast Asia. ‘We’ll probably be forced to lower our prices in order to compete 
with that imported rice, which accordingly would mean reduction of our profits’ 
(Interview, 10 Jan 2015). They also pointed out the lack of qualified Chinese staff in 
the company who can work effectively in the marketing area. Similar to the views of 
Wanbao, CAAIC also admitted the significantly greater profit margin for doing rice 
agribusiness in Mozambique than in China – as long as they could successfully fit 
into the local market. But even in that case, it was expected to take at least 14 years 
for the company to recoup its initial investment. (Interview, 10 Jan 2015) 
3.  China-Africa Cotton Development Ltd. (CACD)102 
China-Africa Cotton Development Co., Ltd. (‘CACD’ hereinafter) was established in 
2008 as a joint venture by Ruichang, a private cotton company from Shandong 
province of China who had entered the Zambian market in 2000, Huifu, a private 
textile company also from Shandong, and the CDB-owned CADFund, which acts as 
the main stakeholder of the CACD. By 2014, CACD had established subsidiaries in 
seven African countries, including Zambia, Tanzania, Mauritius, Malawi, Mali, 
Mozambique and Zimbabwe (Wang, 2014). CACD entered Mozambique in 2011. 
Their Mozambican affiliate, mainly the company office and its processing lines, is 
located in Beira, the capital city of the Sofala province. It has exclusive access to 
approx. 700,000 hectares of land across three provinces of the country on a contract-
farming basis. They bought the French-owned company, CDA, which helped them 
further expand their local influence. It is now among the three largest cotton 
production and processing firms in Mozambique, and the biggest one in the Sofala 
province (CACD, n.d.; Ren, 2014).  
 
The financing model adopted by CACD is quite similar to that of Wanbao, namely 
self-owned capital plus supports from the CDB (loans&CADFund) through 
facilitation of CDB’s local branch in Qingdao, Shandong. As a key shareholder, 
CADFund had invested more than 60 million USD in CACD’s cotton business in 
Africa by 2014; and in Mozambique, the investment value had amounted to above 10 
million USD. Despite the support from the CDB (CADFund and loans), funding still 
																																																								
102 The author tried a number of times through different channels but still did not manage to get 
interview and site-visit opportunities with CACD. Given the representativeness of CACD, I did not 
drop the case but had to base largely on secondary sources. 
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stands as a major problem to CACD, particularly as the company expands its cotton 
business across the continent. (People.cn, 2013a; Wang, 2014) 
 
In terms of organizing production, what CADC adopts is the typical contract-farming 
model. They do not have their own nucleus farm, except for small lots of land for 
seed breeding; instead, they work with over 30,000 local cotton smallholders who 
farm on their own lands. The company provided seeds and upfront capital to the 
contracted farmers, and assigned Chinese agro-technicians to help with the plantation 
process. During the harvest season, they set up hundreds of purchasing stations in the 
small villages to collect the crops from the farmers and transported the cotton to the 
ginning factory based in the port city of Beira. The purchasing price in 2014, for 
instance, was about 9-12 MZN/kilo, slightly higher than the unitary price set by the 
Mozambican government (Ren, 2014). The contract-farming model was believed by 
the CACD management to benefit the local community by helping enhance their 
incomes, while at the same time reduce the risk of land loss for the company in 
circumstances of policy changes (Wang, 2014). The operation of CADC also helped 
to increase the local cotton production. As confirmed by a Mozambican official, the 
cotton output in the province of Sofala had been enhanced from 2,000 to 5,000 tons 
since the company arrived (Ren, 2014). 
 
Although CACD did establish processing facilities in Mozambique, only a small 
portion of the purchased cotton was locally processed. The majority of the raw cotton 
was shipped back to China (Pang, 2015; Wang, 2014; Xinhua, 2013). The processing 
activities were also constrained at very primary levels; for example, the facilities they 
built in Beira were largely only cotton-ginning factories and oil mills (for the cotton 
seeds). They did consider developing deep processing (e.g. yarn, textile and cloth 
manufacturing) and thus extending the value chain, which, however, seemed too 
costly in the African environment. As put by CACD Mozambique’s manager, ‘We’ll 
have to import everything from China, even for the screws, and it’ll take months to 
arrive, which greatly increases the costs’ (Pang, 2015; Wang, 2014; Ren, 2014). 
 
As mentioned earlier, the main market of CACD’s produced cotton is China. The 
cotton industry in Mozambique is largely export-oriented. However, in terms of 
shipping the cotton back to China, CACD expressed their difficulty in not having 
import quotas from the Chinese government (Chapter 4.1.1). Without quotas, CACD 
would not enjoy any price advantages and have to compete face-to-face with other 
transnational cotton traders on the international market, for which the company found 
itself still in a very disadvantaged position (Wang, 2014). As to profits, after nearly 
fifteen years’ operation in Africa, CACD had managed to make profit from its 
business. In 2013 the company earned about 6.5 million USD; however, it also 
expressed the difficulty in staying profitable (Wang, 2014). 
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4.2.3 Integrated Analysis: Prospects and Problems as Observed on the Ground 
The ‘agribusiness model’ that features the incorporation of Chinese agro-firms and 
investment into China’s agro-development cooperation with Africa, has aimed to help 
invigorate the stagnant agricultural sector of Africa through both intentional efforts 
and the natural spill-over effects of agribusiness, while in the meanwhile to facilitate 
Chinese agro-firms to go abroad and serve the development goals of China’s own 
agricultural industry. As seen in the case studies in the previous section, this model 
has shown some positive prospects in terms of developmental impacts, for instance, 
through providing capital, creating jobs, supplying local markets with cheap foodstuff 
as well as cash crops and so on. That said, a number of challenges and problems have 
also been observed of this model, which have already affected and will likely to 
continue affecting the realisation of the expected ‘mutual-development’ goals. Some 
of the key challenges are to be analysed and summarised in the following section.  
Financing 
 
While the capital infusion may potentially help fill the gap and development of 
agricultural sector on the African continent, the fact is that the Chinese agriculture-
based firms themselves also face considerable difficulty both given their own limited 
financial strengths as well as relatively limited supports from the government. This 
may not only constrain their own business development in Africa but also the spill-
over developmental impacts of their investment projects on the locals. 
 
Difficulty in financing was frequently singled out by Chinese investors as a key 
obstacle for them to conduct agribusiness in Africa. First of all, it was by no means a 
cheap investment as some might naturally imagine; or at least not so for the 
medium/small-sized agro-companies that made up the bulk of those engaged in 
Chinese agricultural foreign investment, including in Africa. There were indeed a 
number of pull factors in terms of the costs of doing agribusiness in Africa. For 
instance, land was more often than not provided at nominal costs, labour wages were 
also generally much cheaper than elsewhere (including China), and even inputs such 
as equipment, seeds and fertilizers that were generally expensive to local African 
farmers, did not form a particular financial burden to the Chinese investors for most 
of these machinery and materials could be imported from China at relatively low 
prices. Having said that, a large amount of investment was nevertheless required for 
infrastructure building. This did not only concern infrastructure that was directly 
demanded by agro-projects such as irrigation systems, but also, quite often, roads, 
bridges and electricity, needed in order to facilitate basic transport and processing 
activities. For the entirely uncultivated virgin lands or those that used to be cultivated 
but had been left idle for long, which was quite a common situation facing Chinese 
agro-investors - like in the cases of Wanbao and Hefeng – the costs for infrastructure 
building or rehabilitation were even higher. It was estimated that almost half, or even 
more, of the total investment needed to be put into infrastructure building (Interview, 
10 Jan 2015).  
 
Altogether, based on the data obtained in Mozambique, the investment for 
agribusiness on the African continent varied from 60,000 to 90,000 RMB per hectare. 
For a relatively large-scale project, say beyond 1,000 hectares, it then needed at least 
60-90 million RMB (approx. 9-14 million USD) as an initial capital input. While this 
was not a particularly large amount for a non-agricultural project or a big enterprise, it 
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was not an easy job for the medium/small-sized Chinese agricultural companies who 
earned only about 0.5-200 million RMB of revenue (approx. 76 thousand to 30 
million USD) per year at home (NBS of the PRC, 2011) to finance such a project 
through self-owned capital.  
 
Second, the financing channels for these medium/small-sized, and mostly private, 
agricultural companies were limited, and often ‘biased’. It is true that, due to the 
underdevelopment of the domestic financing market and the high risks of overseas 
investment, fund-raising is generally difficult in China not only for agricultural but 
other types of investors too. That said, a series of factors such as the greater 
dependence on the climate, the relatively lower profits and longer period for capital 
returns, as well as the normally weak power of Chinese agricultural companies, have 
made it even harder for those agricultural foreign investors to raise the capital they 
need. By now, company self-owned capital and state supports were the two main 
sources of finances for Chinese overseas agro-investors (Chapter 4.1.3). This has been 
confirmed by the case studies in the present chapter. What is also confirmed, 
however, is the tendency of the state to support those state-owned enterprises or 
private companies whose mission aligns with the government’s intentions. In the case 
of state-owned CAAIC, the three sources of finances – the self-owned capital from 
CNADC, the capital injection from CADFund, as well as the potential funds from 
SDIC – were, in essence, all using state capital. In the cases of Wanbao and CACD, 
both engaging with large-scale projects in significant crop types (rice and cotton), 
they both gained support from CADFund. Hefeng and other small-sized agro-firms in 
Mozambique – which actually represent the large majority of the Chinese agro-
investors in Africa – were largely self-financed, and because of this, often face 
tremendous difficulty to survive or further expand.  
 
Interestingly, even within the seemingly benign cooperation between the state and the 
private actors, in-depth examination has revealed certain tensions between the two 
sides. Take Wanbao as example. Mistrust started to emerge since the early stage of 
the agreement negotiation. The CADFund had once made an attempt to gain the 
majority holding of the project, but eventually gave up due to lack of expertise in 
agriculture103. Despite the abortion of the attempt, Wanbao had since been cautious 
towards its partner in order to maintain a leading role in the company’s operations 
(Interview, 19 Nov 2013-c). Furthermore, as reported by a number of informants from 
different sources, Wanbao had, since 2014 - or even earlier - encountered severe 
financial and managerial problems. These were considered to mainly revolve around 
internal problems, but perhaps more importantly, around their unwise investment 
strategies104. In addition, the accountants assigned by CADFund to Wanbao were not 																																																								
103 What they proposed then was to let Wanbao be the majority shareholder (51% by Wanbao and 49% 
by CADFund) and take the full responsibility of the project operation and management, while the 
CADFund itself, apart from assigning a staff of their own to monitor the Wanbao’s financial issue, will 
only regularly gain its deserved part of revenue from the company’s yearly profits (Interview, 19 Nov 
2013-c; Interview, 20 Nov 2013-b). 
104 The 20,000-ha proposal is indeed a really ambitious business plan compared to many of those even 
relatively sizable agro-projects in which Chinese companies invested in Africa, especially for a private 
agro-firm like Wanbao. What seems to be more problematic is that the company started to throw a 
large amount of capital into the downstream value chain, such as building large-scale processing lines 
and high-standard storage systems, even before reclaiming all the land allocated and thus without any 
corresponding productivity guaranteed. The downstream investment was so much that they later found 
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fully satisfied with the company’s financial records in the recent years. As 
commented by one informant, ‘While they (private companies) are always 
complaining about not getting enough support from the state, they themselves also do 
not do things up to the expected standards’ (Interview, 10 Jan 2015). This ‘unhappy’ 
experience, particularly given the high profile of the Wanbao project in both China 
and Mozambique, is very likely to have some impacts on the future choice of the 
CADFund in terms of private partners and might make it even harder for private 
investors to seek financial support or form financial partnerships with state actors. 
Production and Processing  
 
The four cases above have confirmed the general observation in Chapter 4.1 that, the 
Chinese investors had primarily invested in the production aspect of the agribusiness 
value chain in Africa. This was almost an unavoidable choice, given the generally low 
agro-productivity on the continent. In terms of production models, similar to the 
general situation of Chinese agro-investment in Africa (Chapter 4.1), the Chinese 
agro-investors in Mozambique also adopted plantation farming, contract farming and 
sometimes a combination of both.  
 
The productivity demonstrated through the different projects under investigation 
proved to be rather encouraging, usually much higher than the previous outputs 
without applying Chinese technology among other inputs. This is a positive sign that, 
leaving aside all other consideration and merely from the production point of view, 
the Chinese agribusiness model does bear the great potential to enhance the 
agricultural productivity and accordingly contribute to the food security or in terms of 
cash crops the export capability. And from Chinese company point of view, while this 
high productivity lay the foundation for their downstream business and prospects for 
greater economic returns. Furthermore, some more nuanced details revealed by the 
case studies suggested that agro-inputs in terms of seeds, fertilizers and equipment 
were usually imported from China; this may benefit either the investors or a broader 
group of Chinese agriculture-related firms. 
 
While a large number of local Mozambican workers were employed – indeed a 
localized labour strategy was preferred by the investors in the long run, as revealed in 
the case studies – Chinese farmers currently made up the majority of working force. 
One of the challenges in the stage of production is the agro-technology transfer, as 
seen in the transfer of Chinese rice farming techniques to locals in the case of Wanbao 
(Chapter 4.2.1), and cross-confirmed by the case of the Chinese ATDC in 
Mozambique (Chapter 3.2). The language barrier as well as the different farming 
cultures, among other aspects of the relations, had slowed down the technology 
transfer process and thus casted doubt upon whether a localized labour-usage strategy 
could satisfy the production demand of the Chinese farms, and if so, how long it 
would take.  
 
Investment in processing (and other downstream agribusiness), on the other hand, had 
remained at a very preliminary stage. According to the fieldwork, developing local 
processing lines still did not seem to be a very welcome option by Chinese investors, 
despite its potentially higher value added that may bring greater benefits to both to the 																																																																																																																																																														
not adequate capital to be put into the fundamental production activities, including paying salaries to 
the workers, and therefore faced both financial and managerial problems. 
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investors and the host country in the long run. This is mostly due to the high costs it 
will entail: a large amount of investment was required, not only for importing the 
equipment from abroad but also for sorting out the infrastructure bottleneck such as 
the lack of electricity (and transmission) and roads. Particularly, for companies 
producing export-oriented commodities, as seen in the CACD case, they may prefer 
selling the raw or preliminarily-processed cotton directly to the international markets 
or shipping them back to China.  
Markets and Profits 
 
For all the Chinese agro-companies interviewed by the author, finding markets for 
their products was repeatedly mentioned as one of the biggest challenges. Take the 
rice value chain in Mozambique as an example. While it is true that there was a gap 
between domestic rice production and consumption, the gap had, however, already 
been well fulfilled by rice imports from a diversity of foreign producers, particularly 
Southeast Asia (e.g. Thailand), South Asia (e.g. India) and South America (e.g. 
Brazil). Over time, this imported rice (of different types and grades) had also 
occupied different segments of the local market, from middle/upper-class to the 
relatively poor. In light of this, the Chinese agribusiness firms did not seem to have 
carried out adequate surveys so as to develop a comprehensive marketing strategy 
concerning, for instance, which consumer group they were targeting, how to fit into 
the local market by integrating with the established sales channels, and how to 
distinguish themselves - especially newcomers - from other similar competitors. As of 
now, the main efforts, in terms of capital and human inputs, from Chinese agro-firms 
had been put into the production stage; no specified marketing department was in 
place and very few professional staff familiar with agribusiness marketing, not to say 
the local environment and language, were involved.  
 
Instead, the way they had been engaging with marketing, or simply sales, was quite 
random. The companies that had the potential markets in their immediate vicinity, or 
at least within cost-efficient distance from their production bases, they tended to 
choose direct selling, without using any local sales agencies. They may open an outlet 
nearby their farms and sell rice directly to the locals as Wanbao did in Xaixai, or 
conduct door-to-door sales with the customers as Lianfeng did in Maputo and Hefeng 
in Beira. In some other cases, when they found direct selling impossible or too costly, 
they chose to depend on local sales agencies such as small retailing stores or big 
supermarkets. Examples were Hefeng’s selling through local retailing agencies and 
Wanbao’s selling through Chinese supermarkets in Maputo. Moreover, Wanbao, for 
instance, had expressed its hesitation in terms of conducting sales through agencies, 
mostly for the fear of losing control (e.g. over prices, profits) to the latter. However, 
they had yet to work out any effective alternatives. 
 
Also, by the time fieldwork was conducted, the rice sales of all these Chinese agro-
firms had been heavily dependent on Chinese communities in Mozambique. 
Wanbao’s sales through Chinese supermarkets in Maputo was a typical case. Others 
who are not able, or cannot afford, to sell rice through Chinese supermarkets, tended 
to establish informal but constant links with Chinese buyers, particularly different 
Chinese companies. This had been the case for Hefeng (and other small-sized private 
agro-firms). Given the increasing number of Chinese people as well as the language 
convenience, it was definitely the easiest way for agribusiness companies to market 
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their rice among Chinese communities. However, this strategy would surely not be 
sustainable: only considering the farms discussed in this paper, the total area 
amounted to at least 27,000 hectares. All productivity released, it would produce 
135,000 tons/year, whereas Chinese people may consume only a frictional part of this. 
Indeed, fierce and even unfair competition among Chinese agribusiness companies 
has already taken place. Due to the difficulty in expanding to other markets, some 
bigger companies started to sell the rice at very cheap prices. As a consequence, those 
smaller companies who were unable to decrease the price would be squeezed out of 
the Chinese community market. This ‘new’ problem emerging in the agribusiness 
area, unfortunately, reminds people of the ‘old’ story of vicious internal competition 
among Chinese companies operating in a range of sectors on the continent. 
 
In terms of expanding to external markets, it may well be outside the agenda of many 
medium/small-sized Chinese agro-firms. For some bigger players like Wanbao and 
CAAIC, they did consider the possibility of selling their rice abroad, which, however, 
also faced a number of challenges. First, there was policy restriction on grains export 
(including rice), given the food-insufficiency situation in Mozambique. Even if rice 
export was allowed, the poor transport infrastructure tends to increase the costs of 
inter-regional grain trade. Unless the Mozambique-produced rice was really 
successfully branded and can thus be sold at fairly high prices, on a large scale in the 
long run, it would be economically unviable to sell it in China considering the freight 
and tax costs, among other aspects. In addition, in terms of shipping the agro-products 
back to China, problems also lied in the Grain and Cotton Quota System, according to 
which Chinese agro-firms operating abroad either gain the quota from the Chinese 
government, or have to pay a higher tariff, similarly to any foreign importers. As 
mentioned before (Chapter 4.1.2), at the current stage, it is still quite difficult, 
especially for private agro-firms, to gain quota from the government. The CACD case 
discussed earlier has also confirmed this.  
 
Furthermore, none of the agro-companies being examined in this chapter have been 
able to earn profits from their projects in Mozambique. This was indeed not only the 
case in Mozambique but it was a common situation for Chinese agro-investors in 
Africa (according to the author’s broader survey and interviews). Given the general 
financial constraints facing Chinese investors, as mentioned earlier, successful sales 
seems to be even more important because revenues from the sales could be re-
invested into the next round of production and thus reduce the pressure for the 
company to seek funds. The difficulty in sales, either in terms of finding markets or 
earning profits, as seen in the case studies, however, has further worsened their 
financial problem and made it even harder to make a successful agribusiness.  
 
The difficulty in terms of finding markets as well as the economic unviability so far, 
caused by a variety of reasons as mentioned before, could become a serious 
impediment to the Chinese investors – dampening their enthusiasm in investing in 
African agriculture and thus diverting their capital and expertise elsewhere. Since the 
company actors and their commercial operation act as the cornerstone of the 
‘agribusiness model’ of development cooperation, this may potentially have a major 
impact on the success or failure of the model, with implications to both the Chinese 
and African stakeholders. 
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Land Issue 
 
To recap the ‘motive analysis’ earlier in this chapter, from the self-interest point of 
view, the current wave of Chinese agricultural investment in Africa, either for the 
government or private actors, is eventually resource-oriented – largely driven by the 
domestic land constraints in China. In this vein, the size of land obtained in overseas 
agribusiness activities, does matter. Small lots of land would hold little significance in 
fulfilling the demand-supply gap from a government point of view; nor would that 
satisfy profit demand of the private investors, even admitting the relatively lesser 
effect of the economies of scale in agribusiness. Furthermore, it is widely believed by 
the Chinese officials, scholars and businessmen that Africa, blessed by its land 
endowments, is an ideal destination for Chinese resource-oriented overseas agro-
investment.  
 
It is true that, comparatively, the African continent is abundant with land resources 
and still with great potential of arable land. According to an estimate of the World 
Bank, almost half of the world’s uncultivated but arable land, amounting to 450 
million hectares, is located in Africa (World Bank, 2013). However, as has been 
gradually recognized, the often seemingly less intensive use of land on the continent 
does not mean that the land is idle. Indeed, as pointed out by some scholars, virtually 
all valuable land is being used or at least claimed by local people (Anseeuw et al., 
2012; Wily, 2011). Given the fact that investors would naturally be more interested in 
land that is fertile in quality, relatively well-infrastructured, easily accessed by 
transport systems, close to habitation and markets, among others, this sort of lands, 
understandably, have quite often already been intensively used by the locals for 
different purposes (Anseeuw et al., 2011). 
 
Adding to the complexity, there are dualistic, both formal and customary, land tenure 
systems co-existing in the African environment and thus sometimes overlapping, if 
not conflicting, claims to the rural land rights. As a common practice prevailing in 
rural Africa, lands are often governed through traditional leaders/chiefs, by a set of 
customary rules deriving from, and sustained within, specific local communities, 
which determine how lands are owned, used and transferred. This is known as 
customary land tenure (Wily, 2012). While customary land tenure is effectively 
operating as an overriding principle in the rural areas, the land rights of customary 
landholders are not always recognized or protected by their governments in the form 
of statutory law (Anseeuw et al., 2011; Wily, 2011). In fact, the customarily held 
lands are more often than not overlaid with definition such as public, state, national, 
or government lands. Both systems, the customary and state regimes, claim 
legitimacy over rural lands (Wily, 2012; FAO, 2013).  
 
Foreign investors, in most times, obtain land through formal government channels. 
Given the capital needs and the inexplicitly biased policies against smallholders, 
African governments generally adopt a welcoming, albeit increasingly discreet, 
attitude towards the commercial use of rural lands. They, therefore, tend to make 
lands available for foreign investors, and often at very low or only nominal costs. Due 
to the relatively weak presence of democratic governance in Africa, however, local 
communities are not always fully consulted and thus their land rights, particularly 
those of the majority of poor smallholders, are easily jeopardized in favour of more 
powerful government authorities or rural elites. This, sometimes leads to involuntary 
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dispossession of land and water resources, deprivation of livelihood, inadequate 
compensation, among others, and thus forms the basis of the ‘land grabbing’ 
discourse (Anseeuw, 2011; Wily, 2011; FAO, 2013; World Bank, 2013). 
 
Having said that, although foreign investors appear to be in a better bargaining 
position as fund-providers, the complex land situations on the continent also impose 
challenges to them. In cases where companies behave with responsibility, they have 
to accept the long time for negotiation and the high costs for compensation. In cases 
where they tend to cut the corner, risks are that they may provoke local resentments 
and conflicts, which may then cause financial and image losses, and even project 
failures (FAO, 2013). The dual land tenure systems also make the land contract 
signed with the governments not entirely stable or secure. 
 
Linked to the empirical evidence obtained from the field, the case studies of Chinese 
agro-investment in Mozambique seemed to largely confirm the abovementioned 
dynamics and challenges around the land issue. All the four Chinese agro-investors 
accessed land through government channels, and despite the awareness of the 
increasingly rigid conditions for foreign agro-investors105, they did not, in effect, 
encounter much difficulty obtaining the land areas they required. The local 
governments – in different regions and at different administrative levels – involved in 
the investment deals were generally very welcoming towards the investors, happy and 
quick in providing lands and facilitation, particularly in the initial period. They tended 
to have the investors secured and deals finalized as soon as possible. Arrangements 
such as the EIA (Environmental Impact Assessment) or RAP (Resettlement Action 
Plan), were not compulsorily required; nor the investors were informed about the 
local situations and potential problems (Chapter 4.2). 
 
Conflicts with the local communities occurred, as seen in the Wanbao case. Neither 
adequate prior consultation nor appropriate compensation was in place (Chapter 
4.2.1). This echoes the dualistic land tenure systems mentioned above. Indeed, 
Mozambique is one among several cases in Africa where customary land rights enjoy 
the greatest legal recognition and protection. In reality, however, as shown in the case 
study and also observed by other scholars, while investors seeking lands must consult 
with local communities, the procedure is ill-structured and undemocratic: it does not 
require organized participation and consent of the majority of the community, but 
only that of a handful of potentially self-selected representatives. Investors, therefore, 
enter into situations where local communities are unorganized and hence unable to 
negotiate on an equal footing with the investor (Wily, 2011), which was also 
confirmed by the case of Wanbao. As a result, different groups of locals were 
negatively affected by the operation of the project (Chapter 4.2.1).  
 
For Wanbao, the production was disrupted by local protests. The company had to 
spend a large amount of time negotiating the compensation with locals. Equally 
importantly, albeit not seeming to be really recognized by the Wanbao management 
itself, the land issue had triggered considerable controversy and imposed negative 
effects upon the company (Chapter 4.2.1). Also, partly due to the case of Wanbao, 
other Chinese companies, such as CAAIC, seemed to behave more cautiously in 
negotiating contracts with the local government. They felt insecure about their 																																																								
105 This is mostly due to the increasing number of foreign investors. 
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contract, particularly whether the local government would be able to deliver its 
promise to provide the agreed amount of land, and also, about the modalities under 
which the resettlement would be solved and financed at the later phase. This led to 
years of negotiation and has significantly postponed the project progress (Chapter 
4.2.2). 
 
The opposite example would be the case of CACD. By adopting a different 
production model and thus land use strategy, the company had largely avoided land-
related controversy (Chapter 4.2.2). This is also in line with the suggestions proposed 
by the World Bank that investors should focus on enhancing the productivity of 
existing land users (World Bank, 2013). However, it is worth noting that the Sofala 
province has the tradition of cotton cultivation, which makes the contract-farming 
model feasible. By contrast, in the case of Wanbao, it may take years before locals are 
able to well master the Chinese rice-farming techniques, and hence the company has 
to first establish from scratch its own nucleus farm, which, somehow, makes the 
conflicts between a first-time, inexperienced foreign investor on the one hand, and 
complex local conditions on the other, almost unavoidable. In short, despite all the 
potential benefits that could be possibly brought to the locals through the 
‘agribusiness model’ of development cooperation, if the basic rights of residence and 
livelihood of the local people were deprived of, the claimed benefits are to be 
nullified or at least largely offset. There are hence many lessons to be learned both 
from China’s own experience such as those seen in the case studies, as well as a 
broader range of experiences from other foreign investors (Cotula et al., 2009; FAO, 
2013 and 2014). 
 
To sum up, as revealed by the four cases in this chapter, the ‘agribusiness model’ of 
Chinese development cooperation in Africa – while demonstrating certain positive 
developmental impacts in terms of, for instance, food security, job creation and 
poverty reduction – is also facing considerable practical challenges. These challenges 
not only constrain the profit margin and business prospect of the Chinese investors, 
but also limit the ‘developmental’ potential of these projects. Like what we’ve 
observed in the ‘innovative agro-aid model’ before (Chapter 3.2), implementation gap 
also exits in the ‘agribusiness model’. The distinctive ‘package’ model of Chinese 
development cooperation with Africa – as far as the agricultural sector is concerned – 
seems yet to fully achieve the ‘win-win’ expectation envisaged and still needs much 
reflection and adjustment in this experimental phase before it can exert greater effects. 
The following and also the final chapter of the thesis will start with summarizing the 
‘mutual development’-oriented ‘development package’ model of China and then 
provide an integrated explanation to the implementation gap as mentioned above. 
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Chapter 0 Conclusion 
Returning to the starting point of the thesis – the ‘phenomenon’ that triggered my 
initial interest to begin this research project – that is, the so-called ‘emerging donors’ 
or ‘new donors’ in the international development cooperation arena, and particularly 
those from the Global South. As already explained in the Introduction and also 
recognized by some more rigorous scholars, the expression of ‘emerging/new’ or 
even ‘re-emerging donors’ by itself is misleading in several senses. First, these 
Southern countries are surely not ‘new’ or ‘re-emerging’ actors given their decades-
long, often non-interrupted experience of engaging in development cooperation (and 
aid more generally) even when they had much weaker economies compared to today. 
Also, they are not ‘donors’ and do not regard themselves as so – indeed they are all 
very opposed to being labelled this way and always try to distinguish themselves from 
the traditional DAC donors. By emphasizing another set of principles that feature 
cooperative relationship on an equal footing rather than the DAC kind of donor-
recipient hierarchy, the Southern actors are more used to describing themselves as 
‘development partners’ in relation to other less-developed countries. 
 
The expression of ‘emerging/new donors’ per se, therefore, may have in fact 
implicitly demonstrated a sort of self-centric perspective of the DAC community, or 
more broadly, that of many observers from the advanced world in terms of looking at 
‘the others’. The Southern development partners are deemed ‘new’ apparently in 
relation to the DAC members themselves who are self-regarded as the more 
established actors (in actual fact they were and still are the most prominent players 
but have never been the only ones in the area of international development 
cooperation). The Southern actors being labelled ‘donors’ has further shown this 
‘DAC-centred tendency’ of both the Northern policy circles and many of the research 
literature, for they just easily ‘transplant’ their own ‘donor’ titles (as well as the 
underlying logics) onto the Southern actors. Indeed, this is not merely a matter of 
terming, but rather something related to people’s mentality; for instance, even though 
more and more literature starts to use the term of ‘South-South cooperation providers’, 
the Southern practices of development cooperation are still very much discussed and 
judged against the ‘donor’ model of the DAC, sometimes even with a genuine effort 
trying to help assimilate the former into the more ‘mainstream’ DAC standards and 
norms (Chapter 1.2). 
 
Moreover, in line with this ‘DAC-centrality’, the existing literature either on the 
subject of Southern development partners or development cooperation more generally, 
has placed an almost exclusive focus on ODA, giving little attention to other forms 
that possibly also serve the ‘development’ objectives. ODA, instead of being a means, 
seems to be often treated as the end per se. The ‘development package’ model, for 
instance, that is often seen in the practices of Southern development partners, 
especially that of China and India, has usually been treated with suspicion and even 
criticism for the underlying self-interest-seeking motives of the cooperation providers. 
However, even in the Northern countries, the so-called PPP scheme has started to be 
applied in development cooperation practices, though still in its infancy, which bears 
noticeable similarity to the Southern ‘development package’ model. Cooperation 
modalities beyond ODA, therefore, are being experimented both by the Northern 
donors and the Southern development partners, and indeed quite necessary given the 
change of times and notably also the debated ‘failure’ of the ODA (Chapter 1.2).  
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It is against this background that I decided to join this currently heated but somehow 
biased (e.g. DAC-centred and ODA-exclusive) debate on the Southern development 
partners and help enrich the understanding of the Southern models through the thesis. 
I was particularly interested in investigating the beyond-ODA, ‘development package’ 
model of China, with the typical case of its agricultural development cooperation with 
Africa. In an attempt to balance the ‘DAC-centrality’, for instance, I have 
intentionally added in a historical perspective (Chapter 2) to help readers understand 
not only the differences of this specific package model of China compared to its DAC 
counterpart (‘what it is not’) but also how this disparate model has come into being – 
the history and the logic behind (‘why it is what it is’). Meanwhile, given the limited 
empirical studies on Southern development partners, in writing this thesis, I have also 
spent extended time in Mozambique – one of the most representative African 
countries involved in agricultural cooperation with China – to collect more empirical 
evidence (Chapter 3&4) in order to flesh out the often abstract, general discussion 
around the topic.  
 
Through the fieldwork, I’ve also been able to point out some practical problems 
occurring on the ground which accordingly led to certain ‘implementation gap’ of 
Chinese agro-cooperation policy in Africa. A systematic explanation to that was 
provided (to be detailed in Chapter 5.2) wherein the explanatory factors were grouped 
into three levels – the design and control of Chinese agricultural cooperation policy 
with Africa, the motivation and capability (among others) of the Chinese policy 
implementers and especially those front-liners, and the structural influence of the 
static and dynamic local implementation environment. And most prominent problem 
among these three has seemed to rest on the ‘implementers’ given their potential role 
in actively remedying the policy imperfections and effectively responding to the 
adverse environment. In particular, the lack of strong or true motivation of engaging 
in agro-aid and agribusiness in Africa – for both SAEs and private agro-firms (but 
perhaps more so for the latter) – and more importantly the limited capability of them 
in operating agro-aid and agribusiness projects in the African context have accounted 
for a large part of the ‘implementer’ problem. These three levels of factors, working 
together and synergistically, explain the ‘implementation gap’ as observed from the 
field between the expected objectives and actual outcomes of Chinese agricultural 
cooperation policy with Africa. 
 
In the following part, I will go through the main findings of the thesis, particularly in 
response to the research questions raised in the Introduction (Chapter 1.3). 
5.1 Chinese Way of Development Cooperation with Africa: The Case of 
Agriculture 
This thesis, through investigating the case of agriculture, has demonstrated one of the 
most important features of China’s contemporary development cooperation with 
Africa, that is the ‘development package’ model. The most direct driving force behind 
this more flexible cooperation modality, I would argue, is the more practical mentality 
of the Chinese government in terms of what to achieve from development cooperation, 
particularly as a developing country. The sixty-year history of China-Africa 
agricultural cooperation has well illustrated this point. Therefore, before summarising 
the ‘development package’ model, I will first briefly review the history and conclude 
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how the essential idea of ‘mutual development’, among others, has evolved over the 
decades and thus paved the way for the emergence of the ‘package’ model. 
5.1.1 On ‘Mutual Development’: What the History Tells… 
Chapter 2 of the thesis has provided a review of the historical trajectory of Chinese 
agricultural development cooperation with Africa over more than half a century since 
the late 1950s. The earlier phase of Chinese agricultural cooperation with Africa, or, 
the ‘pure aid’ phase between the 1960-1970s, was driven primarily by political 
factors. Those more traditional forms of agricultural aid such as building farms and 
extension stations were used particularly as part of the diplomatic efforts of the PRC 
trying to break the Western blockade and strive for international recognition. Africa-
oriented developmental objectives were surely under consideration – for the focal 
sector of agriculture per se was chosen not randomly but almost all at request of the 
recipient African countries given the significant role of agriculture to their people’s 
livelihood. Thus we could see that from the very beginning, agricultural cooperation 
was dually motivated and mutually beneficial, serving both the development 
objectives of Africa to enhance the agricultural productivity and that of China – 
political but perhaps more essential in terms of the broadly understood ‘development’ 
– the acceptance and even survival as a newly established regime. The foreign aid 
reforms starting since the early 1980s left an important imprint on the later evolution 
of Chinese agricultural cooperation practice in Africa. Given the changing 
environment and thus policy priorities as well as the experiences and lessons 
accumulated in the earlier phase, the Chinese government made a series of efforts 
including adjusting aid scale, enhancing aid performance, and most notably, adopting 
an increasingly economically-pragmatic approach to conducting development 
cooperation (Chapter 2.1&2.2).  
 
Accordingly, in the ‘transition period’ of the 1980-90s, Chinese agricultural 
cooperation with Africa underwent a process of consolidation and transformation with 
a growing emphasis on project efficiency, profitability and sustainability. The notion 
of reciprocal benefits and mutual development gained greater acknowledgement and 
reconfirmation from the government level, although in reality, it was still the 
traditional aid forms that prevailed while commercial activities took place only 
moderately. It is not until the ‘New Era’ starting in the 2000s that the opportunities 
for actual ‘mutual development’, especially in economic terms, finally matured. Apart 
from more traditional forms of agro-aid that still remained, two other new models of 
development cooperation in agriculture started to emerge, namely the ‘innovative 
agro-aid model’ exemplified by the ATDC project, and the ‘agribusiness model’ that 
features the use of agro-FDI as a way to boost the recipients’ agricultural sector. Both 
of these two new modalities entail very strong ‘mutual development’ objectives; 
different from the ‘pure aid’ period, however, this time the Chinese government has 
tried to utilise development cooperation to promote and facilitate its own ‘Agriculture 
Going Out’ strategy whilst helping enhance food security and agricultural 
development of the African partner countries. The combination of ‘traditional agro-
aid’ as well as the ‘innovative agro-aid’ and ‘agribusiness’ modalities constitute the 
‘package’ that is applied in China’s contemporary agricultural development 
cooperation with Africa (Chapter 2.3&2.4).  
 
In retrospect, we could see that over the whole course of Chinese agricultural 
development cooperation with Africa, there has always been a clear self-development 
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objective involved – more political during the 1960-70s and from the 1980s on 
increasingly economic oriented. Therefore, the ‘mutual development’, or more 
pertinently, the sort of ‘exchange’ ideology has been at play from the very beginning 
of Chinese external development cooperation practice; in other words, through 
development cooperation, China has been trying not only to help others, but also help 
itself. This is deeply rooted in the fact of China being a rather backward, ‘third world’ 
developing country for most of the time in the last century. It is thus a rational choice 
for China trying to strike a balance of using the limited resources between domestic 
development efforts and external development cooperation. Having said that, this 
process has not been devoid of mistakes and even at times failure. The setback caused 
by the once over-stretching aid giving, largely motivated by the proletarian 
internationalism ideology, during the 1970s finally led to a heated debate in Chinese 
leadership and thereby called a halt to the unrealistic approach to development 
cooperation. It is through this lesson, as well as the overarching policy shifts at the 
turning from the 1970s to 1980s, that the principle of ‘giving aid according to own 
actual strengths’ was approved by the leadership and gradually established; and the 
biggest reality at that time was, as admitted by Deng Xiaoping, that China was ‘still 
very poor’. 
 
With the Reform and Opening-up, Chinese ‘actual strengths’ (particularly in terms of 
the country’s material power), does have increased tremendously, and accordingly the 
scale of its foreign development cooperation. However, the fact that tends to be 
downplayed and thus needs to be reminded of is that China until now is still a 
developing country that has not yet fully completed industrialization and meanwhile 
been confronted with a number of development problems – such as the highly 
imbalanced development across different regions, the still large number of people 
living below the poverty line, the slow economic structural upgrading and 
accompanied problems – just to mention a few. In terms of agriculture, more 
specifically, despite the great success of the country’s agricultural development in the 
past thirty years, the agro-sector still carries significant, and indeed, rather 
challenging duties in the face of the increasingly tight land constraints, in terms of 
feeding the whole country, supporting the industrial development as well as providing 
livelihood to almost half of the population who are still living in the rural area 
(Chapter 4). That’s partly the reason why the ‘Agricultural Going Out’ strategy was 
launched, and accordingly why while China is offering agricultural technology and 
finances in order to help others, it’s been trying to make the best of this chance also to 
help itself. The ‘mutual development’ logic, therefore, is still valid in the current stage 
and acts as the guiding principle as long as China has not fully graduated from the 
developing world.  
 
This forms a strong contrast with the Northern DAC donors who had already been 
quite advanced even back to half a century ago when they just started to provide ODA 
to the ‘third world’ countries. It is because of this entirely different ‘starting point’ 
that the DAC donors have always tried to make development cooperation as an 
independent agenda (often through a separate aid agency such as the USAID and 
DFID) with claimed purely recipient-oriented development objectives106. For some of 																																																								
106 The specific focus of the ‘development objectives’ as defined by the DAC donors, however, has 
been kept changing through the past seven decades – first ‘economic growth’ (through promoting 
productive sector and infrastructure development as in the 1960s), then ‘poverty reduction’ (through 
emphasizing agricultural and social sector development as in the 1970s and 90s), once ‘macroeconomic 
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them, there is the psychology of ‘repayment’ at play given their colonial past; for 
some others, they claim altruistic humanitarianism. Either way, and insofar as only 
economic dimension is concerned (leaving aside political consideration behind aid-
giving or development cooperation provision), it has gone beyond the stage for the 
DAC donors to directly use ODA as a mean to promote their own economic 
development or commercial benefits as conducted by the Southern actors, or at most, 
they do that only marginally such as in the form of tied aid. It may also be fair to say 
that the highly concessional, donation-style development cooperation is largely what 
the DAC donors can afford, which is however less the case for the Southern countries 
who may to varying degrees be constrained by domestic public pressure given their 
own underdeveloped population at home. Furthermore, it may even sound reasonable, 
despite the ‘dislikes’ of the recipients, for the DAC donors to attach certain conditions 
to their ODA for the largely ‘free’ nature of the latter – just another sort of 
‘exchange’. This abovementioned approach, therefore, is also rooted in the DAC 
donors’ own history and particularly their identity as more advanced economies in 
relation to the recipient countries. Self-contained logic but just not really suitable or 
even comparable to the Southern countries. 
 
In addition to the key idea of ‘mutual development’, some other characteristics of 
China’s contemporary development cooperation models also have their historical 
roots. The design of the ATDC especially the commercial operation model that is 
entailed, for instance, while surely taking into account the dimension of promoting 
Chinese agro-firms to go abroad, is also evidently associated with the previous 
lessons of Chinese agro-aid in Africa, particularly the lack of project sustainability. 
This problem did not only largely reduce the developmental impacts of the aid 
projects, but also cause a great waste of Chinese aid funds. It is, therefore, against this 
specific background that the designers of ATDC brought sustainability issue to the 
core and innovatively brought in the business model (Chapter 3). Also, the 
technology-centric approach to agricultural development cooperation with Africa has 
a lot to do with China’s own successful experience in leveraging agro-technology to 
boost the growth of the sector (Chapter 2). In terms of experiences with other donors, 
which are less touched upon in this thesis but could be good examples for the 
historical imprints, the ‘development package’ model, for instance, is believed by 
some scholars to be influenced by Japan’s ODA practice in China as well (Bräutigam, 
2009), and China’s insistence on non-interference may well be linked to its earlier 
negative experiences with the Soviet Union trying to intervene Chinese policy making 
in the 1950s in exchange for aid to China (Niu, 2010).  
 
In a nutshell, by adding in a historical perspective, the thesis has tried to make more 
clearly how the disparate mentalities and modalities of the Southern development 
partners – through the case of Chinese agricultural development cooperation with 
Africa – have been shaped by their different identities and experiences compared to 																																																																																																																																																														
reforms’ (as in the ‘Structural Adjustment’ period in the 1980s) and more recently ‘good governance’ 
(as in the late 1990s). Furthermore, it is already revealed (Morgenthau, 1962; Hjertholm and White, 
2000; van der Veen, 2011) and empirically supported (Alesina and Dollar, 2000) that, in actual fact, 
the claimed recipient-oriented ‘development objectives’ have often been distorted by the donor’s self-
interest driven political and commercial pursuits. In this sense, ‘mutual benefit’, both in political and 
economic terms, has never been an exclusive mindset or practice to the Southern countries – aid in 
general, and even development aid more narrowly, has always been entwined with aid-givers’ self-
interest pursuits.  
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that of the DAC donors. And in so doing, I hope the thesis has also made the point 
clear that the choice of development cooperation models by different development 
cooperation providers is far from a mere matter of ‘policy dialogue’ or ‘mutual 
learning’, but boils down to the respective development status and own experience of 
them, which determines what they want to gain from the cooperation as well as what 
and how they can contribute to it. The attempt of some trying to ‘converge’ the 
Southern models to the Northern ones, is therefore, too DAC-centric and may well 
end up with frustration by neglecting those more ‘structural’ differences and hence 
obstacles.  
5.1.2 On ‘Development Package’: The Logic, Practice and Prospect  
To a large extent, the realistic attitudes towards cooperation objectives, as embodied 
in the ‘mutual development’ idea, naturally point to the more flexible cooperation 
modalities, the so-called ‘development package’ of China. There is no standard 
definition on what ‘development package’ is, but we could largely understand it as a 
mixture of a diversity of economic and technical cooperation forms, ranging from 
more traditional, ODA-like type of aid to broader commercial activities, typically 
trade and investment, with a view to promoting mutual development. In essence, it is 
pragmatic uses of different forms as long as they could possibly serve the expected 
goals. This ‘pragmaticism’ is very much in consistence with the practical-oriented 
ideology and experience of China’s Reform and Opening Up, and notably Deng’s 
‘black cat, white cat’ metaphor107. That said, the ‘development package’ is not 
something that is proposed out of pure blind-mindedness, but rather, a measure that is 
still being tested, as a kind of new form of cooperation that not only differs from the 
DAC-model but also China’s own previous practices. Against this context, the 
agricultural sector, which intrinsically entails the possibility for commercial operation, 
could be seen as a chosen pilot area. It is not guaranteed with better results or 
effectiveness, and indeed, as will be elaborated in more detail later on (Chapter 5.2), 
in many ways falls short of its intended purposes. But still, it could serve as a pool of 
lessons and experience, and may be modified and expanded to other development 
cooperation areas in the future. 
 
Specifically, in examining Chinese contemporary development cooperation in the 
area of African agriculture since the 2000s, I have found that there exist three 
distinctive models, which I’ve referred to respectively as ‘traditional agro-aid’, 
‘innovative agro-aid’ and ‘agribusiness’ models. The ‘traditional agro-aid model’, as 
the name suggests, remains largely the same as the previous agro-cooperation forms 
in the past decades during the 1960-90s, but with a greater focus on the role of agro-
technology (Chapter 2.4). Hundreds of Chinese agro-experts have been sent to 
different African countries to help with agricultural development plan-making and 
technical-related issues. Constant exchange and training programs are held both in 
China and the counterpart African countries. Meanwhile, China has also actively 
participated in different multilateral cooperation mechanisms such as that with the 
UN-FAO and OECD-DAC, in order to collectively contribute to the development of 
African agro-sector. In addition, Chinese government continues to support building 
agricultural infrastructure and donate agro-materials to a number of African countries. 
 
																																																								
107 The original quote is, ‘It doesn't matter whether the cat is black or white, as long as it catches mice.’ 
	 132	
The second model is termed in this thesis as ‘innovative agro-aid model’, which is 
typically exemplified by the Chinese ATDC project in Africa (Chapter 3.1). While at 
first glance the ATDCs look more like a hybrid of the different ‘agro-aid’ forms 
adopted before (e.g. farms, agro-technology demonstration/extension stations, experts 
dispatch), the ‘innovative’ part is displayed in the incorporation of company actors 
and commercial operation. The aim of doing so is primarily to fix the problems of 
project inefficiency and non-sustainability as experienced in the past (Chapter 2), 
thereby to enhance the performance and developmental impacts of these new aid 
projects; but equally important, the ATDCs are also expected to serve as a platform 
and entry point for Chinese agro-firms – not only those acting as the implementing 
agencies but other agro-firms interested in investing in the ATDC-hosting countries as 
well – to go abroad and conduct agribusiness. In actual practice, this combination of 
traditional aid and innovative business model is realised through the design of two 
consecutive operational phases of the ATDCs; specifically the three-year Technical 
Cooperation Stage wherein the centres are fully funded by Chinese government to 
perform the so-called ‘public-interest functions’ such as agro-technology 
demonstration and training, and then the Commercial Operation Stage in which the 
implementing firms are supposed to be self-funded through market-oriented 
production and meanwhile continue performing the ‘public-interest functions’. For 
now, there have been two dozens or so Chinese ATDCs established across different 
African countries.  
 
The last model as seen in China’s current agricultural development cooperation with 
Africa is called ‘agribusiness model’ (Chapter 4.1). To certain extent, the 
‘agribusiness model’ could be equalled as regular agricultural investment, but the 
‘developmental’ nature of agriculture and agribusiness as well as some intentional 
‘development PPP’ elements involved in many of these investment projects, make it 
at the same time also a vital component of the ‘development package’ of China to help 
reinvigorate the agricultural sector and improve people’s wellbeing in Africa. For 
instance, most of the Chinese agro-firms currently engage in the production stage of 
the agribusiness value chain and bring with them relatively more advanced agro-
equipment and techniques, thus making a direct contribution to the productivity 
increase of the agricultural sector. The Chinese agribusiness projects in Africa often 
involve employing and training local smallholder farmers, either through plantation 
production or contract farming models, and hence help with creating more jobs and 
alleviating local poverty. Due to the limited production scale at the current stage, most 
of these Chinese investment projects, especially those engaged in grain-crop business, 
serve the local markets only and thus play a positive role in increasing food supplies 
and enhancing food security of the recipient countries. Furthermore, as revealed in the 
overall review (Chapter 4.1.3) as well as the case studies (Chapter 4.2), many of these 
agribusiness projects have been partially financed by Chinese government through 
concessional or commercial loans with a clear view to supporting African agriculture. 
In total, there are around 100 or so Chinese agro-firms who have invested in different 
countries across the continent, and thereby contributed to China’s contemporary agro-
development cooperation efforts in Africa either individually or through partnering 
with the Chinese government. 
 
This ‘package’ model of development cooperation has also formed a clear contrast 
with that of the Northern donors where there has always been a line carefully 
maintained between the believed recipient-oriented ODA and self-benefiting 
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commercial activities (e.g. trade and investment). A mixture of both, either through 
incorporation (e.g. tied aid) or combination (e.g. development package), would easily 
be regarded as inappropriate, if not immoral. Perhaps part of the reason for that can be 
attributed to the cautiousness deriving from memories of the colonial past, that is, the 
donors might try to avoid the possibility or at least impression of taking advantage 
again of the recipients through offering development cooperation or ODA. It seems 
that Northern donors have somehow constrained themselves by pursuing this kind of 
‘purity’ of development cooperation – purely altruism no any self-interest (though not 
really so in reality), purely ODA (the more concessional the better) no commercial 
stuff – the ODA, therefore, appears to increasingly become the end per se rather than 
a mean, and indeed one of the possible means, to achieve development. While the 
Chinese (and other Southern development partners) who are without this sort of 
‘historical burden’ and thus regard ‘win-win’ scenario likely achievable, the Northern 
donors, on the other hand, tend to behave more cautiously and perhaps also be more 
sensitive to any ‘signs’ of neo-colonialism (of themselves and others) in engagement 
with the recipients.  
 
Having said that, it is worth mentioning that the ‘package’ model – particularly the 
‘innovative agro-aid’ and ‘agribusiness’ modalities – bear close similarity to the 
‘development PPP’ scheme emerging as a new trend in the DAC community in the 
past decade or so. As noted before (Chapter 1.2), there are two main methods 
whereby the private sector actors are mobilized through the PPP scheme, the ‘Grants 
Model’ or the ‘LEGs (Loans, Equities & Guarantees) Model. We have seen, for 
instance, the ATDC project, especially the ‘Commercial Operation Stage’ is quite 
similar to the ‘Challenge Funds’ projects under the ‘Grants Model’, whereas the 
‘agribusiness model’ is often supported by loans and equities provided by the EXIM 
Bank of China and CDB. In the actual practice, we could also find some common 
problems – most notable is the difficulty in trying to exert effective control of the 
behaviours of private sector actors as seen both in the Northern donors like the UK 
(DFID, 2011; ICAI, 2015) and that of China as will be elaborated in the following 
section (Chapter 5.2). Indeed, the ‘LEGs Model’ can be traced back even earlier to the 
last century – the British development finance institution, CDC, for instance, was 
established in 1948 and has had the idea of ‘doing good without losing money’ ever 
since. Therefore, it can be said that the ‘win-win’ idea is surely not only seen in the 
Southern development cooperation but does have been long been side-lined in the 
DAC community with the preoccupation on ODA, and accordingly been neglected by 
the academia.  
 
At the current stage, however, the application of PPP in Northern development 
cooperation practice, though an increasing trend, is still largely outside the 
mainstream. Whether this new type of cooperation will be scaled up in the future may 
depend, among other factors, on what the DAC donors determine to do in the face of 
the challenges of ODA – to continue with its reform path as shown, for instance, in 
the Paris and Busan Declarations; or, more radically, to embrace a broader, more 
flexible methods of development cooperation. That said, at least one problem remains 
for the possible incorporation of business models into development cooperation for 
the Northern donors, that is, the relatively less powerful argument for ‘win-win’ given 
their identities/development status as advanced economies. The question won’t be on 
whether a ‘win-win’ scenario is able to be realised; but rather, who is going to win 
more and who benefit less. Indeed, this problem is set to loom for China as it 
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develops further in the future, gains more wealth and gradually cannot justify itself as 
developing country any more. But here, the solution does not lie in the ‘giver’ side – a 
better plan-design or new justification – but the ‘receiver’ side. It is down to the 
development cooperation recipients to decide which partner they would like to work 
with and even to certain extent they could accept as a ‘necessary satisfice of interest’ 
as a latecomer with a view to gaining development opportunities and greater, long-
term benefits in the future. Furthermore, it also remains to see the actual effectiveness 
either of the ‘development PPP’ or the ‘development package’ (as to be conducted in 
Chapter 5.2) and the scope of them being modified to overcome their deficiencies, in 
order to know the prospect of these new models of development cooperation. 
 
In brief, the thesis has tried to demonstrate in detail the beyond-ODA, ‘package model’ 
of the Southern development partners, through the case of Chinese agro-development 
cooperation with Africa, and has also found certain common ground between the 
Southern ‘package model’ and Northern ‘development PPP’. This is important for it 
signifies a trend: a reflection upon the six, seven-decades of development cooperation 
both for the Northern donors and Southern actors, an exploration for different 
possible manners whereby development cooperation could be conducted, and possibly, 
a reconfiguration of the international development cooperation scheme in the coming 
decades. The thesis, therefore, may have captured the beginning of this transformation 
process, and contributed to the understanding of this process through its in-depth 
empirical evidence. 
5.2 Challenges of the Chinese Development Cooperation Model: From a 
PPI Perspective 
 
As noted before (Chapter 1.2), despite the innovation in cooperation modalities – as 
embodied in the ‘innovative agro-aid’ and ‘agribusiness’ models of the ‘development 
package’ in the case of agriculture – there has been so far a lack of evaluation of the 
actual results of these new models of development cooperation, thereby leaving it a 
question of uncertainty whether and to what extent this Chinese way of engaging 
development cooperation is more effective (versus the Northern ODA approach). In 
this vein, this thesis has made an initial effort in tying to examine and explain the 
actual outcomes through in-depth, fieldwork-based case studies. That said, given the 
limited number of cases entailed by the qualitative nature of research methods 
adopted, and the still short time of practice of these new modalities (starting only 
from the past decade or so), it is impossible for this thesis to provide an extremely 
comprehensive review or an ultimate evaluation of the effectiveness of Chinese 
‘package’ model of development cooperation. What it can offer, therefore, is only a 
contemporary overview of that.  
 
Insofar as this modest aim is concerned, I have found a number of practical challenges 
in the actual implementation of China’s current development cooperation models. The 
identified problems (as detailed in Chapters 3.2&4.2) do not only make the projects 
fail to meet the proposed policy objectives, but have even caused some 
counterproductive effects. For instance, some ATDC projects, while having relatively 
limited effectiveness in terms of technology transfer and not seeming able to achieve 
expected sustainability, also experienced mutual mistrust and discontentment with the 
local partners, mainly due to unsuccessful interactions. Similar cases can be seen in 
the agribusiness projects as well, particularly considering the small level commercial 
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success and the controversies raised around land and labour issues, among others. 
These problems, therefore, may cast doubts on to what extent the expected ‘mutual 
development’ objectives have been or will be realised. There are, therefore, certain 
gaps between the expectation and realities in terms of what Chinese agricultural 
development cooperation, or the policy of that, could possibly bring about. In order to 
give a more systematic summary, I will apply the ‘policy-implementer-environment’ 
framework of PPI analysis (Chapter 1.5) in the section that follows. While the three 
set of factors – those on the development cooperation policy itself, the implementers 
of the policy, as well as the implementation environment of the policy – all play an 
indispensible role, the ‘implementer’ element, as will be elaborated later, appears to 
act prominently in explaining the policy results (especially the ‘gaps’) as observed in 
the case of China-Africa agricultural cooperation; this is mostly because of the 
proactive role or the agency that the implementers could (at least potentially) exert to 
remedy imperfect policies and counter unfavourable environments in this particular 
PPI situation, but unfortunately the failure of the implementers in so doing. 
5.2.1 Policy 
 
Policy is defined earlier in this thesis as a purposive course of action proposed and 
adopted by government authorities aiming to deal with specific public issues (Chapter 
1.5.2-I). Before going to examine the ‘problems’ at the policy level, it should be noted 
that China’s contemporary development cooperation policy, featuring its ‘mutual 
development’ objectives and the ‘package’ models, is still largely a policy in-the-
making, gradually coming into being only since the foreign aid reforms and China-
Africa economic interactions both deepened in the latter half of the 1990s.  
Furthermore, though having been publicly proclaimed in different official occasions, 
China’s development cooperation policy is also something that is more being 
practiced than being carefully compiled and openly publicised as many of the DAC 
donors do. Hence it can be seen at best as at a set of loosely defined arrangement, 
which includes the basic ends and means but inevitably entails much trial and error 
and accordingly an incremental process of policy testing and learning. For this sort of 
policies, it is easier or just normal to find problems compared to those delicately 
designed policies; constant reflection and quick learning, therefore, is accordingly 
more needed. Specifically, at least two types of policy challenges – of policy design 
and policy control respectively – are observed in China’s development cooperation 
policy in African agriculture. 
 
In terms of policy design, which involves the devising of key policy components 
particularly the objectives and action plans of a given policy (Chapter 1.5.2-I), I find 
there are at least three notable problems existing in the area of China-Africa 
agricultural cooperation. The first problem, or more precisely something that causes 
problems, is the multi-objectives involved in Chinese agricultural development 
cooperation policy in Africa. This is first shown in the co-existence of both Africa- 
and self-oriented objectives as informed by the ‘mutual-development’ mentality, but 
also demonstrated at more specific project levels – most typically, the ATDCs that 
combine the pursuits of developmental impact, business promotion and project 
sustainability all together in one project.  
 
While policies with ‘precise and clearly ranked’ objectives are surely preferred 
especially for the sake of effective implementation (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979; 
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Sabatier, 1986), they are however rarely present in the real world. Therefore, multi-
goals are just more demanding, but by themselves do not necessarily create a problem 
for implementation – as long as there are detailed and specifically designed action 
plans and no less importantly, competent and cooperative implementers in place to 
make sure that the disparate aims are able to be fulfilled simultaneously. For example, 
in the case of the ATDCs, adequate control over the company implementers, setting-
up of a capable marketing team, close collaboration and communication with local 
partners, among other factors, are naturally required by the multi-objectives to be 
included as parts of the action plan. As revealed in the case studies (Chapter 3.2), 
however, none of these – at least for the time being – are effectively in place, thereby 
leaving the implementation of that multi-objective ambition almost a mission 
impossible.  
 
In addition, the multi-objective design also easily causes confusion to ‘outsiders’, that 
is, the local African partners. The ATDCs, for example, are in most cases, particularly 
on official or diplomatic occasions, presented as an aid project, a gift from China to 
its African friends, with the primary aim to help enhance the continent’s agricultural 
productivity through transferring China's most advanced agro-technology. While this 
is surely the case, it is only part of the whole story. The problem is that the African 
partners do not seem to have been well informed, consulted or negotiated with 
beforehand about the commercial objectives and mechanisms involved in the project 
beyond the agreed aid agenda, despite quite justifiable reasons (e.g. sustainability 
concern) behind them. What compounds the situation is the often Chinese-dominated 
management model of the projects, with quite limited local staff effectively involved. 
The actual outcome, then, is that the African partners see the Chinese aid-workers 
making business on the aid projects, with themselves, the supposed aid beneficiaries, 
to varying degrees being excluded from that process (Chapter 3.2). This, together with 
other reasons that will be discussed later on, contributes to the mistrust and 
discontentment of the local partners in certain circumstances. 
 
The second problem concerning policy design is the lack of specificity, particularly in 
the policy action plans. Although the importance and some general guidelines of 
China-Africa agricultural cooperation have been highlighted and proposed on 
different official occasions, very few concrete action plans have so far been put 
forward, either in formal or informal forms, even after plenty of projects have been 
operating on the ground for years. In the case of the ATDCs, as revealed previously in 
the thesis (Chapter 3.2), there has been only one guideline document from the Chinese 
government, that is the ‘ATDC Guidance’. While it does outline some key elements 
of the project such as the objectives, actors and tasks, the content in general is very 
basic. It is especially so concerning the final phase of Commercial Operation, which – 
given its dual objectives of seeking agribusiness opportunities and achieving project 
sustainability – is supposed to be the most innovative and very essential part of the 
ATDC project. The design for the Commercial Operation as presented in the ‘ATDC 
Guidance’ is rather simple and ambiguous, giving little concrete direction or 
suggestion as to how the implementing agencies could possibly and successfully run 
the Centres on a business basis. If this ambiguity is understandable given the early 
point the document was issued at when the ATDCs were still largely in their 
Technical Cooperation phase, there has nevertheless been no follow-up documents or 
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informal communications between the government and implementers108, that further 
specifies the implementation plan even during the Commercial Operation phase. 
 
Similarly, in terms of the ‘agribusiness model’, after more than a decade of discussion, 
there still have been few comprehensive official documents or practical action plans 
in place; some more detailed, country-specific agro-investment guidance in different 
African states, furthermore, is even more lacking. The state support system is still in 
an immature phase, which has been confirmed by the case studies (Chapter 4.2). For 
instance, while few new supportive policies (e.g. financial support and insurance/tax 
measures) are set up to facilitate Chinese companies’ agribusiness investment in 
Africa, some long-standing constraints such as the Import Quota System haven't 
really been modified either. No real measures are taken to facilitate or benefit private 
investors who normally face more difficulties in conducting overseas agro-investment 
compared to state-owned companies. Therefore, although there is a lot of policy 
encouragement as to the great potential and necessity of bilateral agricultural 
cooperation, when it comes to concrete measures of translating all that into practice, 
there sometimes seems to be an awkward vacuum.  
 
The last problem in respect of policy design is the inadequate consideration of local 
environment. A typical example is the active encouragement of agro-investment by 
the Chinese government, particularly the enthusiasm for land investment as seen in 
the earlier years of this wave of agricultural engagement (Chapter 4.1.1), without 
adequate warning to the agro-firms about the complexity and difficulties of land 
issues and deals in Africa. This has seemed to – at least partially – contribute to the 
stalemate of many Chinese firms now operating agribusinesses in Africa. A similar 
case can be seen in the problem of economic unviability of the Commercial Operation 
phase of the ATDCs. It has already proven almost impossible or at least rather 
difficult, as the case study shows, for the ATDCs to be able to finance themselves 
through conducting agribusiness as expected by the Chinese government. In addition, 
the inadequate consideration of local environment is also reflected through the lack of 
incorporation of local personnel, either in terms of including them into the 
management team or consulting and collaborating with them whenever necessary. 
This is a common problem as seen both in the ATDCs and different investment 
projects.  
 
Secondly, problems revolving around policy control are also observed in China’s 
agricultural development cooperation with Africa. As discussed before in the thesis 
(Chapter 1.5.2-I), even though a policy per se is well designed, it is not complete 
unless effective control is present. This is mainly for the reason that a policy is rarely 
self-implemented; instead it depends on the cooperation of both the implementers and 
the target groups whose behaviours, however, are seldom naturally obedient. In 
addition, control is needed also as a way of macro-coordination given the often messy 
and inefficient state of multi-organizational implementation. In the case of Chinese 
agricultural development cooperation with Africa, the problem of (lack of) control is 
seen in almost all of the scenarios mentioned above.  
 
																																																								
108 This is according to the author’s personal confirmation with several front-line directors of the 
ATDCs in different African countries at different times in 2016 and 2017. 
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In terms of control over implementers, the control problem appears to be particularly 
relevant because the main policy implementers either in the ATDCs or investment 
projects, are corporate actors who instinctively, and quite understandably, have even 
less inclination to faithfully follow through government initiatives compared to 
government counterparts. Taking the ATDCs for example, with the aim of improving 
project sustainability, the Chinese government incorporates company actors into the 
government aid projects and makes them the key implementers on a daily operational 
basis. This is supposed to be a win-win scenario in the sense that, while the Chinese 
government provides a platform for the companies to seek business opportunities in 
Africa, the companies should in return take the responsibility for managing the 
government's foreign aid projects in a more efficient, and particularly importantly, 
more sustainable way. There is, however, no stipulation as to the obligations of the 
company actors, for example, what profit level should be attained in order to prepare 
for the ATDCs’ Commercial Operation Stage, and how the profits should be 
distributed in the Commercial Operation Stage in order to sustain the ‘public-interest’ 
function of technology transfer. As a result, the implementing companies don’t seem 
to be confronted with any serious pressure as to the performance of agribusiness in 
the Technical Cooperation Stage. Even if the ATDCs could possibly financially 
sustain themselves in the Commercial Operation Stage – this, nevertheless, might be 
even more problematic given the potential conflicts, in the absence of any effective 
control measures, between the profit-seeking motives of the companies and the 
supposed aid nature of the ATDCs. 
 
Policy control over target groups in the context of external policy implementation 
indicates often not coercive regulations or restrictions, but influence or direction of 
their behaviours towards the policy objectives; and the measures also tend to be softer 
due to their lack of governing legitimacy over foreign citizens (Chapter 1.5.2-I). The 
target groups in the case of the thesis topic involve a diversity of local actors such as 
the African government counterparts, local farmers, businessmen, and NGOs. To 
pursue ‘influence or direction’ on the local actors, it requires, at the lowest level, 
adequate negotiation with them in the process of policy implementation. However, as 
will be analysed in more detail in the following section, while the Chinese 
government itself tends to take a rather hands-off position after the projects enter the 
implementation phase, the company actors lack both capabilities and motives to 
actively engage with the local actors. Therefore, the Chinese side (in terms of both 
government and corporate actors) seems to have very little leverage over the foreign 
target groups either through direct (policymaker) or indirect (implementer) influences. 
This affects the implementation result in different ways. For example, for those locals 
who act as co-implementers such as the African government counterparts, lack of 
influence on them leads to the inefficiency of implementation; for those locals who 
are largely the recipients or objects of implementation such as the farmers, lack of 
influence on them sometimes increases mistrust and resentment.  
 
In addition, there are also no formal coordination mechanisms among different 
implementers. As introduced in the previous chapter, the Chinese government did 
establish a mechanism called ‘Inter-ministry Working Mechanism on Overseas 
Agricultural Resources Exploration’ which is comprised of 14 central-level ministries 
and led by the MOC and MOA. It is however more a mechanism for policy 
formulation rather than implementation, and even for the former purpose, it is indeed 
quite an empty one, existing largely only on paper. Furthermore, what is more 
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urgently needed in the case of agro-policy implementation in Africa is the 
coordination between the governmental and the corporate actors, given that in this 
specific policy case, it is the companies who are working on the front-lines and 
playing the most important roles. The notion of ‘governments setting up the platform, 
enterprises providing a performance’ (zhengfu datai, qiye changxi), which is a 
common model for public-private cooperation in China, seems also at work in the 
current case of the country’s agricultural policy in Africa. There is, therefore, no 
intentionally formed cooperation framework that aims to stick the government and 
companies together for a unitary foreign policy goal, be it securing overseas agro-
resources or improving national image as far as the agro-policy in Africa is concerned.  
5.2.2 Implementers 
Implementers are the actors who put the centrally formulated policy into actual 
practice. In the case of Chinese agricultural development cooperation with Africa, and 
particularly under the ‘innovative agro-aid’ and ‘agribusiness’ models, we have seen 
two main groups of implementers. The most important implementers who take the 
direct executive role and work at the very front lines are the Chinese corporate actors. 
We have seen a wide diversity of them: mostly agro-firms but also companies from 
other sectors; companies of different ownership – state-owned, private and sometimes 
mixed; and companies operating at different levels – central and provincial. Among 
them, some are officially designated as policy implementers, as in the ATDC project; 
some are ‘unintentional policy implementers’, as in agribusiness projects, for 
although the companies largely follow their own agenda and would not consider 
themselves carrying out government policies, they nevertheless unintentionally 
contribute to the realization of the government policy objectives (Chapter 1.5.2-II). 
The second group and also secondary level of implementers are the Chinese 
governmental actors. They are also from different sectors, mostly the commercial and 
agricultural systems; and operating at different administrative levels – central or 
provincial. Although being governmental actors, they play a subordinate role as 
‘implementers’, for they are not the ones directly involved with the policy execution, 
be it aid delivery (ATDCs) or investment projects. Instead, they are more in charge of 
facilitation and support. This actor mapping of all that are involved in the 
implementation of Chinese agricultural development cooperation policy reminds us of 
Hjern’s concept of ‘implementation structure’ (Hjern, 1981), which does not only 
indicate complexity, but also impose significant practical difficulties on the 
collaboration among different parties. 
 
As noted before, despite the synergy of the three variables (policy, implementer and 
environment), problems concerning implementers may have explained more about the 
observed ‘policy gap’ given the implementers’ agency they could have potentially 
exerted. However, a number of constraints – including that of their capabilities, 
motivation, discretion and cooperation – have made them unable to play such a 
proactive role.  
 
The first problem, and also a very oft-seen one, in this regard is the inadequate 
capabilities of the key front-line implementers, the Chinese agro-firms. The lack of 
capability of the Chinese agro-firms operating in Africa is demonstrated not so much 
in agricultural technical/professional terms; most of them are after all quite 
established agro-firms back in China, with fairly advanced agro-technology and 
equipment, well-trained technicians, and long experience in conducting farm activities 
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and agribusiness. Therefore, they find little difficulty, for instance, in building and 
managing farms, organizing production and processing, as well as conducting agro-
technology extension in Africa as seen in different ATDC or investment projects. The 
limited capability, instead, is shown more evidently firstly in their limited foreign 
language skills, lack of knowledge about local conditions, inexperience and 
sometimes hesitance in interacting with local actors, and thus difficulty in integrating 
into the local environment. This seemingly indirect constraint, however, has become a 
repeated theme all through the case studies of this thesis and formed an important 
obstacle to satisfactory results.   
 
The Mozambican ATDC, for instance, while having little difficulty in the process of 
conducting agro-technology transfer (e.g. training, demonstration, and experiments), 
has been increasingly confronted with challenges due to their inadequate and 
ineffective communication with the local partners. Most of the time, the ATDC 
operated in a rather separate way. Communication was constrained only on 
administrative issues such as visa issuing, but seldom upon the management of the 
centre. This not only partially led to the limitation of the agro-technology transfer, but 
also caused some dissatisfaction on the Mozambican side as to the transparency of the 
ATDC’s operation, including areas such as decision-making and finances. When the 
centre encountered problems, the Chinese staff tried to seek help from the 
Mozambican side but often found the results frustrating due to what they believed to 
be ‘low efficiency’ of the Mozambican partners, among other bureaucratic reasons. 
However, interviews with the Mozambican side revealed that they found the 
communication very difficult, and a larger part of the reason was attributed to the 
language barrier. As a result, mistrust and even resentment arose and accumulated 
over time.  
 
In the case of investment projects, while the Chinese agro-firms can normally copy 
the Chinese agricultural production model and achieve high yield very soon after they 
launched the project, they don’t seem to be competent in solving problems related to 
the local context, and don’t seem to be able to create a successful business by 
transferring the production advantage into profits. For instance, as seen in the case of 
Wanbao, the company had very limited knowledge about the local social-political 
conditions. After years of operation, they still hadn’t managed to figure out the role of 
RBL-EP in the Mozambican system, which was the most direct and important local 
partner of the company. They also did not understand why the local farmers protested 
against them, given that they had gained the land through formal government 
channels and obtained signed legal contracts. They felt hesitant to talk with the local 
NGO – the main organiser of the protest; instead, they spent most of their time talking 
with and trying to seek help from the Mozambican government, but turned out to be 
extremely frustrated by what they believed as the ‘low efficiency and inaction’ of the 
government. At the same time, the company didn’t seem to have any clear marketing 
plan as to where to sell their agro-products, how to compete with the existing 
transnational traders; the same problem was also observed, to a lesser extent though, 
in other companies such like Hefeng. As a result of this, recent evidence has started to 
reveal internal and vicious competition among a number of Chinese agro-companies 
for they tend to, as a natural easier option, all target the Chinese community in 
Mozambique as their main market.  
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The reasons for this are multiple. The Chinese-dominant management model, for 
instance, explains an important aspect for the lack of communication in the case of the 
Mozambican ATDC. The challenges encountered by Wanbao among other Chinese 
agro-firms in their investment practice have much to do with their inexperience in 
operating in African countries. One common problem shared among all these 
different projects and thus is to be particularly stressed here is the human resource 
constraint of the Chinese agro-firms. There was no lack of qualified professionals 
who are well equipped with agro-technical know-how and are often very experienced. 
However, most of these technicians had very limited foreign language skills and little 
overseas working experience. Furthermore, there were very few people who are 
skilled in international business, or at least have some basic knowledge on the local 
environments (e.g. local political, social-economic, cultural conditions), acceptable 
language and negotiation skills. Indeed, language barrier and cultural ignorance of the 
Chinese staff were raised as the biggest difficulties by the management of Chinese 
projects (both for ATDC and investment) during the interviews (Interviews, 19 Nov 
2013-c and 23 June 2017). In addition, these Chinese agro-firms seldom had a mature 
marketing team that endeavours to investigate local markets and formulate 
corresponding marketing strategies. 
 
An ATDC, for example, had only a small number of staff, averaging a dozen or so, 
who are mostly Chinese; and the personnel structure was rather simple as well – 
normally a director, a technical team comprising several agro-technicians, a translator 
(optional, mostly in non-English speaking countries), an accountant and some other 
logistics staff (e.g. chefs and cleaners). This structure, while evidently showing an 
effort to meet the requirements for agro-technology transfer, demonstrated little 
attempt at fulfilling the centre’s agribusiness function that was designed to serve both 
the commercial aim and the sustainability concern of the ATDC. Further, there was 
often not such a person, at least not someone who was particularly assigned, to take 
charge of the ATDC’s external relations. Even the companies that were directly 
engaged with agribusiness did not often have a professional marketing team, nor any 
public relations department within the company structure.  
 
Apart from the incapability in terms of integrating into the local environment, another 
important constraint on the company implementers’ capability is their limited 
financial strength. As analysed in Chapter 4.1.2, the majority of the Chinese 
investment entities involved in the African agricultural sector are medium-small sized 
agro-firms with limited financial power. Further, under the current conditions, it is 
difficult for those companies to raise capital from the domestic financial market; their 
main support comes from the several policy-oriented national banks which, however, 
have a preference towards state-owned enterprises. Therefore, the companies often 
face great difficulties expanding the investment scale, as seen both in the performance 
of the ATDC commercial development and other general investment projects. The 
human resource constraint, as mentioned earlier, also has much to do with this; these 
agro-firms often cannot offer good salaries to attract qualified personnel and even try 
to reduce costs by employing as few staff as possible.  
 
Even if the implementing agencies are largely competent, it doesn’t necessarily mean 
that they are going to exert their capability at full strength. At least two factors can be 
seen at work in this regard: the implementer’s own motivation, and the control from 
policymakers. We have seen in the previous section that policy control in the context 
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of Chinese agricultural development cooperation policy is not particularly strong, 
which therefore gives more weight to the implementers’ motivation – and more 
pertinently, their independent aims and the extent of congruity of that with the 
officially-set policy objectives (Chapter 1.5.2-II).  Admittedly, there is certain 
congruity between the Chinese agro-firms’ own aims and the government policy 
objectives, especially in terms of commercial considerations and the need for ‘going 
out’ (Chapter 4.1.1). Indeed, fieldwork interviews reveal that some of the agro-firms 
involved in the ATDC and investment projects do have true intentions of developing 
agribusiness in Africa. Having that said, however, that ‘agribusiness’ intention is 
neither the only nor always the most prioritised concern to many companies. In-depth 
investigation and follow-up tend to reveal a more complex picture.  
 
For some ATDC-implementing companies, for example, developing agribusiness in 
Africa, particularly given all sorts of practical difficulties, is only an option rather 
than a must. It would be great if there were some good investment opportunities 
appearing, but it wouldn’t be regarded (by themselves) as a defeat if they couldn’t 
survive after the first three years. They wouldn’t lose anything; in fact, by hosting the 
government aid projects, they could continually receive funding from the Chinese 
government (for at least three years or even more), which can produce more stable 
and in cases higher financial gains compared to what they could possibly gain from 
their home business given the fierce competition and difficult living conditions for the 
agro-firms in China. Carefully controlling the operational costs could bring even more 
profits. Earning money from hosting government aid projects is not an uncommon 
rationale for Chinese companies, and definitely not only the case for agro-firms. This 
may help explain, admittedly only partially, why sometimes the ATDCs are not seen 
to actively engage with the local markets or implementing companies expanding 
agribusiness by, for instance, putting in self-owned capital; for doing agribusiness 
might not be a prioritised or preferred option to them at all, whereas the project 
sustainability objective (supposedly realised through agribusiness) is apparently 
something that’s cared about more by the government rather than by the companies. 
 
In some investment cases, especially private ones, the investment scale is surprisingly 
huge although the investment strategy per se looks rather unrealistic. For example, 
Wanbao invested a large amount of money – a considerable percentage of that coming 
from national bank support – into the downstream value chain, such as building large-
scale processing lines and high-standard storage systems, even before reclaiming all 
the land allocated to them and thus without any corresponding productivity 
guaranteed. Furthermore, they even planned to build a ‘Wanbao city’ which, 
according to the plan (Interview, 19 Nov 2013), includes office buildings, staff 
accommodation, basketball courts, swimming pool and so on109, which seemed a bit 
too far-sighted for an agribusiness project and especially one that was still in its initial 
phase. The downstream as well as all the extra investment was so large that they later 
found inadequate capital to be put into the fundamental production activities, 
including paying salaries to workers, and therefore faced real financial and 
managerial problems. This seemingly unwise investment strategy, however, was 
adopted for the company’s other hidden agenda. They tried to expand the scale of the 
project – their first overseas farming project – as quickly and visibly as possible, in 																																																								
109 I myself visited to the site for the prospective ‘Wanbao city’ where many of the planned facilities 
were indeed already under construction.  
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order to enhance the company's reputation at home and, among other considerations, 
pave the way for the company to be listed on the stock exchange. Therefore, what was 
really the concern for the company in question, instead of developing agribusiness in 
Africa, was to serve the company’s own development strategy. Indeed, wisely 
enough, the company has seized the opportunity of government promotion of foreign 
agro-investment; otherwise it would be tremendously difficult for an agro-firm, 
particularly a private one, to raise enough money for foreign investment.  
 
In the earlier section, we pointed out some inherent flaws of the Chinese agricultural 
policy in Africa from a policy design point of view, namely the multi-objectives, lack 
of specificity, and inadequate consideration of local environment. That said, as 
already pointed out, we did not exclude the possibility of achieving desired policy 
outcomes, and instead still left some hope for the implementers who might be able to 
modify the policies through day-to-day practice and experience accumulation, that is 
through the execution of positive discretion from the front-line implementers 
(Chapter 1.5.2-II). 
 
Some very specific problems facing the ATDCs, for instance the training model and 
post-training application (Chapter 3.2), are understandably difficult for policymakers 
to fully foresee and take into account beforehand. They are instead easily observed 
once the project is put into practice and indeed not particularly difficult tasks for the 
implementers to solve through communication and collaboration with local partners. 
Turning to the investment cases, more discretion by the company implementers 
themselves is required to determine suitable investment strategies in order to run a 
successful business. The investment guidance from the government level is 
admittedly rather limited (and sometimes misleading) particularly considering the 
state interests and motives behind it, but agro-investment is, after all, a commercial 
activity that depends fundamentally on company decisions and operations. However, 
exactly because of the capability and motivation constraints of the implementers, as 
analysed earlier, the discretion that might possibly offset the flaws of the original 
policy design is also greatly limited.  
 
Lastly, multi-organizational cooperation is also an acute problem in the 
implementation of China’s agricultural development cooperation policy in Africa. As 
revealed earlier, actors of different types and from different administrative levels 
constitute a complex ‘implementation structure’. Most important among these are 
government agencies and corporate actors. These are supposed to work in tandem 
with each other both as seen in the quasi-PPP model for the ATDC aid project and the 
state-led agro-investment initiatives. While corporate actors play a leading role on the 
front lines, the government agencies are supposed to play a supportive role when 
necessary. In reality, however, the government supportive role is more visible in the 
pre-implementation phase, such as chairing negotiation with African partners and 
helping channel finance for companies, but once the projects are started, the 
government side has seemed to take a rather hands-off attitude. 
 
This is particularly evident when the front-line companies encounter problems in their 
daily operation, such as the land protests against Wanbao and the discontentment of 
local partners as seen in the case of the Mozambican ATDC. The companies involved 
in these cases turned out to be in a rather helpless situation, especially given their 
general incapability as analysed earlier. Reasons for this lack of cooperation are 
	 144	
mutual. From the Chinese government point of view, they tend to regard the daily 
operation, including problems arising in this process, as solely the responsibility of 
the companies. They themselves are more a governor or supervisor rather than partner 
of the companies, and hence present only in diplomatic occasions such as 
accompanying local African politicians to visit the project sites or the annual 
inspection of projects. On the other hand, the companies either in the ATDC or 
investment projects, when interviewed as to why they did not seek help from the 
government in face of difficulties, expressed their hesitance in doing so given the 
complexity of dealing with government relations, explaining, for instance, that they 
often gained more criticism and pressure (for example, on their incapability and slow 
progress) rather than any constructive advices or actual help. This is the case for both 
the relevant government agencies back in China and the overseas government 
branches in the African countries. Because of this, the companies would rather act on 
their own instead of creating more trouble for themselves.  
5.2.3 Environment 
Environment here is defined as the setting/context wherein the implementation takes 
place, and that could possibly exert some influence/constraints on the implementation 
process, or, the implementers’ behaviours. For an analytical purpose, the 
implementation environment can be further differentiated between static environment 
factors such as natural, political, economic, social, cultural conditions, and dynamic 
environment factors which involve actions and interactions among different actors 
(Chapter 1.5.2-III).  
 
Examples of constraints imposed by static environment are many. For instance, as 
seen in the cases of the ATDCs, although the technology training per se went quite 
well, the absence of production conditions for local farmers (e.g. infrastructure, tools) 
and the different farming culture can make the aimed technology transfer a rather vain 
effort. The local environmental constraints are even more obvious for agro-investment. 
Factors such as the lack of infrastructure, the shortage of skilled workers, the 
existence of many long-standing foreign traders, and the complicated land issues, all 
make conducting agribusiness in Africa an extremely challenging enterprise.  
 
Given the ‘static’ nature – that is, relatively stable within a certain period – of this 
type of environment, in theory it could be possibly taken into consideration either 
beforehand by the policymakers or later on by the implementers, and therefore the 
negative effect could to different extents be lessened. However, some prevailing 
notions (e.g. ‘self-orientation’, yiwo weizhu) and habitual practice (e.g. taking things 
for granted without proper prior survey) in Chinese engagement with Africa, not only 
in terms of agriculture, have made it difficult to avoid this sort of problem.  
 
The constraints imposed by dynamic environment tend to be more proactive, and also 
more challenging to the implementers. For instance, in the case of the Mozambican 
ATDC, politics played out between the two local governmental agencies, the MINAG 
and the MCT (Chapter 3.2.1). Both wanted to be the local partner of the Chinese 
ATDC for their own interests. The MINAG, given its expertise in agriculture, seemed 
to be the natural choice and indeed participated a lot in the initial stage and even the 
land of the ATDC was provided by IIAM, the MINAG-affiliated research institute. 
However, in the end, for unclear reasons, MCT won out and became the formal 
partner of the ATDC, which inevitably left some resentment between the two 
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ministries over the ATDC issue. The Chinese side, however, knew little about this, 
only to find the arrangement quite inconvenient because the centre had more direct 
relevance with MINAG that is also more powerful on many matters. What 
compounded the situation is that after the three-year Technical Cooperation Stage, the 
Mozambican government decided to transfer the centre to the MINAG with whom the 
ATDC had not directly worked. The MINAG took a rather strict attitude towards the 
ATDC, expressing discontentment about the centre and once insisting on taking over 
the chair of the ATDC director, which caused considerable, and entirely unexpected, 
trouble to the Chinese side (Interview, 19 Oct 2015). 
 
A similar case can also be seen in the land conflicts encountered by Wanbao, the 
private Chinese agro-firm operating in Mozambique. The farmer protest against 
Wanbao over the land controversy was organized by FONGA (Chapter 4.2.1), a local 
NGO which had constantly targeted and criticized, and thus had a high level of 
tension with the government. As revealed by the NGO director, even FONGA itself 
didn’t think it was the Chinese company to blame, but rather, their own government. 
They organized the protest more as a weapon to attack and pressure the government. 
They would even have liked to ‘talk and cooperate’ with Wanbao on the issue. 
However, in effect, while the government had largely ignored the situation, 
dismissing it largely only a ‘routine trouble’ made by its ‘old friend’, Wanbao, on the 
other hand, was directly affected both in terms of disrupting its normal production 
activity and harming the company's image. 
 
In these two cases, certain similar trends appeared. Politics was playing out among the 
local countries’ internal actors within which the Chinese could possibly play a role, 
but by and large were side-lined except for the direct negative effects imposed on 
them. It is admittedly quite a challenge for any foreigners/outsiders to be fully aware 
of and further able to manipulate such domestic and internal dynamics. However, that 
doesn’t mean there is no room for any action at all, especially when their interests are 
directly affected. As seen in practice, however, the Chinese actors appeared to behave 
rather passively, and more importantly, not well equipped to actively engage and 
effectively deal with such situations. For instance, they couldn’t be able to find a good 
negotiator or even a qualified translator from their team to talk with their partners, not 
to say their quite limited knowledge of the actual situations and complex dynamics 
that were going on.  
 
We have by now examined the three aspects–policy, implementers, and environment–
that contribute to explain the ‘gap’ between the expectations and actual results so far 
of Chinese agricultural development cooperation policy in Africa. To sum up, three 
points are to be raised here. First, it is worth highlighting that all the abovementioned 
variables as well as the sub-variables cannot be separated in making a sound 
explanation. For example, a policy with multiple or even competing objectives does 
not necessarily mean that the aims cannot be attained, if the action plans can possibly 
be designed in a more delicate way. The relative ambiguity and lack of specificity as 
of certain policy action plans does not necessarily lead to an implementation failure 
because the field implementers may well conceive of more workable schemes and 
thus well make up the design flaws of the policymakers. The extent of the discretion 
exerted in that sense, however, will strongly depend on the capability and motivation 
of the implementers involved. And discretion has to be dealt with rather carefully for 
it may produce undesired results if no proper policy control is in place. However, 
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even the most competent and motivated implementers surely won’t succeed without 
effective collaboration with one another given the often multi-organizational nature 
of the implementation process. Implementation environment has an inevitable shaping 
effect on the implementation process, thus the policymakers should bear that in mind 
during policy design, and also the implementers need to take them into careful 
consideration in their daily practice. Moreover, there is a higher requirement for the 
implementers to achieve successful interactions with local partners and even to create 
a favourable environment, which, again, will have to depend back on the capability, 
motivation, discretion and cooperation of the implementers. In a nutshell, none of 
these factors alone could fully explain the implementation problem; instead, the 
problem has to be explained through the synergetic effects of all the relevant factors 
identified. This is clearly shown in the case of Chinese agro-development cooperation 
in Africa, where neither the immature policy per se, nor the incompetent 
implementers, or the unfavourable environment is to blame; it is rather the 
imperfection of all these three key aspects existing and working together that makes it 
difficult to achieve satisfactory policy outcomes. 
 
Second, having emphasized the ‘synergetic effects’ of different factors and indeed as 
already demonstrated in the analysis above, we could see a (potentially) much greater 
role of the ‘implementer’ element. Good policy may not be translated to satisfactory 
results as expected without qualified and motivated implementers present; on the 
other hand, well-equipped and effectively stimulated implementers can cope even 
under certain policy vacuum or evident policy imperfections. The same logic works 
also in the implementer-environment interactions where the implementers often have 
a great role to play in connecting, adapting and utilizing the given environment in 
order to gain the most from it, even it may not seem, at first glance, very favourable 
(and indeed quite often so) to the policy implementation. In short, the exertion of 
(positive) discretion and agency by implementers may well offset some of the adverse 
policy or environment constraints, which thus gives the former a greater weigh in the 
‘policy-implementer-environment’ explanatory triangle. In this vein, at the current 
stage when SAEs are generally better qualified than many (not all) private agro-firms 
in China and also (comparatively) more closely aligned to Chinese government’s 
intentions, it might be helpful to engage more of Chinese SAEs in the process of agro-
development cooperation with African countries, and gradually extend to more 
private ones, in order to reduce the ‘capability and motivation’ risk of the latter and 
better serve the ‘mutual development’ aims. 
 
Last, in spite of all these abovementioned challenges that can be observed from 
different aspects and levels, it is still too early to give any ‘final evaluation’ to the 
Chinese ‘package’ model of development cooperation. As already noted, China’s 
development cooperation policy, instead of being a deliberately devised and read-
made one, is more a policy-in-the-making and meanwhile put into real-life 
experiment – something that is typically seen in many areas of China’s domestic 
policies, especially for new policies. Problems and challenges, therefore, are just 
normal and could be largely regarded acceptable as long as constant reflection and 
quick learning is involved (though it is worth a further research on whether this is 
present for China’s agro-cooperation policy in Africa). Furthermore, the problems 
observed are also largely ‘solvable’, particularly on the policy (e.g. through better 
policy design) and implementer level (e.g. through choosing more SAEs at the current 
stage as noted earlier). 
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Concluding Remarks 
With an intent to further the current research on the so-called ‘emerging donors’ and 
especially the Southern development partners, this thesis has chosen China as an 
example and investigated in depth the Chinese ‘package model’ through the case of 
its agricultural development cooperation policy and practice in Africa. In writing this 
thesis, I have made intentional efforts in three regards in order to overcome some of 
the limitations of the existing literature and thus help complement and enrich the on-
going debate on the topic. 
 
First, the thesis has added in a historical dimension so as to examine how China’s 
contemporary development cooperation model which features a strong ‘mutual-
development’ mentality and more flexible cooperation modalities has come into 
being. It argues that China’s own identity (as a developing country) and experiences 
(as an aid recipient) over the past decades have played a significant role in shaping its 
current development cooperation model, and thus balances, to certain extent, the oft-
seen ‘DAC/Northern-centric’ tendency of many in observing, judging and sometimes 
trying to assimilate the Chinese/Southern model(s). Second, the thesis has given an in-
depth treatment to the ‘development package’ model that, as seen in the case of 
Chinese agricultural cooperation with Africa, comprises not only traditional, more 
ODA-like aid forms but also those that entail evident commercial elements, and 
compared that with the emerging trend of ‘development PPP’ in the Northern DAC 
community. It thus enriches the research on Southern development partners and that 
on development cooperation in general which both tend to focus almost exclusively 
on ODA. Third, the thesis has filled the gap of lack of empirical evidence in the 
existing literature by incorporating more project-level, fieldwork-based case studies 
on the Chinese/Southern development cooperation model(s). By doing so, the thesis 
also points out a series of practical problems in the implementation phase that 
otherwise may not be identified, and more importantly provides a systematic 
explanation for that ‘implementation gap’. It thus helps to reflect on the actual results 
and possible modification measures of the Chinese/Southern development 
cooperation policies110. 
 
From a theoretical perspective, furthermore, in order to explain the abovementioned 
implementation challenges, this thesis has adopted the ‘Public Policy Implementation 
(PPI)’ approach and established an analytical framework based on a ‘dialogue’ 
between the theoretical literature and the empirical data. It has thus found that three 
aspects – namely the policy per se that structures the implementation process, the 
policy implementer who are formally or informally mandated to carry out the policy, 
and the implementation environment wherein the policy is executed – have played a 
crucial and synergic role in accounting for the observed ‘implementation gap’ of 
Chinese agricultural cooperation policy in Africa. Moreover, although this analytical 
framework developed in this thesis is largely specific to the agricultural case, the 
problems revealed through applying this framework are not uncommon in the broader 																																																								
110 This is important for the current academic community on China-Africa development cooperation 
and the bilateral relations in general has seemed to be overwhelmingly focused on the pledges of the 
Chinese government, either in terms of policy statements or policy measures, and tended to 
prematurely draw conclusions on the “possible” implications to Africa. Few have clearly pointed out 
the challenges for the Chinese government to deliver its pledges (c.f. Alden and Large, 2011) and even 
fewer have clearly pointed out policy slippage/deficiency and explored the reasons behind that. 
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practice of Chinese contemporary development cooperation or other types of 
engagement with the continent – such as the deficiency of policy design, lack of 
policy control, incapability of policy implementers, inadequate cooperation and 
coordination among different implementers, and the general lack of knowledge and 
experience of operating in the African environment. Therefore, the ‘policy-
implementer-environment’ framework may also serve as a useful analytical tool for 
analysing China’s development and foreign policy implementation in other fields in 
Africa and explaining the implementation results. 
 
There are a number of limitations of this thesis: primarily the limited number of cases 
due to the constraints of time and research resources, and the preliminary status in 
terms of the ‘policy evaluation’ given the still short implementation time of the policy 
in question. Also, while it is outside the scope of this thesis, it is quite necessary to 
explore more also from the recipients’ perspective as to the execution and impacts of 
the Chinese model of agricultural development cooperation; for instance, not only the 
feedback from the Mozambican stakeholders in terms of specific projects as already 
included in this thesis, but also their attitudes towards this mixed combination of 
cooperation modalities in general. Particularly, the more I work on this ‘development 
cooperation’ issue, the more I find research on development cooperation – both that 
of Northern donors and Southern development partners and including this present 
work as well – needs to link more closely to the recipient countries’ home-grown 
(overall and sectorial) development strategies and policies. Indeed, the lesson has 
already been learned, given the less satisfactory results of the ODA practice over the 
past decades, that development partners should encourage the recipients to exert 
‘ownership’ in designing and steering the countries’ development, and align the 
development cooperation efforts to the latter. Accordingly, in academia circles, 
perhaps more research is needed on how and how well the development cooperation 
models, be that of the Northern or Southern partners, have fit into the recipient 
countries’ own development plans – if there are any (and imperatively, which are 
driven by real and strong political will); if not, how the development partners could 
assist the recipients to work out proper, country-specific development plans (but not 
through imposing any prescriptions), which is the core of achieving real development 
progress and the prerequisite for any effective development cooperation as well. 
 
To conclude, despite a number of practical challenges for now as have been identified 
earlier (Chapter 5.2), the Chinese way of conducting development cooperation still 
bears large potential to serve the developmental objectives of less developed 
countries, and to become a useful alternative or complementary approach to 
international development cooperation. In the first place, by highlighting ‘mutual 
development’ (and accordingly the application of ‘development package’), the 
Chinese (or more broadly, the Southern) approach may well address the underlying 
‘incentive’ problem that is vital for both development partner governments and 
private sector actors. After all, we may have to admit that development cooperation or 
foreign aid is more often than not influenced by partner countries’ national interests – 
though moral/altruistic or ideological factors do also play a role and sometimes quite 
remarkably. Part of the reasons for the so-called ‘donor fatigue’ among the OECD-
DAC community in the 1990s, for instance, can surely be attributed to the end of Cold 
War whereby a significant political/strategic ‘incentive’ of aid suddenly withdrew 
from the stage. The more recent proposal by the Trump Administration, in line with 
its ‘America First’ belief, to cut the foreign aid budget (including the development 
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assistant account) by almost one third provides another example of the possible 
prospect of ODA when no or inadequate, direct ‘incentives’ are involved. If 
mobilizing state resources to assist other countries’ development is such difficult for 
advanced donors, the pressure of doing that for the Southern development partners 
can only be much greater in face of their own development tasks at home.  
 
The economic reciprocity entailed by the ‘mutual development’, therefore, provides at 
least one of possible ways that may help increase the enthusiasm and likelihood 
(given the public pressure) for governments to participate in external development 
cooperation, especially in a sustainable way. This is perhaps even more so for the 
private sector actors who are	 intrinsically self-interest and profit driven. In order to 
mobilize resources from a larger group of the private sector (not only the relatively 
few who are devoted to philanthropy) and on a larger scale, it is necessary to allow for 
certain degree of profits to the participant companies – as in the case of those Chinese 
firms who are engaged in the ‘development package’. Similar ‘win-win’ logic is also 
clearly incorporated in the Northern ‘development PPP’ scheme but as noted already, 
it might be more difficult for the advanced donors to realise this sort of 
‘transformation’ both due to their deeply-rooted, ODA-dominated mindset 
(sometimes compounded by certain moral superiority and influence of the colonial 
past) as well as their much better-off development status and identities as developed 
countries.  
 
Turning to the recipient end, furthermore, the Chinese way of development 
cooperation may well better serve those more urgent development needs of many less 
developed countries in Africa. One of the distinctive features of Chinese development 
cooperation is the prioritised focus on infrastructure and productive sector 
compounded by flexible financing package (grants, concessional loans and 
commercial loans). Having said that, this seemingly ‘Chinese characteristic’ in fact 
very much resembles what the Northern donors used to do in the earlier phase of their 
development cooperation in the 1950-60s when – in line with the then ‘structural 
transformation and economic growth’ approach to understanding ‘development’ – 
capital inflows were deemed very important and great emphasis was placed also to 
productive sectors and infrastructure building. As touched upon earlier, for varying 
reasons, the Northern donors later on shifted their focus increasingly to social sectors 
(e.g. health and education), micro-economic policies and ‘good governance’ from the 
1970s on, which are definitely important and necessary especially from a long-term 
perspective and to forge a more sustainable development. The problem, therefore, is 
not that these new focuses are wrong, but rather they have been over-emphasized to 
the extent that those more fundamental elements to the first-step economic growth or 
takeoff per se – precisely the roads, grids, agriculture, manufacturing, and perhaps 
most significantly, capital that could start all these off – are unfairly downplayed. 
 
Realities have thus shown limited economic progress especially in terms of structural 
transformation from agrarian to industrial societies in most of African states. It is 
surely not only the external development cooperation to blame, but it does prompt 
people to reflect on the use of the precious development cooperation or aid resources 
(for both the recipient and giving countries) – whether or not they have been put into 
the most urgently needed and potentially more productive areas. Or, given the fact 
that it may be sincerely difficult to gauge, qualitatively or quantitatively, which aspect 
(economic or social sectors) is more productive or needed – for instance, part of the 
	 150	
reasons for the oft-observed limited results of Northern ODA may lie in that the 
effects of the donor-focused capability building through health and educational 
investment in the past couple of decades will show up more evidently in the long run. 
In that sense, development partners may need to walk ‘on two legs’, assisting both in 
terms of economic growth and social (and political) development. China, given its 
current comparative advantage particularly in financing and infrastructure, may well 
act as a positive (and perfect) complement to the Northern aid – whilst the Chinese 
development cooperation may assist the recipients to seize the momentum of growth 
first, the Northern aid could help them to maintain that. There is no need, therefore, 
for either one to conform to the other, and in terms either of motives or modalities; the 
Northern donors and Southern development partners are offering different types of 
assistance that however are both imperative to the development of recipients, in the 
immediate and more distant future. 
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Appendixes 
Appendix 1. Classifications of Crops as Used in the Chinese Context 
Staple-food Crops Cash Crops 
Grains/ 
Cereals 
 
Beans 
 
Roots 
and 
Tubers 
Fibre 
Crops 
Oil Crops Sugar Crops Tropical 
Crops 
Others 
Rice, 
Wheat, 
Maize, 
etc. 
Soybean, 
Pea, 
mungbean 
etc. 
Potato, 
Sweet 
potato, 
Cassava, 
yam, etc. 
Cotton, 
etc. 
Soybean, 
Palm oil, 
etc. 
Sugarcane, 
Rape, etc. 
Rubber, 
Sisal, etc. 
Coffee, 
Tea, 
Tabaco, 
etc. 
Source: The author. 
Notes: This is a crop classification that is commonly used in the Chinese context, however it is not 
perfectly strict (for there may be some overlap between the two categories). Staple-food crops (liangshi 
zuowu), as defined by the Chinese government in its official documents, include mainly grains, beans, 
and root and tuber crops. Staple-food crops are used both for human food (kouliang, e.g. rice and wheat) 
and animal feed (siliaoliang, e.g. maize and soybeans). Cash crops (jingji zuowu) are those supposed to 
have more commercial value added, and can be used for both food and industrial purposes. Although 
cash crops can be used for food purposes, some, like oil and sugar crops, are quite indispensable – 
comparatively speaking, they are not imperative in food security terms. One of the tricky crop types for 
differentiation is soybean, which is treated more as an oil crop in China although the residue of it, the 
soybean meal, is also used as important animal feed. 
Appendix 2. China's Net Grain Imports by Crop (Unit: Million Tons) 
 
Source: The author based on data from Chinese Ministry of Agriculture. 
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Appendix 3. China's Grain Production (1993–2012) 
 
Source: The author based on data from the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture. 
Appendix 4. China's Grain Production and Self-sufficiency Rate (1993–2012)  
 
Source: The author based on data from the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture. 
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Appendix 5. Overseas Agro-projects of CNADC 
Company Project/Subsidiary Area Main Business Other Info 
AFRICA 
CSFAC China-Zambia Friendship Farm 
(Zambia, 1990) 
670 ha Crop farming (maize, soybean, 
wheat) 
 
Cocoa Factory 
(Ghana, 1996) 
N/A Cocoa producing, processing and 
trading 
Joint venture (China 45%, Ghana 55%); 
Not being operational since established and now 
looking for investors to take over 
Societe Sino-Guineenne Pour La 
Cooperation Dans Le Developpement 
Agricole S.A 
(Guinea, 1996) 
N/A Crop farming, animal husbandry, 
fishery, agro-processing and 
trading, technological consulting,  
Joint venture (China 80%, Guinea 20%);  
Used to be government agro-aid project and 
transferred to CSFAC to operate in 1998 
Cooperation Agrotechnique Gabon-
Chine (Gabon, 1998) 
300 ha Crop farming, animal husbandry, 
agro-processing 
Joint venture (China 75%, Gabon 25%) 
CSFAC Friendship Farm (Zambia, 
1999) 
2600 ha Animal husbandry, vegetable 
planting 
 
CAAIC Zhongken Industry 
(Zambia, 1994) 
3600 ha Crop farming (maize, wheat), 
animal husbandry 
Transferred from the CSFAC in 2010 
Tanzania Company 
(Tanzania, 1999) 
6900 ha Sisal planting and processing Transferred from the CSFAC in 2010 and using the 
Government Concessional Loans of the EXIM Bank  
CAAIC&Yuanshi Company 
(Madagascar, 2014) 
N/A Hybrid rice planting In cooperation with private Yuanshi company and the 
CADF of the CDB 
CAIDC ATDC (South Africa) N/A Freshwater aquaculture Government agro-aid projects 
ATDC (Benin) N/A Crop and animal farming 
Maize Co-research Project (Benin) N/A Hybrid maize planting 
Soil Improvement Project (Algeria)  N/A Soil improvement 
AUSTRALIA 
CSFAC Australia Company (1989) 30,000 ha Animal husbandry  
EASTERN EUROPE 
CAIDC Ukraine Company 2600 ha Crop farming (grains except for 
rice; soybeans and other oil crops) 
and diary farming 
 
Source: The author based on company websites and media reports.
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Appendix 6. Some of the Major M&A Deals by COFCO since 2011 
Year Investment Targets Value of M&A 
2011 Worldbest Biochemicals Cassava Processing Factory (Thailand) N/A 
2011 99% share of Tully Sugar Factory (Australia) 140 million 
Australian Dollar 
(Around 130 million 
USD) 
2014 51% share of Nidera (The Netherlands) 
Nidera: One of the major international agribusiness and trading companies. It 
specializes in supply-chain business, connecting commodity producers and 
users. Procures agro-products from farmers, merchandisers and processors in 
the major producing areas across the Americas, the Former Soviet Union, 
Europe and Australia, and sells to Europe, the Mediterranean basin, the 
Middle East and Asia. Wheat, maize and soybeans are among the main crop 
types that Nidera is handling. The company is also strong in some crop 
technology aspects and set up extensive storage and logistics networks in its 
partner countries. 
1.2 billion USD 
2014 51% share of Noble Agri (Singapore-listed) 
Noble Agri: One of the leading originators of grains and oilseeds, e.g. wheat, 
maize, barley, soybeans in South America. It is also a top crusher and 
distributor in the Middle East and Asia. The company also trades some key 
types of cash crops such as cotton, sugar, coffee and cocoa. 
1.5 billion USD 
Source: The author based on company websites and media reports. 
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Appendix 7. Agricultural Foreign Investments by Chinese Provincial State Farming Enterprises 
The 17 Reclamation Areas That Have Completed the Conglomeration Transformation 
Reclamation Area Farming Enterprise/ 
Group Corporation 
Investment 
Country 
Investment  
Field 
Other Investment Information 
Beijing 
(Municipality) 
Beijing Capital Agribusiness 
Group 
Australia Animal husbandry Purchased and managed local farms since 2010. 
Tianjin 
(Municipality) 
Tianjin State Farms 
Agribusiness Group 
Corporation 
 
Bulgaria Crop farming 
Animal husbandry 
 
Purchased 100% equity of a local agribusiness firm 
including 3,400 ha of self-owned land, 5,700 ha of 
leased land and related equipment, storage and office 
facilities in 2014; planned to establish grain 
warehouses and processing factories in later phase. 
Shanghai 
(Municipality) 
Bright Food Group 
Corporation 
 
New Zealand, 
Australia,  
Dairy industry Conducted four transnational M&A deals since 2009, 
including Synlait Milk (New Zealand), Weetabix (the 
UK), Manassen (Australia) and DIVA (France). 
Chongqing 
(Municipality) 
Chongqing Agricultural 
Investment Group 
Corporation 
Sudan Crop farming  
(Alfalfa, an kind of 
animal feed) 
Gained access to 120,000 ha of land for Alfalfa 
farming as a way for Sudanese government to pay off 
its 20 million USD debts to Chinese companies. 
Heilongjiang 
(Province) 
Heilongjiang Beidahuang 
State Farms Agribusiness 
Group Corporation 
 
Russia, Brazil, 
Philippines,  
Crop farming 
(Soybeans, maize, 
wheat, rice, 
vegetables) 
Had invested 24 million USD to lease approx. 47,000 
ha of foreign land by 2009; the aim was to expand 
overseas land to 330,000 ha in the future. 
Jiangsu 
(Province) 
Jiangsu State Farms 
Agribusiness Group 
Corporation 
Zambia Crop farming 
(Grains and 
vegetables) 
Had managed four overseas farms in Zambia, with land 
area totalling about 2,300 ha since early 1990s. 
Anhui 
(Province) 
Anhui State Farms 
Agribusiness Group 
Corporation 
 
Zimbabwe Crop farming  
(Wheat, maize, 
soybeans, tobacco) 
Took over three overseas farms in Zimbabwe since 
2010, cultivating 5,000 ha of land by 2013; planned to 
expand to 50,000 ha in the second phase by 2015; 
investment volume approx. 240 billion USD. 
Shanxi ( ) 
(Province) 
Shanxi State Farms 
Agribusiness Group 
Corporation 
Cameroon  Crop farming 
(Rice, cassava)  
Animal husbandry 
(Ostrich) 
 
Gained access to 10,000 ha of virgin land in Cameron 
for reclamation and farming under a 90-year lease 
since 2006. 
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Source: 
The author based on company websites and media reports. 
Guangdong 
(Province) 
Guangdong Guangken 
Rubber Group Corporation 
Thailand, Malaysia, 
Singapore, 
Indonesia, 
Cambodia, 
Vietnam,  
Crop farming 
(Rubber) 
Owned approx. 45,000 ha of overseas rubber 
plantations in a number of Southeast Asian countries 
by 2013; developed integrated value chain from seed 
breeding, planting, processing to trade,  
Yunnan 
(Province) 
Yunnan Rubber Industry 
Group Corporation 
 
Laos, Myanmar,   
 
Crop farming 
(Rubber) 
Owned approx. 10,000 ha of overseas rubber plantation 
in Laos and Myanmar by 2011; developed integrated 
value chain including planting, processing, trade,  
Hainan 
(Province) 
Hainan Rubber Group 
Corporation 
 
 
Sierra Leone Crop farming 
(Rubber and Rice) 
Planned in 2012 to cultivate 100,000 ha of land for 
rubber planting and 35,000 ha for rice planting in 
Sierra Leone; planned to develop integrated value 
chain including planting, processing, trade,  
Guangxi 
(Province) 
Guangxi State Farms 
Agribusiness Group 
Corporation 
Indonesia, Vietnam, 
Myanmar,  
Crop Farming 
(Cassava) 
Had invested 200 million USD in several agricultural 
FDI projects, particularly in Southeast Asia by 2014. 
Others: Gansu, Ningxia, Guangzhou, Kunming, Nanjing 
The 17 Reclamation Areas That Have Not Undergone Conglomeration Transformation 
Xinjiang 
(Autonomous 
Region) 
Xinjiang Production and 
Construction Corps 
Ukraine, Angola Crop farming 
Animal husbandry 
Signed MOU in 2013 with Ukraine KSG Agribusiness 
firm to co-manage 100,000 ha of farmland on a 50-year 
lease, with capital input from the Chinese side totalling 
2.6 billion USD; invested 160 million USD in building 
overseas farms in Angola with total area of 13,000 ha. 
Inner Mongolia 
(Autonomous 
Region) 
Hailaer State Farms 
Agribusiness (Group) 
Corporation 
Russia Crop Farming 
(Rapeseeds, wheat, 
barley) 
Planned to invest 80 million USD in 100,000 ha of land 
under a 20-year lease in Russia, still in the discussion 
period by 2013. 
Hubei 
(Province) 
Lianfeng Overseas 
Agricultural Development 
Company 
Mozambique, 
Zimbabwe, 
Australia,  
Crop Farming 
Animal husbandry 
Had access to approx. 27,000 ha of overseas farms, 
with investment volume totalling over 130 million 
USD. 
Others: Liaoning, Jilin, Hubei, Henan, Shandong, Shanxi ( ), Zhejiang, Fujian, Hunan, Jiangxi, Sichuan, Guizhou, Qinghai 
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Appendix 8. Selected Examples of Chinese Private Overseas Agro-projects 
Fields Companies Countries Crop Types Investment Modalities 
Grains Muxue 
(Chongqing 
Municipality) 
Laos Grains, coffee, 
Chinese 
medicine,  
Farm plantation (approx. 
100,000 ha) and  
Wanbao 
(Hubei Province) 
Mozambique Rice Farm plantation (approx. 
20,000 ha) and preliminary 
processing  
Oils  Fudi  
(Zhejiang Province) 
 
Brazil Soybeans Farm plantation (approx. 
18,000 ha) 
Julong 
(Tianjin 
Municipality) 
Indonesia 
(Liberia, 
Cameroon, 
Ghana, Kenya in 
plan) 
Palm oil Farm plantation (approx. 
150,000 ha), processing, 
trade and logistics 
Huifu 
(Hebei province) 
Brazil, Argentina, 
Indonesia 
Soybeans, 
palm oil 
Farm plantation (approx. 
200,000 ha), trade and 
logistics 
Cotton Jinfang 
(Shandong Province) 
Zimbabwe Cotton Farm plantation (100 
million USD of investment 
value), processing,  
Rubber Gaoshen 
(Yunnan Province) 
Laos, Myanmar Rubber Farm plantation (approx. 
13,000 ha) and processing 
Source: The author based on company websites and media reports. 
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Appendix 9. Interviews111 
Interview with the former Chinese ambassador in Lawanda. Interviewed by Lu Jiang. 
Beijing, China. 23 Aug 2013.  
Interview with the Chinese Economic and Commercial Counsellor of the Embassy of the 
People's Republic of China in Mozambique. Interviewed by Lu Jiang. Maputo, 
Mozambique. 9 Oct 2013. 
Interview with the Chinese director A of the ATDC in Mozambique. Interviewed by Lu 
Jiang. Boane, Maputo province, Mozambique. 18 Oct 2013. 
Interview with a Chinese staff A working at the ATDC in Mozambique. Interviewed by 
Lu Jiang. Maputo, Mozambique. 4 Nov 2013-a. 
Interview with a Chinese staff B working at the ATDC in Mozambique. Interviewed by 
Lu Jiang. Boane, Maputo province, Mozambique. 4 Nov 2013-b. 
Interview with the Chinese director A of the ATDC in Mozambique. Interviewed by Lu 
Jiang. Boane, Maputo province, Mozambique. 8 Nov 2013-a. 
Interview with several Mozambican workers hired by the ATDC in Mozambique. 
Interviewed by Lu Jiang and Sérgio Chichava. Boane, Mozambique. 8 Nov 2013-b. 
Interview with a Mozambican staff working at the MCT. Interviewed by Lu Jiang and 
Sérgio Chichava. Maputo, Mozambique. 14 Nov 2013. 
Interview with two of Wanbao’s management team. Interviewed by Lu Jiang. Xaixai, 
Gaza province, Mozambique. 18 Nov 2013. 
Interview with a Chinese staff working for Wanbao. Interviewed by Lu Jiang. Xaixai, 
Gaza province, Mozambique. 19 Nov 2013-a. 
Interview with two Mozambican agro-technicians working for Wanbao. Interviewed by 
Lu Jiang. Xaixai, Gaza province, Mozambique. 19 Nov 2013-b. 
Interview with one of Wanbao’s management team. Interviewed by Lu Jiang. Xaixai, 
Gaza province, Mozambique. 19 Nov 2013-c. 
Interview with a Chinese staff working for Wanbao. Interviewed by Lu Jiang. Xaixai, 
Gaza province, Mozambique. 20 Nov 2013-a. 
Interview with a Chinese accountant assigned by CADFund to Wanbao. Interviewed by 
Lu Jiang. Xaixai, Gaza province, Mozambique. 20 Nov 2013-b. 
Interview with two of Wanbao’s management team. Interviewed by Lu Jiang. Xaixai, 
Gaza province, Mozambique. 20 Nov 2013-c. 
Interview with the director of FONGA. Interviewed by Lu Jiang. Xaixai, Gaza province, 
Mozambique. 21 Nov 2013-a. 
Interview with two of Wanbao’s management team. Interviewed by Lu Jiang. Xaixai, 
Gaza province, Mozambique. 21 Nov 2013-b. 
Interview with the chairman of the DPA Gaza. Interview by Lu Jiang and Idalêncio 
Sitoe. Xaixai, Gaza province, Mozambique. 22 Nov 2013. 
Interview with two female Mozambican farmers. Interview by Lu Jiang and Sérgio 
Chichava. Xaixai, Gaza province, Mozambique. 20 Dec 2013-a. 
Interview with the chairman of RBL-EP. Interview by Lu Jiang and Sérgio Chichava 
Xaixai, Gaza province, Mozambique. 20 Dec 2013-b. 
Interview with a staff working for CAAIC. Interviewed by Lu Jiang. Maputo, 
Mozambique, 7 Jan 2014. 
Interview with a Chinese working for a private Chinese agro-company in Mozambique. 
Interviewed by Lu Jiang. Maputo, Mozambique. 29 Dec 2014. 
Interview with a Chinese staff working at the ATDC in Mozambique. Interviewed by Lu 
Jiang. Boane, Maputo province, Mozambique. 29 Dec 2014. 																																																								
111 Only formal interviews included (see Methodology in Introduction). 
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Interview with the Chinese manager of CAAIC’s Mozambican project. Interviewed by 
Lu Jiang. Maputo, Mozambique. 10 Jan 2015. 
Interview with a Chinese staff working for Hefeng. Interviewed by Lu Jiang. Buzi, 
Sofala province, Mozambique. 14 Jan 2015. 
Interview with the farm director of Hefeng. Buzi, Sofala province, Mozambique.  15 Jan 
2015 
Interview with a Chinese staff working at the ATDC in South Africa. Interviewed by Lu 
Jiang and Angela Harding. Gariep Dam, Free State province, South Africa. 29 Jan 
2015. 
Interview with a Chinese staff A working at the ATDC in South Africa. Interviewed by 
Lu Jiang and Angela Harding. Gariep Dam, Free State province, South Africa. 30 Jan 
2015-a. 
Interview with a Chinese staff B working at the ATDC in South Africa. Interviewed by 
Lu Jiang and Angela Harding. Gariep Dam, Free State province, South Africa. 30 Jan 
2015-b. 
Interview with several South African farmers working at one of the six fish farms. 
Interviewed by Lu Jiang and Angela Harding. Gariep Dam, Free State province, 
South Africa. 30 Jan 2015-c. 
Interview with a Chinese staff working at the ATDC in South Africa. Interviewed by Lu 
Jiang. [By phone] London, UK. 8 Mar 2015. 
Interview with the Chinese director B of the ATDC in Mozambique. Interviewed by Lu 
Jiang. [By phone] London, UK. 19 Oct 2015. 
Interview with the Chinese director of the ATDC in Tanzania. Interviewed by Lu Jiang. 
[By phone] London, UK. 15 Nov 2015. 
Interview with the Chinese director B of the ATDC in Mozambique. Interviewed by Lu 
Jiang. Shanghai, China. 23 Jun 2017. 
 
